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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to enhance understanding of the way in which political 
connections benefit or impair connected firms. For this purpose, the current study employs 
the data of Pakistani listed non-financial firms from 2002–2010, and examines the impact of 
political connections on the economic life of individual firms. More specifically, this thesis 
comprises three empirical studies: the first enquires into the way in which political 
connectedness influences firms’ access to finance; the second empirical chapter examines the 
impact of political connections on the performance of the connected firms; and lastly, the 
third empirical chapter explores the channels through which connected politicians intervene 
in business operations.  
The findings in the first empirical chapter provide strong and robust evidence of preferential 
lending in the credit market. Political connectedness appears to be a determining factor of the 
total and long-term leverage of the firms; nevertheless, short-term financing is indifferent to 
political connections. The study also finds that having connections with a winning politician 
or politician affiliated to the winning parties (coalition) have a larger impact on the firm’s 
total and long-term leverage, thus implying that the benefits associated with political 
connections ultimately depend on electoral outcomes. In addition, firm size and business 
group affiliation have increasing effect on the borrowing capabilities of the connected firms, 
whilst connections underplay the significance of collateral.  
Through the use of an instrumental variable framework focused on the long-term panel and 
cross-sectional data of Pakistani listed firms, the second empirical chapter finds that political 
connections distort the performance of the connected firms. Consistent results are found for 
various accounting and marketing measures of performance. So as to investigate the impact 
of connectedness on performance in different political environments, the sample period is 
stratified into two contrasting government periods: autocratic; and democratic government 
periods. The result is more pronounced in the autocratic regime, providing evidence of 
excessive managerial inefficiencies and rent-extraction of affiliated politicians in dictatorship 
regime. It was also found that the performance of connected firms increased further if they 
belonged to business groups, whilst the large firms were subject to severe performance 
distortions more so than small firms. Finally, those firms with low growth opportunities were 
more prone to the negative effects of political connectedness in terms of their performances. 
The findings in the second empirical chapter (connections insert negative effect on the firm 
performance) inspired us to progress one step further and investigate the intriguing question: 
what are the channels through which politicians interfere and distort the performance of the 
connected firms? In quest to answer this question, the last empirical chapter provides strong 
and robust evidence of political intervention in the investment and employment decisions. 
More specifically, results find the existence of investment inefficiencies and excessive 
employment in the connected firms. Importantly, the effect of political interference is more 
pronounced for employment decisions, indicating the presence of clientelism in the Pakistani 
market, where politicians distribute job favours in exchange of electoral support. The study 
also reveals that connected firms with high growth opportunities experience political 
interference less often than their peers with low growth opportunities. Lastly, the economic 
cost of such political intervention in employment decisions is estimated to be 0.15% GDP 
annually.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the framework of the thesis. It begins with the 
background information and rationale for the research. The aims and objectives of this study 
are discussed in the next section, followed by the contribution of the research. Finally, the 
structure of the thesis is illustrated in the last section.  
 
1.2 Research background and rationale 
Government policies often have significant effects on the firm’s value. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the firms have adopted several strategies to cultivate the relationship with 
government officials. Such strategies may include campaign contributions, lobbying efforts, 
and engaging politicians to serve on their Board of directors (Houston et al., 2012). In recent 
years, an increasing trend of such practices has been noticed. Kang & Zhang (2011) reveal 
that 31.5% of their sample firms had politically connected directors in 1990; this number 
increased to 54.5% in 2007. Similarly, USA Today reports an upsurge in political 
connectedness amongst Fortune 1000 firms, which has risen from 39% in 1992 to 55% in 
2000 (Houston et al., 2012).  
 
The outbreak of the most severe East Asian financial crises of the late 1990s has instigated an 
investigation into the effects of political connections on corporate economic outcomes. The 
aspect that has been amply borne from the nascent literature is the distinction between the 
relationship-based financial system prevalent in many developing countries, as well as the 
arm’s-length financial system that generally characterises developed economies (Charumilind 
et al., 2006). Although the phenomenon of political connection is pertinent to countries all 
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around the world, it remains widely argued that the prevalence of political connection is 
considerably higher amongst developing countries with relationship-based financial system 
(Desai & Olofgard, 2011). In developed countries with well-functioning financial systems 
connections complement formal contracts to make deals work smoothly; however, where 
enforcement of law is weak, informal relationships can serve as a substitute in facilitating the 
deals to be made (McMillan & Woodruff, 1999). Fundamentally, reliance on political 
connections stems from inadequacies in formal institutions that make arm’s-length 
contracting unreliable; therefore, in economies with weak institutions, where politicians have 
enormous discretion or not much accountability, connections to those in power are more 
valuable for firms. 
 
In fact, firms with close connections with politically connected individuals gain favours that 
have large economic value. A growing body of literature documents such economic benefits 
as the outcomes of political connections. For instance, in a seminal study, Fisman (2001) 
found that the value of those firms connected to the President Suharto’s family in Indonesia 
dropped at the time of the dissemination of the news of the President’s bad health. In an 
illustration of political influence from the seniority system in the US Senate, Roberts (1990) 
showed that the sudden death of Senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson in 1983 caused an abnormal 
drop in the stock returns of firms contributing to his re-election campaign. Noticeably, at the 
same time, firms connected to his successor as ranking member of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, Senator Sam Nunn, witnessed an unanticipated rise in stock returns. Similarly, 
Jayachandran (2006) documents the announcement effects of Senator Jim Jeffords’ decision 
to leave the Republican Party in 2001 on firm performance: in a result of this move, the 
control of the US Senate was tipped from Republicans to Democrats. The study finds that this 
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particular decision resulted in an almost 1% decline in the market value of firms that 
contributed to the Republicans. 
 
In developing markets, the most prevailing manifestation of political connectedness is 
preferential bank loan, characterised as a higher debt ratio and a lower interest rate. This 
notion is supported by several empirical evidences. Indeed, Charumilind et al. (2006) find 
that political connections are, by far, the most important determinant explaining firms’ long-
term leverage in Thailand. In a cross-country study, using firm-level connections to 
politicians and ex-politicians as a proxy of political connectedness, Faccio (2006) examines 
the degree of firm leverage amongst connected firms. Results indicate that connected firms 
make greater use of leverage than their non-connected counterparts. This pattern is more 
pronounced in the context of developing markets. Finally, Claessens et al., (2008) bring to 
light preferential lending as a possible channel politicians utilise to repay firms’ 
contributions. Their results show that connections induce strong positive impacts on bank 
leverage during the years following the federal deputy election. From a theoretical 
perspective, the positive impact of connections on the firm leverage somewhat challenges the 
view of Trade-off theory, which is known to reflect the influences of taxes and costs of 
financial distress. More specifically, it suggests that the optimal debt–equity ratio of a firm is 
determined by balancing the benefits of the tax deductibility of interest payments against 
bankruptcy costs; however, the cheap credit to connected firms indeed decreases the expected 
cost of financial distress, thereby influencing the debt–equity balance. Likewise, the easy 
accessible credit to connected firms entices managers to use higher leverage, which 
fundamentally contradicts the suggestion of Pecking order theory (internal capital would be 
preferred over leverage). 
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In a sharp contrast, there are various studies depicting the inverse or complete lack of 
relationship between political connections and leverage: for instance, Bunkanwanicha 
&Wiwattanakantang (2009) do not observe the preferential access of financing for Thai 
connected firms. Indeed, the connected firms are found to use leverage equivalent to 
benchmark non-connected firms. Similarly, consistent with this view, Dombrovsky (2008) 
finds no effect of politicians’ strength on the preferential credit of the connected firms. Taken 
together, in view of such conflicting arguments, the relation between firms’ financing 
decision and their political connections is ultimately an empirical question. 
 
Similarly, the view that political connections insert positive impact on performance of the 
connected firms is also considered as contentious amongst researchers. The existing empirical 
evidence acknowledges both positive and negative returns to political connections in terms of 
corporate profitability. Considering the positive impact, there are a number of reasons as to 
why politically connected firms might show superior performance to their non-connected 
counterparts. Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, the preferential access to credit leads to a 
competitive advantage for a firm, and thereby maybe translated into better performance 
(Faccio, 2006; Li et al., 2008). Secondly, politicians are commonly outsiders to the corporate 
world, and thus may prove beneficial to the firm by providing an independent view that 
eventually positively affects firm performance (Niessen & Ruenzi, 2010). Thirdly, politicians 
are generally better informed about the imminent economic policies, with such insight 
potentially having positive impacts on firm performance. In contrast, studies advocating the 
negative relationship between political connections and firm performance argue that a 
politically connected Board does not have managerial incentives to maximise shareholders’ 
wealth and improve overall firm performance (Boubakri et al., 2008; Faccio, 2010). 
Furthermore, other studies, such as that by Dewenter et al. (1997), suggest that politically 
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connected firms forgo maximum profit in the pursuit of social and political objectives. It 
follows from provided evidences that whether connected firms are more or less efficient than 
firms without such connections is primarily an empirical issue. 
 
Despite the volume of research centred on the role of political capital in developing 
economies, relatively little is known about the precise form firm-level political influence 
takes or its outcomes. Contemporary scholarship views one side of the relationship, and 
examines the way in which firms benefit from political connections; however, the detrimental 
effects of political connections on firms are largely ignored in the research agenda. The only 
notable empirical work dealing with this issue is that by Chen et al. (2011), who argue that 
political intervention distorts a firm’s investment behaviour and ultimately results in 
investment inefficiency; however, the work does not consider other channels of political 
intervention that may also lead to corporate operational inefficiencies. Thus, there is a strong 
need to investigate such alternative channels through which politicians may intervene and 
influence the business operational efficiencies. 
 
Throughout the course of this thesis, this line of inquiry is pursued further by investigating 
both the financial benefits that political connections may offer, as well as the effects of those 
connections on firm operational efficiencies and performance. The study is conducted using 
data from Pakistan, which offers a unique research setting for the study of the nexus between 
business and politicians, and its possible implications for business decisions. First, politics in 
Pakistan has been linked closely to clientelism, rent-seeking, and corruption. This is evident 
from the Index of Economic Freedom, co-published by The Heritage Foundation and the 
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Wall Street Journal1. The index consistently ranked Pakistan as one of the most corrupt 
countries in the world. During the past decade and a half, three elected prime ministers and 
their respective assemblies were dissolved on identical charges of maladministration, 
corruption, and political patronage; such a circumstance reflects clearly the widespread extent 
of political corruption in the economy, which also has a significant impact on firm behaviour. 
Given the weak legal system and the higher extent of corruption, the value of political 
connections is likely to be greater in Pakistan than in other countries on the similar stage of 
development (Khwaja & Mian, 2005). 
 
A second important reason for the focus directed towards Pakistan lies in the diversity of 
data. Earlier studies from developing economies have taken political patronage in a limited 
sense, where corporate political benefits can be extracted by affiliating with a single powerful 
politician (i.e. Suharto in Indonesia and Mahathir in Malaysia). On the contrary, in Pakistan 
many politicians can benefit their affiliated firms. This is owing to the fact that the political 
system in Pakistan is mainly dominated by several influential families which are recognised 
as having economic incentives to remain in politics. In addition, the ability to extract the 
political benefits varies depending on the political strength of a politician. In this regard, 
Pakistan offers useful variation in terms of the type of political connections that can be used 
to examine this phenomenon. 
 
Third and finally, during last decade, Pakistan undertook drastic steps to curb political 
corruption. A new law stipulated that public officials must declare their assets. Moreover, the 
National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) was introduced in 2002 with the aim of 
                                               
1
 Recently, in year 2009, Pakistan is ranked 139th out of the 180 countries featured in the index. More details 
are available athttp://www.heritage.org/index/freedom-from-corruption 
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eliminating corruption from the political system. Nevertheless, a number of sceptics have 
since questioned the efficiency of such initiatives, as the accountability process is obstructed 
in several ways, such as through a constitutionary bill introduced to exempt judiciary and 
armed forces from accountability, and the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) that 
granted amnesty mainly to politicians that were accused of corruption and embezzlement. 
Therefore, whether or not connected firms in Pakistan indeed benefit from political favours 
under the reformed period remains an open question. 
 
1.3 Objectives of the study 
Attracted by the anecdotal evidence on the nexus between business and politicians, a 
burgeoning recent literature investigates the phenomenon of political patronage in countries 
around the world. Importantly, politicians have been known to form close affiliations with 
businessmen through conferring favours, which commonly adopts the form of contract 
rewards, privileges enshrined in regulatory conditions, and access to financial resources. 
Subsequently, large numbers of studies have documented that political ties grant preferential 
access to financing, which ultimately improves firm performance2.Nevertheless, an opposite 
view is held, which emphasises that political connections cause inefficiency, just as any other 
preferential or merely distinctive treatment of some agents, which subsequently averts 
efficient equilibrium outcomes (Fan et al., 2007). Following such contradictory evidences on 
the implications of political connections, it is worth examining further the economic 
consequences of such relationships. Moreover, the specific nature of political patronage 
varies from country to country depending on its institutional, political and regulatory 
environment (Desai &Olofgard, 2011); therefore, it is of great interest that the business–
                                               
2
 Detailed review of this literature is provided in the chapter 2.  
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politics relationship be studied in the context of Pakistan where socio-economic facets are 
similar to other developing countries, albeit some context-specific political characteristics. 
 
From the above, it is safe to assume that political connections have positive influence on firm 
performance (e.g. Niessen & Ruenzi, 2010; Li et al., 2009). Considering the complexities 
inherent in the business–politician nexus, the study belongs to a rare cohort which questions 
the above assumption by witnessing inverse relationship where existing political connections 
have led to poor firm performance. Consequently, taking one step further, the researcher 
seeks to draw possible antecedents for the underperformance of connected firms by 
examining the mechanism of political interventions in business operations, ultimately leading 
to operational inefficiencies and poor performance. 
 
Specifically, the main objectives of this study are as follows: 
1. To investigate whether or not political connections facilitate connected firms in terms 
of accessing leverage. 
2. To analyse the impacts of political connections on firm performance. 
3. To investigate the channels through which politicians may influence the business 
operational efficiencies.  
 
1.4 Contributions to the body of knowledge 
This research focuses on the aforementioned objectives, which are driven mainly by the gaps 
in contemporary research and the practical importance of the issues addressed. Hence, in 
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order to achieve the goals of study, three independent empirical studies have been conducted; 
thus, it seems logical to highlight the contributions respectively.3 
 
Theoretical Contributions 
Focusing on the first analysis (Chapter Four), the study contributes to the capital structure 
theories by identifying one of the idiosyncratic firm level facets that has received very limited 
attention in the earlier literature (e.g. Frank & Goyal, 2009; Walsh & Ryan, 1997)—that of 
corporate political connection. In particular, the study reveals that firms with political 
connections may evade financing frictions owing to privileged treatment from government-
owned enterprises, mainly banks. Consequently, these firms do not necessitate physical assets 
as collateral to overcome the problems—mainly information asymmetry―inherent in the 
credit market. Thus, the predictions of Trade-off and Pecking order theories in regard to 
tangible assets do not precisely hold for politically connected firms4. In addition, considering 
the privileged treatment in the credit market, the ease of access to credit allure connected 
firms to maintain high leverage that contends the proposed financing hierarchy of Pecking 
order theory. When considered together, by reviewing political connection as a determining 
factor of firms’ financial decision, this study extends the Trade-off and Pecking order theories 
into the political strategy field. 
 
Subsequently, whilst investigating the impact of political connections on firm performance, 
the next study (Chapter Five) adds to the Agency theory in the field of corporate governance. 
                                               
3
 Additional details on the contributions of each study are also provided in the respective empirical chapters.  
4
 Trade-off theory indicates that the firms utilize physical assets as collateral to provide lenders with security in 
the event of financial distress. Similarly, Pecking order theory also predicts a positive relationship between 
collateral and leverage, and asserts that physical assets as collateral reduces the information asymmetry between 
firm and lender. 
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Results demonstrate that politicians exacerbate the agency problems by coercing management 
to engage in self-interested actions that protect their interests, thus deteriorating firm 
performance. Importantly, this is the first investigation of its kind to find political 
environmental context (democracy or autocracy) does matter to the intensity of agency 
problems that ultimately affects firm performance. As a whole, the study emphasises the 
importance of understanding the role of firm political connectedness in examining agency 
problems, specifically from an institutional perspective, previously unexplored in Agency 
theory, which ultimately impacts the firm performance. 
 
Finally, the last part of the thesis (Chapter Six) also embarks on The Agency theory by 
explicating the mechanism through which political connectedness affects firms’ economic 
decisions. More specifically, the study demonstrates investment inefficiencies and excessive 
employment as channels through which politicians intervene in business operations, which 
ultimately averts the firms from making optimal decisions. By showing political intervention 
acting as another friction that increases agency costs for connected firms, this study adds 
another dimension to understanding of Agency theory. On a related note, the examination of 
more than one channel of political interference—as a source of agency problem—has not 
been investigated in prior research. Furthermore, this study also contributes to the corporate 
investment literature based mainly on standard corporate finance theories, such as Trade-off, 
Pecking order, and Agency cost theories (Heinkel, 1982; Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999; 
Hoshi et al., 1991). However, we find that political forces play a significant role in the 
investment decisions of the firms; thus, the political aspect warrants inclusion whilst 
examining corporate investment behaviour. 
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Empirical Contribution 
The first study (Chapter Four) contributes to empirical literature in two main ways. Firstly, it 
aims to extend research on the effects of political connections (e.g. Braggion & Moore, 2011; 
Boubakri et al., 2008; Faccio, 2006) through providing empirical evidence that political 
connectedness helps in accessing external finance. In doing so, the study contributes uniquely 
to the literature by considering the debt maturity structure, and by further examining the 
effectiveness of political connections in accessing short-term and long-term debt, each 
separately. Additionally, the study takes a step further and conducts a series of tests with the 
objective to show that the results vary across the strength of affiliated political figures. More 
directly, it examines empirically whether privileged access to finance is dependent on the 
electoral outcome for connected politician. The second contribution of the study lies in the 
investigation of whether the standard firm-specific determinants of leverage—known to be 
associated with financing decision—hold any significance for politically connected firms. 
Henceforth, we empirically test that the predictions of traditional theories on the firm-specific 
determinants of leverage may alter due to firm-level political influence. The prior studies on 
political influence and finance have remained profoundly focused on the East Asian 
economies (e.g. Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009; Fisman, 2001)5 and Western 
economies (e.g. Infante & Piaza, 2010; Ferguson & Voth, 2008). Although economies such 
as Pakistan—where the market system and redistributive mechanism coexist—the extent of 
political patronage is seen to differ from the aforementioned economies (Cole, 2009). 
Moreover, it has been observed that the relationship between political connections and 
finance is more context-specific than universal; nevertheless, no other study carried out thus 
                                               
5
 The event of East Asian financial turmoil of 1997-1998 has stimulated the research on the relationship between 
corporate political ties and financial market (Charumilind et al., 2006). 
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far has addressed this issue in Pakistan. The only notable exception is that of Khwaja & Mian 
(2005), who employ data on bank loan portfolios and report that connected firms receive 
credit amounting to almost twice that of other non-connected firms, and have a 50%  higher 
default rate on these loans. Such a lending pattern is more prominent amongst state-owned 
banks in contrast to private ones. Furthermore, they provide direct evidence against the social 
lending view under which government banks lend to socially efficient but high-risk 
investments. Despite the fact that they use bank loan level data and accentuated bank lending 
pattern, their finding that political connections matter in terms of accessing credit is 
consistent with our results. 
 
Subsequently, Chapter Five examines the influence of corporate political connections on firm 
performance with special focus directed towards the role of the political environment in this 
nexus. Importantly, this study complements the existing literature along several lines. Firstly, 
it contributes to a burgeoning literature investigating the performance of politically connected 
firms. This question has been explored through taking the data from different countries, 
including France (Bertrand et al., 2007), Germany (Niessen & Ruenzi, 2010), Thailand 
(Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2001), Latvia (Dombrovsky, 2008) and China (Li et 
al., 2009, 2008; Yeh et al., 2012; Fan et al., 2008, 2007), all of which implicitly assume that 
the impact of political connections does not change in different political environments. In 
contrast, this study underscores the importance of the varying nature of political systems, in 
particular the autocratic and democratic regimes, and further highlights that the performance 
of the connected firms is worse in the dictatorial regime. To the best of our knowledge, this 
study is the first to analyse how political connectedness affects firm performance in 
contrasting political environments. Secondly, this study seeks to identify whether the impact 
of political connectedness on firm performance could be shaped by growth opportunities 
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available to a firm. However, although previous studies have extensively documented the 
relationship between growth options and firm performance (Chow et al., 2011; Ho et al., 
2004; Gaver & Gaver, 1993), it has generally been overlooked in the political connection’s 
perspective—a gap this study aims to fill. Thirdly, the study establishes that the impact of 
political connectedness on firm performance is subject to political environment and the 
growth opportunities indeed a step toward reconciling the mixed empirical findings on the 
effects of political connections on firm performance. Finally, the study offers implications for 
other economies that exhibit patronage system similar to that of Pakistan. For instance, 
corporate political connectedness and state-controlled resources are common phenomena in 
countries such as Russia, China, India, Cuba, Malaysia, and Indonesia; therefore, the findings 
of the present study can be generalised to those countries. 
 
Finally, the last empirical chapter (Chapter Six) offers an array of contributions to the 
corporate political connections literature. Firstly, the study answers the call made by a 
number of scholars in the field to bridge the gap in our understanding regarding the 
consequences of political relationships. By showing investment inefficiencies and excessive 
employment as direct avenues through which political connections distort firm operational 
efficiencies, it adds further evidence to the new and growing literature on the implications of 
political relationships (e.g., Fraser et al., 2006; Yeh et al., 2012; Boubakri et al., 2008) which 
largely explains the positive impact of political connections. Secondly, although not the 
immediate focus of this study, our empirical specifications also test and confirm earlier 
studies investigating the influence of growth opportunities and cross-industry heterogeneity 
on corporate economic decisions. Lastly, new evidence is added to the economic literature 
examining the nexus between resources distribution and social welfare loss (i.e. Kurer, 1993) 
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by providing a sense of economy-wide costs caused by political intervention in business 
decisions. 
 
In summary, the thesis accentuates the significance of political connections and their 
economic outcomes to business practitioners. The results of this research allow us to 
understand why and under what circumstances firms would engage in political activity, as 
well as how political connections may help firms in terms of improving operational 
efficiencies and performance in less developed economies. 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter Two lays the foundation of this study by introducing the phenomenon of corporate 
political connections. It is followed by the presentation of the antecedents and consequences 
of political connections. In doing so, the chapter discusses the existing theoretical and 
empirical studies undertaken across various countries with the aim of investigating the nexus 
between corporate political connections and business activities. Finally, in the end, based on 
theoretical and empirical discussion, a few research questions are raised.  
 
Chapter Three discusses the data sources and sample selection criteria used in this research. It 
also explains extensively the various techniques utilised in order to measure corporate 
political connections. Subsequently, industry classification and the significance of business 
group affiliation in Pakistan are discussed. The last section of this chapter describes the 
financial disclosure practices in the country.  
 
Chapter Four attempts to provide answers to the first research question. More specifically, 
this chapter examines whether or not political connections is, in fact, a good predictor of 
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preferential access to leverage in Pakistan. In so doing, the relationship between politics and 
business in Pakistan is first described, with the sub-hypotheses for the chapter developed 
subsequently, with an appropriate econometric methodology discussed. Lastly, empirical 
findings are reported and discussed. 
 
Chapter Five introduces the second empirical investigation based on the second objective of 
the study. More specifically, it investigates the impact of political connections on firm 
performance. The Pakistani political system and the context of the pertinent elections is 
described, with the presentation of sub-hypotheses and econometric methodology presented 
subsequently. Following, in the last section, empirical results are presented and discussed at 
length.  
 
Based on the third objective of the study, Chapter Six presents the empirical exploration into 
the relationship between political connections and business activities. More directly, the 
channels through which politicians may influence the business’s operational efficiencies are 
discussed, with the sub-hypotheses developed further so as to conduct the study and end up 
with a presentation and discussion of the regression results.  
 
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis by providing the main findings of each empirical chapter, 
and discusses the contributions of the study. Finally, it considers the main limitations of the 
study and suggests various avenues for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to lay the foundation of this study by introducing the 
phenomenon of corporate political connections, and to accordingly present the antecedents 
and consequences of political connections. In so doing, the chapter discusses the existing 
theoretical and empirical studies undertaken worldwide with the objective to investigate the 
nexus between corporate political connections and business activities. More specifically, this 
chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 introduces and defines the concept of political 
connections; Section 2.3 presents the antecedents of corporate political activity, which are 
categorised according to firm, industry, and institutional level; Section 2.4 firstly provides the 
underpinning theories used in this study—namely Trade-off, Pecking order and Agency cost 
theories; whereas the relevance of these theories to the studies undertaken is as follows: the 
first empirical chapter, investigating firm leverage, is based on all theories, whilst the Agency 
cost theory is pertinent to the second and third empirical chapters, examining firm 
performance and political interventions, respectively. The last part of this section presents the 
studies discussing the consequences of political connections in theoretical as well as 
empirical perspectives. Lastly, Section 2.5 concludes by unfolding the relevant issues from 
the literature survey.  
 
2.2 Definition of corporate political connections 
The resource-based view of the firm claims that the firm’s competitive advantage in its 
markets originates from its valuable resources that are not easy to imitate by competitors 
(Barney, 1991). Some of these resources maybe intangible in nature and idiosyncratic to the 
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firm, and may have been developed over a long period of time. Many of a firm’s resources 
are relationship-based as the earning potential of these assets depends on the relationships a 
firm has with its stakeholders (Woods & Jones, 1995, also cited in Godfrey, 2005).  
 
The political connection of a firm(s) is its relational asset, which reflects personal connection 
with government officials; this has a dual impact on the resources available as well as on firm 
performance. A robust operational definition of political connection can be drawn from the 
economic literature, where political connection is defined as the personal connection between 
a politician and a specific firm, either via cronyism or shareholding or directors (Johnson & 
Mitton, 2003; Fisman, 2001)6. Desai & Olofgard (2011, p. 1) elaborate on this phenomena as 
the arrangements by which the firms or groups—with close ties to incumbent political 
authority—receive favours encompassing economic value.  
 
Scholars from a political science discipline recognise political connections as rent-seeking 
activities where individuals or firms seek preferential treatment from states by spending 
resources in lobbying or bribing. In this regard, Khan & Jomo (2000) identify the conditions 
under which these activities can be categorised. At the very least, three settings are presented: 
in the first, firms privately negotiate changes in rights in the absence of state involvement, 
with the underlying condition being that the gainer always compensates the losers (for 
instance, firms intra industry negotiations to set the level of supply and prices in the market); 
the second scenario describes the rent-seeking practice in which the firm attempts to 
influence the state (which enforces rights and contracts) by lobbying, bribing, or otherwise 
through political influence, with the gain from such rent-seeking activity directly depending 
                                               
6
 In this study we employ the definition of the firm’s political connectedness as the personal connection between 
politicians and specific the firms through directors.  
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on the spending power of the firm; in the last scenario, rent-seeking activity is initiated and 
created by the state, where the state no longer passively responds to influence, but is a rent-
seeker (typical example is the role of state-owned firms in Russia and China). In practice, the 
first type of rent-seeking is obsolete in the real world as differences in power between the 
firms would discourage the stronger from compensating the loser. Although the rest of both 
scenarios are more pertinent to the real market, the concern of this study can be seen in the 
second scenario, where a firm influences the underlying criteria of resource distribution, 
which is set and controlled by the centralised administrative authority of a polity. 
 
In contrast, economists have centred on the exchange view of politics, and have further 
described the interdependence of suppliers and the demanders of resources (e.g., Hillman & 
Hitt, 1999; Hillman & Keim, 1995; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986). The demanders comprise the 
interest groups and the firms that contend for scarce resources, whilst suppliers are those who 
control state resources, such as elected politicians and regulatory agents. From the supplier’s 
standpoint, the resource distributors face considerable information and resource constraints; 
thus, they have needs of both financial and information resources (Schuler et al., 2002)7. On 
the other hand, Hillman & Hitt (1999) argue that demanders can participate in this transaction 
by offering information, votes, and financial support. Nevertheless, the decision of individual 
firms to participate in political activity is solely hinged on the analysis of costs and benefits. 
Thus, whether or not a firm establishes political connection is an outcome of costs and 
benefits analysis. 
 
                                               
7
 For instance, firms provide information about policy details to legislators through lobbying, which 
subsequently decrease the inherent uncertainties in new legislation (Aplin & Hegarty, 1980).  
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During the last two decades, the literature on political capital has dedicated a great deal of 
attention to the working of political connections. In particular, such studies aim to investigate 
the reasons behind why firms become politically active, and the outcomes of such political 
engagements. Based on existing empirical studies, the following three general conclusions 
can be drawn: (a) the state plays a determining role in business operations; (b) the level of 
political activity differs dramatically amongst firms or industries; and (c) political 
connections have performance implications (Hillman, 2003). In what follows in this chapter, 
the antecedents and consequences of corporate political connections are reviewed in detail. 
 
2.3 Antecedents of corporate political connections 
The interpenetration of political and economic power intensifies the significance of political 
connections for businesses around the world. The firms endeavour to establish political 
connections, which subsequently enhances their chances of success (Boubakri et al., 2008). 
In principle, political connections benefit both parties: the politicians hand out rewards in the 
form of policies and privileges to those firms against their cooperation (political and 
financial), whereas firms utilise these connections to enrich themselves (Boubakri et al., 
2008). Existing studies have identified various reasons for the engagement of firms in 
political relationships; these reasons can be categorised at the firm, industry and institutional 
level. 
 
At a firm level, scholars recognise the political relationship as a pervasive strategic choice 
centred on enhancing the firm’s overall value. In designing their corporate strategies, the 
firms systematically seek to anticipate and exploit opportunities in their business 
environment. Although many of these opportunities offer themselves in markets, the firms 
have the facility to generate new opportunities by investing in political connections (Leuz & 
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Oberholzer-Gee, 2003). Nevertheless, the decision to become politically active largely 
depends upon the firm-specific factors, such as size, international diversification, and 
financial resources (Schuler, 1996). 
 
The relative size of a firm signifies its likelihood to engage in political activity. As the 
establishment of political connections entails some degree of cost, it is likely that only large 
firms can afford to do so (Hillman, 2003). The firm diversification has also been argued to 
positively relate to the possibility that the firm will be establishing political connections. 
Diversified firms have a wide and complex range of trade interests, and are thus more likely 
to engage in political connections (Lenway & Rehbein, 1991). Finally, empirical studies have 
confirmed that financial resources are necessary in order to engage in costly political 
activities (Keim & Baysinger, 1988). Therefore, a firm with sufficient financial resources 
tends to engage in political relationships more often than firms lacking such resources. 
 
At an industry level, industry structure, such as the industry concentration and the degree of 
competition are commonly recognised determinants delivering a profound effect on the 
political strategy of the firm (Schuler et al., 2002). Such firms in industries facing intense 
competitive pressure find political connections increasingly important when striving to gain 
protection and privileged treatment from the government (Jia et al., 2012). Competitive 
advantages stemming from political connections are highest amongst regulated and state-
dominated industries. Nee & Opper (2007) find the empirical support for this conjecture, and 
further report that, in administrative and regulated industries, political capital—either in the 
form of political connections or government support—confer competitive advantage in 
economic transactions. The firms in concentrated industries have more incentive to establish 
political connections since they enjoy higher political payoffs. This view is also echoed in the 
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work of Schuler et al. (2002), the findings of which suggest that firms in a concentrated 
industry tend to engage in lobbying and campaign contributions more often than those in 
fragmented industries. Additionally, the volatility of the economic environment—which 
notably affects the likelihood that the government will continue to support the industry—
similarly influences corporate efforts required for establishing political connections (Schuler, 
1996). 
 
At an institutional level, connections matter to the firms in both the developed and 
developing markets. In a well-functioning legal system, for example, connections 
complement formal contracts to make deals work smoothly. Where the enforcement of law is 
weak, informal relationships can serve as a substitute in terms of allowing deals to be made 
(McMillan & Woodruff, 1999). Fundamentally, reliance on connections stems from 
inadequacies in formal institutions, such as the legal system, which accordingly proves arm’s-
length contracting unreliable. If regulatory governance is deficient, informal mechanisms—
such as the embedding of economic and financial transactions in a network of social 
relationships—maybe viewed as an endogenous response (Charumilind et al., 2006). 
 
The extent and nature of political connections differ largely across countries based on their 
institutional development (Desai & Olofgard, 2011). In developed markets, for instance, the 
firms may use campaign finance, political action committees, and the ‘revolving door’ 
between lobbying firms and congressional staff offices to establish political connections. On 
the other hand, in less developed economies, political influence is achieved generally through 
a combination of kinship ties, political alliances, or direct financial dealings between the 
owners and the politicians (Desai & Olofgard, 2011).  
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In many developing economies, administrative restrictions upon economic activity are 
pervasive facts of life. Such restrictions give rise to power that politicians preserve so as to 
extend preferential treatment in terms of resource distribution and policy enforcement to 
those firms with strong political ties (Jia et al., 2012). Therefore, the political connections 
with politicians and government officials in such an environment facilitate the firms to 
overcome obstacles in regard to conducting business efficiently.  
 
Resting on the notion of access to credit in developing countries, firms may seek to establish 
connections with the most influential individuals in their system—primarily politicians—to 
access the firm-specific political favour, mostly in the form of easy access to leverage. Due to 
the slow development of market-supporting institutions, private firms in developing countries 
face obstacles in accessing bank leverage, which is subject to heavy government regulations. 
In such an environment, close relationships to politicians help firms to overcome problems 
relating to an ill-functioning market. Therefore, connections are more valuable in countries 
where supply of funds is scarce (Charumilind et al., 2006)8. In such markets, firms might be 
able to access leverage simply because they have established strong ties with individuals that 
are able to influence bank-lending policy. Essentially, accessing leverage is one of the 
ultimate outcomes of corporate political connectedness. Besides, banks also have incentives 
to provide such loans as they expect to receive other private benefits in response (Infante & 
Piaza, 2010). Such benefits include bank bailout, and prospects to maintain other transactions 
with their debtors that are beneficial to themselves and their privately owned companies. 
 
                                               
8
 In addition, owing to fact that supply and demand of resources does not equally correspond to each other in 
developing countries consequently firms establish political connections to access these resources. Thus, the 
extent of political connections is more widespread in developing markets which makes them more important in 
such markets.    
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There is a literature on political connections that views such connections as an outcome of 
inefficient allocation of resources at both the micro and macro level. These studies suggest 
that, owing to inefficient distribution of capital, some firms benefit at the cost of others, and 
the presence of political relationships is likely to insert an adversarial effect on economic 
growth (Faccio et al., 2006; Kang 2002). Extending this view, Ritcher (2012) argues that 
financial institutions may rationally select to offer privileged financing terms to connected 
firms as they are the only organisations in the market with the institutional support necessary 
to succeed. Thus, political connections are essential in order to reduce those uncertainties 
inherent in a weak institutional environment.  
 
2.4 Consequences of corporate political connections 
As discussed above, it is now apparent that the main objective of political connections is to 
receive economic benefits that are favourable to the firm’s continued economic success. 
Economists have long noted that those firms that lobby or maintain political connections gain 
a variety of economic benefits in return (Mobarak & Purbasari, 2006; Fisman, 2001; 
Braggion & Moore, 2011); however, relatively few empirical works have argued that political 
relationship may potentially be detrimental to the firm value (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994; Frye 
& Shleifer, 1997); in fact, they rest on the argument of ‘grabbing hand’, where government 
officials (mainly politicians) can extract more resources from firms—particularly those that 
are privately owned—through bribes or operational inefficiencies, then conferring to the firm. 
Accordingly, logically speaking, it may be stated that the firm establishes political 
connections only if the marginal benefits of such connections are greater than their own 
marginal costs. 
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In essence, political connections provide a range of benefits to favoured firms, including 
preferential access to credit, preferential treatment by state-owned firms, collusive deals in 
tariff, the allocation of governmental contracts, relaxed regulatory oversight of the company 
in question, tax evasion, and government bailouts of financially distressed firms (Faccio & 
Parsley, 2006). 
 
In light of the insight offered by the earlier discussion, it may be inferred that, in the quest for 
improved performance, firms seek opportunities in their business environment and 
accordingly follow strategies believed to provide competitive advantage in the marketplace. 
Accessing easy and cheaper leverage through their political ties is one such strategy used by 
the firms. As Haslag & Pecchenino (2005) also indicate, bank credits are the most prevalent 
source of relative advantage of the connected firms across the world. Moreover, access to 
leverage is an inevitable strategy for firms to develop in less developed economies, such as 
that of Pakistan, where the financial system is characterised by underdevelopment, 
widespread bankruptcies, and state control. This easier access to credit—which also confers 
certain cost to firms—brings a priori changes in the operational efficiencies owing to the 
political intervention in operational and financial policies of the firms, thus affecting firm 
performance9. 
 
In the subsequent subsections, the literature on the potential impact (benefits and costs) of 
political connections is reviewed in three broader rubrics: financial resources, performance, 
and operational efficiencies. However, owing to the volume of scholarship on politically 
motivated financial favours—preferential credit, tax aversion, subsidies, and tariff reliefs—
                                               
9
 Operational efficiencies here refer to the business decisions, mainly investment and employment decisions that 
are subject to political intervention at utmost level (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994; and Chen et al., 2011).  
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being too great to be included in this review, the first section is instead more focused on the 
literature examining preferential access to credit. Finally, as the crux of this thesis is to 
investigate the consequences of political connections in three dimensions (leverage, 
performance and operational efficiencies), the aim is to provide a holistic overview of each 
facet, firstly by describing the impact of political connections in theoretical perspective and 
secondly by the carrying out are view of relevant empirical studies pertaining to each aspect. 
 
Before we proceed, there is first a need to introduce some of the underpinning theories used 
in this study. 
 
Underpinning Theories Employed in this Study 
The optimal capital structure of a firm is a mixture of internal and external capital that 
optimises the firm’s value (Bradley et al., 1984); therefore, the question of how to finance or, 
equivalently, how much to borrow from internal or/and from external sources becomes a 
crucial corporate financial decision. Several theories have been put forward in an attempt to 
explain the financing decision of firms with an underlying aim towards maximising its value. 
The modern finance theories originating from the firm’s market value maximisation principle 
are embodied in the initial proposition of Modigliani & Miller (1958). The first proposition 
asserts that the cost of capital—and hence the value of the firm—is irrelevant in terms of its 
capital structure. Since the perfect world of Modigliani &Miller (MM henceforth) does not 
involve transaction cost, taxes, and market frictions, the value of levered the firm is equal to 
the value of un-levered firm. Initially, however, the proposition of MM was considered for 
the firm’s debt equity choices, although the applications of proposition have since expanded 
to all corporate financial policies. The perfect capital market that they assumed have 
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stimulated researchers to add the real world’s elements in a quest of how theoretical 
predictions change accordingly. Issues such as asymmetric information, financial distress 
costs, transaction costs, and taxes pertain to the elements of real world, all of which are 
known to have an effect on corporate financing choice. Subsequent theoretical work therefore 
concentrates on the factors associated with market imperfections, and their impacts on the 
financial policy. Mainly, this research work relates to the following three main theories: 
Trade-off theory, Agency cost theory, and Pecking order theory.  
 
Trade-off theory: Trade-off theory, as proposed by Miller (1977), asserts that there is an 
optimal debt-equity ratio, with firms attempting to minimise the overall costs of capital by 
balancing the tax benefits of higher debt and the greater probability of financial distress. 
Alternatively, it can be stated that a firm is required to select debt until the marginal benefits 
of using more debt equalises the marginal cost of utilising more debt (cost of financial 
distress), and thus the optimal capital structure located at the point at which the net benefits 
of using more debt amount to zero (Hovakimian et al., 2001). 
 
Agency cost theory: Aware of the bankruptcy cost of debt, Jensen & Meckling (1976) 
observe that the costs and benefits of any business relate to its owner until there is no 
separation between firm ownership and control. However, once the ownership of the firm is 
distributed amongst outsiders, and upon external entity taking control and making corporate 
decisions on the owner’s behalf, the problems of interests emerge. The main objective of a 
firm is to maximise the firm’s value. The fiduciary duty of managers—acting as agents for 
principals (shareholders)—is to maximise the wealth of shareholders. Since the principal 
(owner) is unable to observe the actions of the agent (manager) in full depth because of 
information asymmetry, and considering the fact that such monitoring is costly, managers 
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may act opportunistically to run the firm according to their own interests as opposed to those 
of shareholders (Hart &Moore, 1998; Sing, 2011; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Mauer & Sarkar, 
2005). The opportunism imposes agency costs manifested in the aberrant actions/decisions of 
such include inefficient investments, consumer perquisites, and other private benefits. 
 
Pecking order theory: This theory is based on the information asymmetry between the 
insiders of a firm and the less-informed outsiders, which is a vital element of the real world 
(Myers, 1984). The firm’s managers or insiders are assumed to have more information about 
operations and future prospects than the outside investors. Owing to such information 
asymmetry between the managers and the investors, Pecking order theory suggests a 
preference ranking over financing sources. Beginning with internal funds (least information 
sensitive financial option), followed by debt, and then equity, firms work their way up the 
pecking order to finance investment in an attempt to minimise adverse selection costs (Leary 
& Roberts, 2004). The idea of financing hierarchy originates from the pioneering work of 
Donaldson (1961), although Mayers & Majluf (1984) present a clear theoretical rationale on 
the issue; they argue that, if a firm finances new investment by issuing under-priced equity, 
wealth would be transferred from existing shareholders to new investors; therefore, managers 
tend to reject the investment, regardless of its positive NPV. In this regard, Mayers & Majluf 
suggest that such under-investment problems can be avoided if sources of finance are 
switched to financial sources, which are less susceptible to underinvestment, such as retained 
earnings or debt. It can be inferred that, in such circumstances, internal funds and debt would 
be preferred to equity. 
 
2.4.1 The impact of political connections on leverage 
Theoretical perspective 
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Political connections may affect the traditional viewpoint of leverage theories. Firstly, 
Pecking order theory suggests preferring internal capital over external finance (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984; Narayanan, 1988), whilst leverage is regarded as a second choice since it 
involves costs to secure it. The easy assessable credit in the market entices managers to use 
higher leverage, which contradicts the suggestion of the Pecking order theory.  
 
Managerial opportunism is an additional motive for political connections. Jensen & Meckling 
(1976) note that the financial resources managers spend in order to establish political 
connections (cost of political connections) may also induce a non-pecuniary benefit. A 
manager may contribute firm resources to building personal connections with influential 
individuals, which can provide other benefits (subsequently making the individual more 
powerful and facilitating access to other opportunities, etc.). In this case, unless the costs of 
political connection are at least offset by economic benefits, this represents an agency cost.  
 
In a somewhat similar vein, Getz (2002) developed an agency theory-based model with firms 
as principals and politicians as agents, and accordingly proposed situations under which a 
particular political strategy would be selected. His model treats political influence as a means 
of agent control, and accordingly suggests that political strategy must be selected on the basis 
of the agency problems the firm is facing. Finally, political connections also challenge the 
predictions of agency theory for growing firms, which prohibits firms to use leverage in its 
early years of operations10. It is argued that debt repayments and unpredictable cash flows in 
early stages increase the costs of debt for the growing firms, thus making debt less attractive 
                                               
10
 Myers (1977) reported that high growth firms experience underinvest problem due to the agency cost of 
outstanding debt therefore predicted a negative relation between leverage and growth opportunities. Effectively, 
by lowering leverage directly reduces the cost of risky ‘debt overhang’, ex ante, and enables growing firms to 
invest more, ex post (Dang, 2010).  
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(Stulz, 1990). However, easily accessible leverage is viewed as attractive for growing firms, 
particularly in the early years. 
 
Trade-off theory (Miller, 1977; DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980) emphasises the trade-off 
between the benefits of tax deductibility of interest payments and bankruptcy costs. Political 
connections may contradict the predictions of Trade-off theory in two main ways: firstly, the 
connected firm reduces tax liability by utilising its political relationships; secondly, 
connected firms are able to reduce the bankruptcy risk by having cheap credit, thus reducing 
the expected cost of financial distress. Empirical evidences by Adhikari et al., (2006) and 
Faccio (2006) show that politically connected firms receive tax breaks which eventually 
appear in paying taxes at lower rates. Adhikari et al., (2006) further report that these tax 
breaks often appear in the form of tax shields like non-taxable income, allowance and special 
deductions. In addition, connections may also facilitate firms in government bailouts.  
 
During recent years, there has been increased concern that conventional theories focus mainly 
on firm or industry factors to explain firm financing pattern, which can only partially explain 
the degree of firm’s financial leverage11. Several recent cross-country studies have revealed 
that a significant part of the leverage pattern—which remains unexplained by traditional firm 
or industry-specific aspects—can be explained by institutional factors (Rajan & Zingales, 
1995; Booth et al., 2001; Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2001). The corporate political 
connections are one of the outcomes associated with institutional settings as they stem in a 
response to inadequacies in formal institutions that make arm’s-length financing impractical; 
                                               
11The East Asian financial turmoil of 1997-1998 brought into sharp focus the effect of political connections on 
businesses and financial market (Charumilind et al., 2006). Subsequently, researchers began examining more 
vehemently the intricate nexus between political capital and business world.  
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such settings have sufficient explanatory power to account for the corporate financing 
pattern, and thus must be the part of theoretical considerations. 
 
Empirical perspective 
Political connectedness has been anecdotally accepted as a determining factor for corporate 
financial leverage. For example, political connection as a determinant of preferential access 
to long-term leverage is analysed by Charumilind et al. (2006), using the dataset of 270 Thai 
firms prior to the crisis period. By employing several measures for connections based on Thai 
largest business groups, they argue that political connections are, by far, the most important 
determinants explaining the firm’s long-term leverage. Furthermore, surprisingly, analysis 
finds much less effect of firm-specific factors that standard theories of firm financing 
acclaims should be important for external financing, such as firm size and collateral. The 
study also sheds light on the financial stability of politically connected firms; it shows that, 
since such firms are less financially constrained owing to easier access to long-term debt, 
they are less vulnerable to the Asian crises of 1997. Nevertheless, in the sharp contrast, a 
recent study (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009)—in the similar context 
investigating Thai connected firms—surprisingly do not show the preferential access of 
financing. In fact, connected firms are found to use leverage equivalent to their non-
connected counterparts in the same industry. 
 
In a cross-country study, using firm-level connections to politicians and ex-politicians as a 
proxy for political connectedness, Faccio (2010) examines the degree of firm leverage 
amongst connected firms. Results indicate that the connected firms make greater use of 
leverage than their non-connected peers. Further, leverage is higher for firms with strong 
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connections, i.e. those connected through their owners rather than connected through a 
director, and/or those connected with a minister. In Korea, according to Cho (2002), the 
Chaebols—which had acquired substantial control over the financial system through the 
ownership of the merchant banks—enjoy easier access to credit and bailouts when they are in 
trouble. Likewise, Siegel (2007) argues that connections with political network in Korea also 
increase access to key external resources, such as cheap finance and favourable land sites, 
etc., from abroad. In a similar vein, Infante & Pizza (2010) show that those firms with local-
level political connections benefit from low interest rates; such benefits intensify when 
politicians are on their Board.  
 
Based on firm level data from Brazil, Claessens et al., (2008) show that political connections 
have a positive relationship with bank leverage following the Federal deputy elections. After 
controlling Brazilian firms’ characteristics, the results show that connections induce a strong 
positive impact in terms of the bank leverage following the federal deputy election. Such 
results are explained further from the perspective of volume of contribution and the way in 
which such contributions are distributed across different types of candidate. It was found that 
connections with winning candidates create a larger impact on bank leverage. The findings of 
this research attest to the growing literature on the role of political connections in driving 
firm access to finance.  
 
The effects of the electoral cycle on macroeconomic factors in general and on bank-lending 
in particular are discussed in a cross-country study carried out by Dinç (2005), which covers 
22 emerging economies. He reports that, in comparison with private banks, state-owned 
banks increase their lending during election years. In addition, loan forgiveness prior to 
elections increases, which consequently elevates the overdue amount to state-owned banks. 
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In a related study, Cole (2009) presents evidence on electorally motivated resource 
redistribution during the electoral cycle in India. He compares the lending practices of Indian 
public banks in years prior to scheduled elections to lending in off-election years. The 
findings indicate that agriculture credit lent by government-owned banks is substantially 
higher in the election period than in off-election years. More specifically, more loans were 
made in districts in which the ruling state party experienced tough competition than in less 
competitive districts. Furthermore, this targeted redistribution of resources was accompanied 
with substantial loan write-offs to politically supported firms. 
 
There are studies addressing the issue of political gains in terms of higher leverage in anti-
corruption campaign setting, such as that of Fan et al. (2008), who pursued this line of 
inquiry by gathering a sample of 23 most eminent corruption cases in China, involving 85 
publicly listed firms during the period 1995–2003. They sub-categorised the sample into 
firms that bribed politicians—termed as ‘bribing firms’—and those which had established 
connections owing to the past job affiliations of any of the Board members—termed 
‘connected firms’. Their results show that being connected with politicians either through 
bribes or affiliation offers firms a comparative advantage in terms of accessing debt finance; 
in particular, long-term debt. Importantly, such firms maintain higher debt levels overall. 
However, this debt advantage disappears for both connected and bribing firms once the 
connection is broken due to the arrest of the connected bureaucrats. Ramalho (2003) used 
stock market data to access the impact of Brazilian presidential impeachment, following 
corruption charges, on politically connected firms’ preferential treatment. The results 
emphasise that directly connected firms maintain preferential access to leverage even after 
impeachment. In terms of firms’ value, although there was an initial loss in stock market 
value, one year after impeachment, however, the firms fully recovered. However, amongst 
 33 
 
those firms indirectly, there was no significant affect in terms of access to credit or leverage 
ratio. 
 
Miguel & Zaidi (2003) test the patronage effect in public expenditure distribution at the 
district administrative level (through which the national budget is distributed) in Ghana. The 
flow of public funds is observed towards areas where politicians receive stronger support. 
The estimated incumbency advantage, on the other hand, inserts no effect on the distribution 
of financial sources; however, the results of this study are subject to limitations; notably, 
findings were derived in a very particular setting with limited sample size, which restricts the 
results in terms of their capacity to be generalised to other countries. 
 
Sapienza (2004) used Italian data on interest rates charged on individual loans to examine the 
credit allocation pattern of state-owned banks. He observed that the state-owned banks charge 
lower interest rates than private-owned banks in a winning political party-supported area. 
Furthermore, lending patterns are affected by the electoral results of the political party 
affiliated with the bank. It was found that state-owned banks divert financial resources to 
areas where there is more patronage; therefore, companies in southern Italy were found to 
benefit more so from state-owned banks’ credit following the new government. 
 
In a single-country study of Pakistan, Khwaja & Mian (2005) took individual loan level data 
(which is information on every credit given to firms in Pakistan) and provided evidence of 
state-owned banks’ favouritism to firms where a politician sits on the Board. Such firms 
receive credit almost twice that of other non-connected firms, and have 50% higher default 
rate on such loans. This pattern of lending is more pronounced for large firms. In a further 
analysis, it was revealed that firms connected with winning politicians or politicians whose 
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political party wins elections obtain even greater preferential leverage from public banks. 
Both winning and being in the winning party enhances preferential treatment in the financial 
market, thus exhibiting the exercise of political power. The unique contribution of this study 
remains in the estimation of the economy-wide costs of rent provision to the economy, which 
was estimated to be approximately 2% GDP, thus complementing the contribution of Mauro 
(1995) and Cole (2009). 
 
There is some scattered evidence that discusses banks’ preferential treatment to connected 
firms from other perspectives; for instance: corporate bailouts are examined in Brown & Dinç 
(2004), Faccio (2006) and Hutchcroft (1998); corporate governance is studied by Yeh et al. 
(2012); and risk-taking and performance is investigated in Mobarak & Purbasari (2006), 
Boubakri et al. (2009) and Bertrand et al. (2007). Furthermore, the empirical study of Faccio 
(2006) reports that politically connected firms are more likely to be bailed-out than their non-
connected peers, particularly in economies that receive International Monetary Fund or 
World Bank rescue packages. Similarly, firms with unprofitable but politician-backed 
projects were commonly granted extension very easily in corrupt capital markets.  
 
The connections-leverage nexus is augmented with the element of corporate governance in a 
recent study of Yeh et al. (2012). Through employing duration and collateral requirement to 
measure the extent of preferential treatment in China, the study found that KMT- 
(Kuomintang-) connected firms are associated with higher non-collateral bank loans. 
Moreover, corporate governance is inversely related to preferential bank credit. Authors 
attribute this relation to the fact that firms with good governance can create other low-cost 
financing alternatives, thus making preferential bank credit less lucrative. This result, to some 
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degree, testifies the findings of Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee (2006), who note that political 
connections remarkably reduce the net benefits of foreign securities for connected firms. 
 
Thus, to summarise, the existing research on the preferential access to finance to connected 
firms is intriguing. Essentially, firms use politicians to influence banks in order to obtain 
easier access to debt, and rely excessively on connected leverage. Furthermore, the belonging 
of a politician to a ruling party is quite a significant facet of political patronage. As shown by 
Khwaja & Mian and Claessens et al., such a factor increases firms’ or politicians’ political 
strength in terms of obtaining even greater preferential access to credit from banks. However, 
although studies provide convincing evidence on favouritism to politically connected firms in 
the credit market, evidence on the impacts of political connections on determinants of 
leverage, and the degree of leverage with respect to maturity, ultimately remain scarce. 
 
2.4.2 The impact of political connections on firm performance 
Theoretical perspective 
Agency theory argues that the separation of firm control and ownership potentially leads to 
managerial self-serving actions (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In an attempt to overcome 
agency issues, politicians, as outside directors, may be able to monitor and control the 
management in a better manner owing to their presumed independence relative to insiders, 
which ultimately improves firm performance. Besides the source of financial favours, 
politicians, as directors, may also contribute to improved firm performance by offering 
insight into the imminent regulatory policies able to facilitate firms in making efficient 
investment decisions. Nonetheless, politicians can also exacerbate agency-associated 
 36 
 
problems by coercing management to engage in self-interested actions that protect the 
interests of politician, thus deteriorating firm performance. 
 
Empirical perspective 
As discussed in the preceding section, political connections facilitate firms in terms of 
obtaining preferential treatment from banks—mostly in the form of easier access to leverage 
with lower interest rates. This easier access to external finance ultimately brings about 
changes in the firm’s financing policy, which is linked directly to firm performance. If 
efficiently allocated, such inexpensive leverage has the capacity to provide politically 
connected firms with a comparative advantage over their competitors; such advantages 
should reflect favourably on their performances. On the other hand, political interference in 
terms of firms’ management decisions—such as project selection and resource allocation—
could be harmful to firm performance (Boubakri et al., 2009).  
 
In a quest to examine this relation, Boubakri et al. (2009) carried out a three-year event study 
on a sample of 234 politically connected firms. Following Faccio (2006), they define political 
connection as being if at least one of its Board directors is a politician or related to a 
politician. The findings reveal that politically connected firms increase their performance—
defined as return on assets—following the establishment of political connections. 
Furthermore, it was also established that firms with close (direct) ties with politicians gain 
easier access to credit, and accordingly exhibit higher performance when compared with their 
counterparts’ having indirect connections. In order to control endogeneity bias in their results, 
they instrument political connection with the firm’s location in order to establish robust 
results.  
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Ferguson & Voth (2008) observe the performance of firms connected to the Nazi party, and 
define a firm as being politically connected if the firm has made financial contributions to the 
party and/or member of the Nazi party served on the supervisory Board. Findings show that 
connected firms show better performance, measured in terms of share price performance; 
specifically, they outperform non-connected firms by 5–10%. In another recent single-
country study, Braggion & Moore (2011) study the interaction between firm performance and 
the political connections of 467 British firms. Through the use of Tobin’s Q as a proxy for 
firm performance, it was established that connections are associated with higher performance 
amongst new-technology firms, although a lower performance is observed within the 
traditional manufacturing sector. Influencing work by Fisman (2001) investigates Indonesian 
firms that are connected to the Suharto family, and shows that performance in the return of 
shares of such firms declined more so than the return of less-connected firms, following the 
proclamation of deteriorating health of Suharto. Furthermore, the severity of the stock return 
for the connected firms intensifies when such news is more negative. 
The impacts of connections with the ruling Communist Party on the performance of private-
owned firms in China is investigated in a study of Li et al. (2008). Through applying party 
memberships as a measure of political status, it is revealed that performance—provided as a 
return on assets and return on equity—of member firms is greater than their non-member 
counterparts. Such connections facilitate firms in terms of improving performance through 
helping to easily secure leverage from banks, resolving their business disputes in court, and 
providing them with a greater degree of confidence in the legal system. In addition, such 
effects of political connections on firm performance are more pronounced in regions with less 
developed markets and legal systems. 
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An event study on the financial performance of Italian publicly traded firms during 1994–
2008 was carried out by Asquer & Calderoni (2011). Contrary to widely held opinion, the 
negative effects of political connections on Italian firm performance were reported in terms 
of stock return. Once the firms were isolated according to electoral outcome, it was clearly 
visible that those firms connected to election losers did not gain from their respective 
connections; however, on the other hand, being connected with (future) governing coalition 
had the predicted positive effect on performance; therefore, it maybe concluded that 
performance of the connected firms ultimately depends on the electoral outcomes. Similarly, 
Bertrand et al. (2007) analyse the performance of politically connected French firms, and 
subsequently conclude the presence of detrimental effects as a result of political connections. 
Results show that the rate of return on assets for connected firms is lower than for non-
connected firms. By adopting the event study approach, Fan et al. (2008) examine the 23 
corruption scandals and accordingly test the hypothesis suggesting that financing advantages 
associated with political connections do not play a role in capital misallocation, and tend to 
lead firms towards better performance; however, their results failed to find evidence to 
substantiate this proposition. Their empirical design was less subject to endogeneity concerns 
owing to the fact that corruption enforcement is exogenous to firms, and thus not caused 
directly by such firms.  
 
In an eminent cross-country study, Faccio et al. (2006) report that politically connected firms 
are more likely to receive government bailouts during times of economic distress, and their 
operating performance, measured as return on assets, is significantly poorer than their non-
connected peers at the time of bailout and subsequent to such bailouts. The study also 
presents evidence that connected firms showed worse performance just prior to the bailout 
than non-connected firms that are bailed out. In yet another cross-country study, Faccio 
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(2010) established similar results by utilising two measures of firm performance—return on 
equity and market-to-book ratio—with the aim of examining the operating performance of 
connected firms. The scholar established that connected firms are poor performers: the return 
on equity of connected firms was found to be lower by 5.38%, and market-to-book ratio was 
also found to be lower by 0.48%. In addition, the return on equity of connected firms 
significantly deteriorates with the level of corruption in each country, whilst market-to-book 
ratio does not change. In order to control the potential endogeneity in terms of the estimation, 
the lagged values of total assets and financial performance are used as instruments to regress 
connection variable.  
 
Dombrovsky (2008) examines the similar relation amongst Latvian firms. Following the 
adoption of firms’ total sale and growth in sales as measures for firm performance, results 
were found to show that firms acquiring politicians as their Board members experience a drop 
in sales by 40%, followed by an increase in sales amounting to approximately 75% the 
following year. Such results can be interpreted as either the politician joining the firm at a 
time of financial distress and subsequently helping the firm through political support, or that 
politicians predate the targeted firms in order to secure Board positions. Once connections are 
separated on the basis of the strength of politicians, however, a significant difference was 
observed. It was found that firm performance improves in the year following politicians 
joining the ruling coalition, with performance deteriorating substantially in the years when 
politicians leave the ruling coalition. However, such results are not found robust to alternative 
specifications of performance due to the relatively small number of firms that experience 
such events. In a cross-country study, Hellman et al. (2000) investigate firms’ influencing 
and colluding behaviours with public officials in 22 transition economies. It was found that 
large firms with both formal and informal ties with the government have an influence on 
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shaping the rules—even without making private payments to the governmental officials. 
Firms with such connections grow faster and exhibit higher performance in terms of sales 
volume and investment level over the previous three years.  
 
Other works focus on the role of political connections in an advanced system of the US. For 
instance, Jayachandran (2006) documents the announcement effects of Senator Jim Jeffords’ 
decision to leave the Republican Party in 2001—a decision that transferred the control of the 
US Senate from Republicans to Democrats. She finds that this decision caused almost 1% 
decline in the market value of those firms that contributed to the Republicans. At the same 
time, firms supported by Democrats benefited from an expected rise in stock value. Similarly, 
a recent study carried out by Cooper et al. (2010) further strengthens this viewpoint through 
the utilisation of a new and comprehensive dataset of US publicly traded firms from 1979 to 
2004. It was found that politicians—both in House and Senate—have statistically significant 
positive relations with future performance in terms of abnormal returns for contributing 
firms. Contrarily, Ansolabehere et al. (2004) finds no noticeable stock return difference 
across contributing and non-contributing firms. They investigate the soft money contributions 
for the Reform bill to cap the campaign contribution, and show no effect of contribution 
following the approval of bill. Finally, Houston et al. (2012) report that politically connected 
firms pay a lower loan spread than non-connected firms. This effect is even stronger for those 
firms with more government procurement, lower credit ratings, and operating in competitive 
industry. 
 
In light of the above findings, it can be concluded that, despite the widely-held belief that all 
political connections are inherently valuable and improve firm performance, empirical 
evidences do not collectively support such a view. Additionally, thus far, little is known 
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about how and why political impact on performance varies across firms in the literature. 
There is the need to consider the roles of firm-level and country-level political economy 
factors simultaneously. Consideration to both factors concomitantly allows the building of a 
more complete understanding of political economy determinants of firm performance12. 
 
2.4.3 The impact of political connections on operational efficiencies 
 
Theoretical perspective 
The theoretical argument of agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) states that managers 
ought to protect the interests of the firm and its shareholders by engaging themselves in the 
firm’s value-enhancing activities. Contrary to this prediction, Managers could engage in 
inefficient investments—subsequently impacting the overall operational efficiency of the 
firm—without worrying about career concerns owing to their relationships with the 
politicians. 
 
Theoretically, the priorities of politicians do not necessarily coincide with those of the 
shareholders; therefore, in contrast to the wealth-maximisation objective of shareholders, 
politicians may want management to support their objectives. Consistent with this view, 
studies establish that firms with political connections are the subject of political interferences, 
subsequently leading to inefficient decisions (Dewenter et al., 1997; Fan et al., 2007). 
 
 
                                               
12
 Analytical framework for this purpose is presented and discussed in Chapter 5.  
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Empirical perspective 
The empirical literature on the impacts of political connections on operational efficiencies is 
quite scarce. The studies concerned slightly with operational efficiencies have, thus far, been 
confined largely to the political impact on firm performance. As such, on the basis of 
research outcomes, the studies deduce that the beneficial (detrimental) effect of connections 
on performance is interpreted as the political intervention being favourable (unfavourable) for 
the firm that enhances (undermines) corporate operational efficiencies. 
 
A first stream of literature that finds positive effects of political connections infers the 
augmented operational efficiencies of the firms. Ferguson & Voth (2008), for instance, 
observe the positive effects of firms’ relationships with the Nazi party on firm performance. 
They conclude that such political ties enhance the operational efficiencies of the firms, 
thereby performance. Li et al. (2009) and Fan et al. (2008) also interpret their findings in a 
similar fashion when considering Chinese firms, where such an effect is even stronger in 
regions with less developed markets and weak legal systems. A similar study (Dombrovsky, 
2008) examines the effectiveness of corporate political activity, and provides improved 
performance and operational efficiencies of affiliated firms, soon after politicians join firms. 
 
In contrast, a relatively smaller series of papers showing the detrimental effects of political 
relationships on performance imply that such ties result in low operational efficiencies. For 
instance, Faccio (2010) reports that connected firms are poor performers, thus suggesting that 
connections impair operational efficiencies and firm performance. In a similar vein, Asquer 
& Calderoni (2011) provide compelling evidence of the detrimental effects of political 
relationships on the operational efficiencies of Italian firms.  
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The empirical works that have been dedicated to investigating the direct impacts of political 
connections on operational efficiencies are focused mainly on excessive employment. In an 
influential paper, Shleifer & Vishny (1994) highlight that self-interested politicians use their 
political power to interfere in the affiliated firms for their own objectives. Consequently, 
managers of the connected firms pursue strategies that satisfy the political objectives of the 
connected politician, which subsequently undermines operational efficiencies and distorts 
performance. They further explain that politicians mainly intervene in employment decisions 
and demand for politically motivated employments, which is an action that ultimately distorts 
business efficiency. In another important study, Bertrand et al. (2007) examine the political 
intervention in corporate employment decisions. Their results show that the performance of 
connected firms is lower than non-connected firms owing to excessive employment. They 
further highlight the fact that connected firms adjust their employment level and plant 
creation (and destruction) practices in ways that are consistent with helping incumbent 
politicians in their bid for re-election. Such employment practices are destructive for 
performance; therefore, low performance amongst connected firms is observed, which is 
driven mainly by higher labour cost. 
 
Table 2.1: The review of empirical literature: Major results of selected empirical studies 
Authors Results 
Ansolabehere et al. 
(2004) 
• This study challenges the belief that firms use their campaign contributions to shape 
policy and avail substantial benefits from the government. Results find no apparent 
changes in the market valuation of profitability of donating firm.  
Asquer & Calderoni 
(2011) 
• Contrary to most studies, their results show that political connections insert negative 
effect on performance in terms of stock return in Italy. 
• The firms connected only to future governing party have positive effect, whereas 
maintaining connections with opposition have no effect on firm performance. 
• Indirect connections have a noticeable positive impact on firm performance, while 
direct connections insert negative or no effect on stock return.  
Bertrand et al. (2007) • Study investigates the political intervention in corporate employment decisions. Their 
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findings reveal that presence of political directors on board significantly increases the 
level of excess employment in firm that ultimately inserts negative impact on the 
corporate operational efficiencies. 
• Particularly, firms adjust their employment level (through hiring and firing) and plant 
creation (and destruction) practices according to the demand of connected politician.  
Boubakri et al. (2009) • Politically connected firms increase their performance after the establishment of their 
relationships.  
• Study also confirms that the connected firms gain preferential access to cheap credit. 
• This effect is even stronger when firms have closer ties with political power. 
Bunkanwanicha & 
Wiwattanakantang 
(2009) 
• The result contradicts the notion that political connections improve access to finance. 
In fact, the connected firms are found to use leverage equivalent to their non-
connected counterparts in the same industry. 
Charumilind et al. 
(2006) 
• Results from analysis of a detailed dataset on Thai firms before the Asian crises, 
support the idea that connections allow to have easier access to long-term debt.  
• Political connections replace the role of collateral for long-term debt.  
• Such firms were proven to be less vulnerable to crises of 1997, owing to their ability 
of accessing long term debt.  
Claessens et al. (2008)  • Political connections insert strong positive impact on the bank leverage.  
• Leverage of firms that made contributions to candidates affiliated to the winning party 
increased in the following years of election.  
Cooper et al. (2010) • Their results show the positive economic effects for the firms that contribute to 
political candidates in the House and Senate.  
Cole (2009) • Find evidence of political lending cycles.  
• Lending is targeted towards areas where the ruling party won or just lost the election 
by small margin. In addition, rate of loan write-offs were also greater in those areas. 
• Target lending was observed prior to the election and write-offs were noticed 
following the election.  
Dinç (2005) • Presents cross-country evidence that politicians use state-owned banks for their 
political objectives. More specifically, government banks increase their lending and 
loan forgiveness in election years. 
Dombrovsky (2008) • Firms that acquire politicians on their Board experience a drop in performance, 
followed by an increase in the following year.  
• Results found no evidence that ex-politician affect firm performance.  
Faccio et al. (2006)  • Connected firms are more likely to receive government bailouts in times of financial 
distress than their non-connected peers across the world. However, this pattern is 
more pertinent to countries that are perceived as highly corrupt.  
Faccio (2010) • Firms with political ties make greater use of leverage, but they underperform 
compared to their non-connected peers. 
• This difference between connected and non-connected firms is more pronounced 
when political relationships are stronger. 
Fan et al. (2008) • Presented evidence of higher leverage, particularly long-term debt of connected and 
briber firms before; and significant decline in leverage following the corruption 
scandals.  
• Results remained robust after including various leverage and maturity measure.  
Fisman (2001) • Study reports the impact of connections on performance by measuring the returns of 
shares of the connected firms. 
• Findings indicate that performance of these firms dropped following the proclamation 
of deteriorating health of Suharto. 
• The power of event study model is strengthened by aggregating a number of episodes 
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during which there were rumours about the Suharto’s health condition, and affirms 
the negative returns of the connected firms. 
Jayachandran (2006)  • The finding reveals the significant relationship between political connections 
established through electoral denoting and firm performance in terms of stock return. 
The loss of about 1% of market capitalisation is observed following the Jeffords’ 
party switch for a firm that had denoted $250,000 as electoral contribution.  
Khwaja & Mian 
(2005) 
• Political firms borrow about 45% more and have 50% higher default rates than non-
political firms.  
• Preferential lending is more pronounced for the large firms. In addition, both winning 
and being in the winning party enhances preferential treatment in the financial 
market, exhibiting the exercise of political power. 
• Study estimates the economy-wide costs of the rents, which is between 0.30–1.9% of 
GDP annually.  
Leuz & Oberholzer -
Gee (2003) 
• This study tests the hypothesis that global financing and political connections are 
substitutes. 
• Well-connected Indonesian firms are less inclined to access global capital market, 
since these firms are able to get low cost capital from the domestic banks.  
Sapienza (2004) • Using a large dataset of Italian firms they find that government owned banks charge 
lower interest rate than do privately owned banks. 
• Firms located in Southern part of Italy (winner party’s supported area) benefit more 
from state-owned banks.  
Shleifer & Vishny 
(1994) 
• Connected politicians desire to maximise their political support by maintaining high 
employment level which results in deteriorated firm operational efficiency. 
Siegel (2007) • Political network significantly increases the rate at which Korean firms access to key 
outside resources from abroad. These resources include cheap finance and favourable 
land sites.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter first describes the phenomenon of political connections. Subsequently, the 
antecedents of political connections are discussed at firm, industry and institutional level. 
Finally, the chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical studies discussing impacts of 
political connections—stemming as a result of inadequacies in formal financial 
institutions―on the degree of financial leverage, performance, and operational efficiencies. 
Prior to this comprehensive review, a brief description of underlying theories used in this 
study is presented. 
 
Political connection is the personal connection between politicians and a firm, either through 
cronyism, or shareholding or directors. It is viewed as a type of relational asset through which 
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firms or groups with close ties to an incumbent political authority receives favours that have 
economic value. Fundamentally, the firm endeavours to establish political connections as this 
enhances its opportunity to succeed. At a firm level, firm size, international diversification 
and financial resources are important determinants of political connections, whereas industry 
concentration and degree of competition are regarded as important industry-specific factors 
that determine the likelihood of firms’ political activity. Finally, at an institutional level, 
political connections are viewed as being an endogenous response of inadequacies in the 
formal system. 
 
An anecdotal evidence on the relationship between politicians and firms (Fan et al., 2008; 
Dinç 2005; Khwaja & Mian, 2005) documents that firms with political connections enjoy 
exceptional access to government loans, and are more likely to employ excessive leverage in 
financing decisions. This view predicts a positive relationship between corporate political 
connections and the degree of financial leverage. However, there are studies depicting the 
inverse or a complete lack of relationship between political connections and leverage 
(Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009; Asquer & Calderoni, 2011). When considered 
together, existing research yields mixed results. Thus, in light of such diverse findings, it is 
still difficult to draw any definitive conclusion regarding the impact of connections on firm 
leverage. 
 
Securing finance at preferential terms is a widely adopted channel through which political 
connectedness pays off. If this excessive debt is allocated efficiently, it should be reflected 
positively in the performance of the connected firms. Empirical evidences support this notion, 
and further show that political connections translate into better firm performance (Li et al., 
2009; Dombrovsky, 2008; Ferguson & Voth, 2008). However, there are numerous studies 
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that provide evidence of a negative correlation between firm performance and political 
connections, mostly because of political involvement in management decisions (Asquer & 
Calderoni, 2011; Bertrand et al., 2007). Additionally, connection-performance nexus is 
documented mainly through privatisation literature (Boubakri, et al., 2008; Cuervo & 
Villalonga, 2000). Accordingly, due to the inconclusive impact of political connections on 
performance, it is difficult to predict the direction of relationship. 
 
Theoretically, the priorities of politicians do not necessarily coincide with those of the 
shareholders: politicians want management to support their objectives rather than pursuing 
the wealth-maximisation objective of shareholders. Consistent with this view, studies indicate 
that connected firms are subject to political interferences, which subsequently result in poor 
performance (Dewenter et al., 1997; Boubakri et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2007). Although these 
studies agree on the political intervention in the corporate operations as a reason for 
underperformance, the mechanism of such interventions has generally been overlooked. 
Hence, the channels through which such interventions are carried out and which lead to 
operational inefficiencies are an issue worthy of future research.  
 
The overall discussion raises a number of unresolved questions: 
 
1. Do predictions of standard capital structure theories hold for politically connected 
firms as well? Are benefits of political connections in terms of leverage are uniform 
across debt maturity structure? What type of firms is more likely to benefit from 
having connections with politicians? Do relationships with politicians with different 
levels of political strength (political influence) induce different impact on a firm’s 
leverage? 
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2. How do political connections affect agency costs, and where do connected firms stand 
performance-wise in comparison to their non-connected counterparts? Under what 
political environment are firms more likely to benefit from their connections? What 
are the other factors that shape the impact of political connections on firm 
performance? 
 
 
3. What are the channels of political interventions? How does political intervention 
affect corporate operational inefficiencies? Does political intervention uniformly 
affect all firms? Does political intervention differ across industries?  
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CHAPTER 3: DATA AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN 
3.1 Introduction 
The review of underpinning literature and related empirical studies in the previous chapter 
identifies the research gap and direction of this research study. This chapter provides the 
research methodology of this study. The chapter is organised as follows: the first section 
demonstrates the data and study sample by explaining the sources of data, the type of data 
collected, and the sample selection criteria; Section 3.3 presents the techniques utilised in 
order to measure the political connections in earlier studies; Section 3.4 introduces the 
industry classification criteria used in this study; Section 3.5 discusses the presence of 
business groups in the Pakistani market; finally, financial disclosure practices in Pakistan are 
reviewed in the last section.  
 
3.2 Data collection and sample specification 
This section discusses the construction of sample data used in this study. It also describes the 
data sources, and further presents information relating to the guidelines for the sample 
selection.  
 
3.2.1 Sources of data 
In order to conduct this study, three data sources are used. First, the firm-level financial 
information used in this study comes from the OSIRIS, which is a Bureau Van Dijk’s 
publication. OSIRIS provides globally standardised financial accounts of over 70,000 listed 
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firms from all over the world—up to approximately 10 years13. In addition to the financial 
statements—income statement, balance sheet, cash flow statement and ratios―information 
regarding the Board members of each firm is also included. From this database, the Pakistani 
firms are selected. Secondly, in order to identify the group affiliation of firms, this research 
relies on the book by Rehman (2006), which reports the list of top business groups (based on 
their size) and their associated firms within the Pakistani market. The similar source for 
identifying the business group affiliation in Pakistan has also been used in several other 
studies, such as those of Masulis et al. (2011), Ashraf & Ghani (2005), and Candland (2007). 
 
Nevertheless, although access to the published financial report of Central bank of Pakistan 
(State bank of Pakistan) on listed firms on Karachi stock exchange and DataStream were 
available; however, the number of firms in these sources was smaller than those available in 
OSIRIS. In addition, the OSIRIS database is considered superior for this study as it covers 
more years and provides information on the ownership structure.  
 
Third, in order to measure the firm’s political connection, dataset on political actors at 
national and state level is required. This political data is taken form Election Commission of 
Pakistan (ECP), which conducts elections for the National and Provincial Assemblies. It 
maintains the comprehensive information on national and state elections, including 
candidates list, parties’ positions, and electoral outcomes. Khwaja & Mian (2005) employed 
the same dataset to identify the political connections in the Pakistani market.  
 
                                               
13
 OSIRIS globally collects financial data from diverse set of sources with different accounting standards, and 
subsequently standardizes it which is comparable across countries, industries and firms. So, if a country changes 
its accounting standards it does not affect the data provided by OSIRIS. In any case, Pakistani listed firms 
comply with International Financial Reporting Standards since 1984 which assures standardization of our data.  
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3.2.2 Data sample 
Panel data on Pakistani firms is available for the previous nine years ranging 2002–2010 in 
OSIRIS database. It was deemed necessary to select a long period in order to draw sound 
statistical estimations for the relationships to be tested in this research. The study begins with 
2002 owing to the fact that this is when the first election was held and the government was 
established. Therefore, this study uses panel data that contains information for a nine-year 
period, and combines this particular cross-section with the time-series. It is argued that panel 
data, having blending characteristics of both cross-sectional and time-series data, improves 
the overall efficiency of econometric estimates through offering a greater degree of freedom 
and less collinearity amongst variables (Hsiao, 1985). Accordingly, each firm in the study 
sample does not contain the same number of time-series observations, and so this dataset is 
an unbalanced panel data.  
 
The sample includes non-financial listed firms from Pakistan for the period 2002–2010. The 
decision to restrict the sample only to non-financial firms (with SIC less than 6,000) is due to 
the accounting treatment of revenue and profits for financial firms (banks, insurance and 
investment firms) being significantly different to in the case of non-financial firms. Rajan & 
Zingales (1995) argue that the leverage of financial firms is significantly influenced by 
explicit (or implicit) investor insurance schemes, such as deposit insurance. In addition, the 
capital structure of such firms is influenced heavily by regulatory requirements; therefore, it 
is not appropriate to compare the financing policies of such firms with non-financial firms. 
Moreover, it is necessary for each firm to report a minimum two-consecutive years’ 
information in order to assess the changes in the financing structure of the firm. 
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Firm-level information in the OSIRIS database is available for 419 non-financial listed 
Pakistani firms. Following the application of the aforementioned selection criteria, an 
unbalanced panel of 2,199 firm-year observations on 380 firms was remaining for the 
empirical analysis. In order to identify the group affiliation of the sample, the reported list of 
top-30 business groups and their associated firms (published by Rehman, 2006) was used. In 
fact, this book identifies the 38 top business groups in Pakistan. Amongst those, eight 
business houses comprised only non-listed and/or financial firms; therefore, the remaining 30 
business groups are considered. By matching the list of 30 business group-affiliated firms 
with the sample, 105 firms are identified as business group-affiliated, whilst 275 firms are 
considered as not affiliated to any business group.  
 
In order to garner the information about the firm’s political connection, firstly, data on all 
politicians needs to be gathered. For this purpose, this research relies on the Election 
Commission of Pakistan (ECP). ECP provides information on all individuals who have 
participated in previous elections—at both national and state level. Given that the sample 
period covers 2002–2010, there are two relevant national and state elections for this study: 
general elections held in 2002 and those held in 2008. This politician dataset includes all the 
information on the names and party affiliations for all candidates in the elections, including 
the winner, party affiliation, and the number of votes each received. Each politician is 
identified uniquely through a combination of first and last name. There were around 210 
national and 460 state constituencies in each election, with 6–9 candidates per constituency 
and a total of over 8,800 candidates in both election years. Following Khwaja & Mian (2005) 
and Faccio (2006), irrespective of the electoral outcome, all politicians are considered 
influential individuals who can benefit firms through preferential access to finance.  
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3.3 Corporate political connections 
Political connections are not directly observable as it is not possible to establish whether or 
not a firm has political ties and/or whether a bank has granted a loan on easy terms. 
Furthermore, if political connectedness is not reported publicly, it must be inferred by 
considering a firm’s major shareholders and by examining the composition of its Board and 
management. As Fisman (2001: 1059) suggests, ‘in countries where political decision-
making is decentralized, simply defining political connectedness is an extremely complicated 
proposition’. He further explains that knowing the political link of any firm in developing 
countries requires information in terms of its relationships with several government decision-
making bodies and some mechanism associated with cumulating these connections. 
Obtaining precise data would be complicated in such economies as a business-politics 
relationship is often a taboo subject of conversation, and connections are likely to shift 
noticeably over time. Identifying a firm as politically connected is cumbersome in a 
developing country like Pakistan, with Fisman (2001) suggesting that the business–politics 
relationship in developing countries is commonly a proscribed subject of conversation, with 
connections likely to shift noticeably over time.  Therefore, researchers have adopted mainly 
three approaches whilst seeking to identify firms as being politically connected. 
 
In the first approach, there are studies that have employed subjective measures to identify the 
corporate political connections: for instance, in an attempt to measure the political 
connections amongst Indonesian firms, Fisman (2001) uses Suharto Dependency Index, 
developed by the Castle Group. Castle Group is a leading economic consulting company in 
Indonesia, offering the services of strategic partner search. Amongst their main popular 
products is a ‘Roadmap of Indonesian Business Groups’ (1998), which outlines the 
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relationship amongst the leading groups14 along with information centred on their holdings 
and government connections. It includes an index of numerical rating (1 to 5) concerning the 
extent to which each of the top 25 largest industrial groups is dependent on political 
connections for its profitability. Fisman takes this measure so as to identify corporate political 
connection. In the context of this study, there is a large economic consulting service 
(export.gov) 15  available for foreign firms to identify a potential local trade partner in 
Pakistan. Although their services include useful information on Pakistani firms regarding 
their business activities, financial conditions, credit-worthiness, and trading experience, 
information on corporate political connections is unavailable. 
 
In the second widely used approach, studies such as those of Jayachandran (2006), Roberts 
(1990) and Kroszner & Stratmann (1998) identify political ties through political donations. In 
the US, for example, Federal Election Commission (FEC) requires political parties to unveil 
soft money contributions, with such data publicly available from the FEC. However, public 
information on such donations is made available in only a few countries (mainly the US). 
Therefore, in this study, this particular method—which is centred on identifying political 
donations—is not applicable owing to such information not being available publicly in 
Pakistan.  
 
Following the third approach, political economics literature matches two separate databases 
to identify the corporate political connections. In so doing, the names of politicians from the 
first database containing the politician’s information are used to cross-check the top directors 
                                               
14
 Most of these groups have multiple companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange, yielding a total sample 
of 79 firms.  
15
 Export.gov brings together resources from around the globe to assist US companies in planning their 
international sales strategies. Their services also provide information on Pakistani firms to facilitate US 
companies to find the strategic partner. http://export.gov/index.asp 
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of companies from the second dataset (containing firm level information). If a politician’s 
name is matched to a firm director’s name, that firm is considered politically connected.  
 
In the same spirit, in an influential cross-country study, Faccio (2006) defines a firm as 
politically connected in three ways: firstly, if one of the firm’s large shareholder is either a 
member of parliament; secondly, large shareholders have links with a minister or head of 
state; and thirdly, large shareholders are closely related to top officials. The term ‘large 
shareholders’ is defined as anyone directly or indirectly owning at least 10% of shareholder 
votes. According to the second classification scheme, firms are recognised as being 
connected if any relative (spouse, child, sibling, or parent) of a politician (parliamentarian or 
minister or head of state) is a large shareholder. Connections of a third type occur when a 
politician is an ex-top executive, or if a large shareholder is a friend of a minister or a 
Member of Parliament. Information on Members of Parliament and the government is taken 
from the official website of each country’s government and parliament, whilst the names of 
top shareholders are drawn from Worldscope. The essence of this measure is adopted in 
several other studies (Asquer & Calderoni, 2011; Goldman et al., 2009; Leuz & Oberholzer-
Gee, 2006; Ferguson & Voth 2008; Infante & Piaza, 2010; Khwaja & Mian, 2005). These 
studies generally identify a firm as being connected if any of the firm’s Board members have 
taken part in any level of national election.  
 
In this study, following mainstream literature (Khwaja & Mian, 2005; Faccio, 2006; Infante 
& Piaza, 2010) which is based on aforementioned third approach, a firm is defined as 
connected if it has a politician on its Board of Directors. A politician is defined as any 
individual who stood in the national or provincial election. Given that the sample period 
covers 2002–2010, there are two relevant national and state elections for this study: the 
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general election held in 2002 and those of 2008; thus, an individual who participated in the 
national or provincial election, held in 2002 and 2008, is considered as politician. Data on 
politicians (electoral candidates who participated in elections held in 2002 and 2008) is taken 
from Pakistan Election Commission. This politician’s dataset includes all information on the 
names and party affiliations for all the candidates in these elections, including the winners, 
and the number of votes received by each. Each politician is uniquely identified by a 
combination of first and last name. Information regarding the firm’s Board of Directors is 
taken from OSIRIS. Finally, the complete names of Board of Directors will be matched 
against each listed politician’s name. If the full name of the director provides a precise match 
with the complete name of the politician, the firm is classified as a politically connected firm. 
Thus, corporate political connectedness in our study is time-invariant. This measure of 
political connection yields 107 firms as being politically connected. The size of non-
connected firms in our sample is 273. Importantly, these 107 connected firms are found to 
maintain political connections for the entire sample period 2002-2010.   
 
It is worth noting that our measure of political connection does not consider the connections 
that may have been established through relatives, friends, or similar educational intuitions, 
also termed as ‘indirect connections’. Generally, indirect connections are retrieved through 
print media, and employed mainly in the studies on developed countries, such as Asquer & 
Calderoni (2011) and Sapienza (2004) in Italy, and Goldman et al. (2009) in the US. Because 
of institutional settings and strong political influences on both print and electronic media in 
Pakistan, it is difficult to have confidence in such sources. As International Media Support 
(2009) points out, in Pakistan, political affiliations, commercial interests, and hidden political 
agendas are commonly the motivations behind biased political information arising in mass 
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media. Accordingly, our sample is entirely based on direct personal political connections that 
are retrieved from the existing databases.  
Table 3.1: Data sources and measures of political connections used in existing studies 
Authors Data source of 
political connections 
Data source of 
firm specific 
variables 
/board 
members 
Country proxies 
Asquer & 
Calderoni 
(2011)  
CONSOB website, 
maintained by 
Government authority 
that oversees the 
security market, and 
collects the information 
on board members of 
public traded firms 
publishes such data on 
this website.  
Bloomberg Italy • If one of firm’s large 
shareholders is a 
member of parliament. 
• Large shareholders 
have links with a 
minister or head of 
state. 
• Large shareholders are 
closely related to top 
official.  
Faccio 
(2006) 
Official Web site of 
each country’s 
government and 
parliament. 
Worldscope Cross-
country 
• If one of firm’s board 
of director is a Member 
of Parliament. 
• Large shareholders 
have links with a 
minister or the head of 
state. 
• Large shareholders are 
closely related to the 
top official.  
Faccio & 
Parsley 
(2006) 
Mainly from 
www.rulers.org; and  
 
w.politicalgraveyard.co
m 
DataStream 
Worldscope 
Cross-
country 
• Firms are regarded as 
connected if their 
headquarters are 
located in the home 
town of the deceased 
politician (city where 
politician resided).  
Ferguson & 
Voth (2008) 
Self-explored Official price 
lists published 
by Berlin Stock 
Exchange 
Germany • Membership of Nazi 
party or political 
donations 
Fisman 
(2001)  
Suharto Dependency 
Index, developed by the 
Castle group in a 
product “Roadmap of 
Indonesian Business 
Financial Times' 
Extel Financials 
Database  
 
Indonesi
a 
• Suharto Dependency 
Index (scale 1-5), 
developed by the Castle 
group. 
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Groups (1998)” 
Goldman et 
al. (2009) 
Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) 
Securities and 
Exchange 
Commission 
(SEC) 
US • A firm is defined as 
connected if any board 
member held a position 
in any time in past such 
as Senator, Member of 
Administration, 
Member of the House 
of Representatives. 
• Or has been a director 
of an organisation such 
as CIA, FEMA, or 
OMB.  
Jayachandra
n (2006) 
Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) 
Centre for 
Research on 
Security Prices 
(CRSP) 
US • Political donations 
Khwaja & 
Mian 
(2005) 
Pakistan Election 
Commission (PEC)  
Credit 
Information 
Bureau (CIB) 
database 
Pakistan • They count firm as 
connected if a firm has 
a politician on their 
board of directors. A 
politician is defined as 
any individual who 
stood in the national or 
provincial elections 
during the sample 
period. 
Kroszner & 
Stratmann 
(1998) 
Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) 
Federal Election 
Commission 
(FEC) 
US • Political donations 
Leuz & 
Oberholzer-
Gee (2006) 
Suharto Dependency 
Index, developed by the 
Castle group in a 
product “Roadmap of 
Indonesian Business 
Groups (1998)” 
Financial Times' 
Extel Financials 
Database  
 
Indonesi
a 
• Suharto Dependency 
Index (scale 1-5), 
developed by the Castle 
group. 
Li et al. 
(2009) 
Survey, jointly 
conducted by All China 
Industry and Commerce 
Federation, the China 
Society of Private 
Economy, and the 
United Front Work 
Department 
Survey, jointly 
conducted by 
All China 
Industry and 
Commerce 
Federation, the 
China Society of 
Private 
Economy, and 
the United Front 
Work 
Department 
China • Membership of 
Communist Party of 
China 
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Infante & 
Piaza 
(2010) 
Ministry of the 
Interior’s website & 
websites of Houses of 
the Italian Parliament 
InfoCamere 
database 
Italy • If one of the firm 
shareholders is a 
Member of Parliament. 
 
Roberts 
(1990) 
Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) 
COMPUSTAT US • Political donations 
 
3.4 Industry classification 
Every firm makes financial policy which is best fitted to its current situation and which 
minimises the cost of capital. Amongst other factors, the type of industry constitutes the 
external environment in which a firm operates. Owing to the fact that various industries 
experience different economic conditions, such situations may instigate discrepancies in the 
firm’s financial policy. For example, a firm operating in a sector with volatile earnings would 
not rely on leverage, but would most likely pile-up the cash stock as a buffer against 
unforeseen contingencies (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993).  
 
Talberg et al. (2008) emphasise the distinctive features associated with different industries. 
They elucidate that the food industry, for example, is known as being more stable owing to 
the fact that food is a basic need, but simultaneously, it is considered a highly competitive 
sector. The construction industry is considered expensive in the initial stage of investment, 
and is further regarded as sensitive to general economic cycles. Investment level is commonly 
lower in the periods of economic downturn. The oil and gas sector is known as capital-
intensive but with high operating margins. The telecoms industry is highly regulated, and 
faces a number of challenges in relation to technological development. Regulated firms have 
stable cash flows and lower expected costs of financial distress. Thus, regulated firms should 
have more debt; at the same time, however, managers have less discretion in regulated firms, 
which in turn reduces the severity of shareholder–manager conflicts, and makes debt less 
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desirable from a control perspective. Such characteristics are specific of each industry, and 
shape the financial policies of firms—depending on the industry in which the firm operates. 
 
Industry effects reflect a set of correlated factors, which cause industry differences in the 
firm’s financial policy and ultimately performance. Firms in an industry face common forces 
that affect their financing decisions. Such forces may be reflected in product market 
interactions or otherwise by the nature of competition. Moreover, these could also reflect 
industry heterogeneity in relation to the types of asset, business risk, technology, or 
regulation (Frank & Goyal, 2009). Empirical studies report significant variations in terms of 
the degree of leverage, investment efficiencies, and expected performance across industries 
(Lemmon et al., 2008; Hovakimian et al., 2001). Scott (1972) and Schwartz & Aronson 
(1967) observe persistent differences across industries and strong intra-industry similarities in 
firm leverage. According to Bradley et al. (1984), the intensity of R&D, investment, 
advertising expenditures, regulatory standards, and earning volatility helps in terms of 
explaining both inter- and intra-industry variations at a firm leverage level. Industries with 
more growth opportunities and greater information asymmetries tend to hold more cash. An 
obvious consideration is that firms in more profitable industries depend less on external 
funding than firms in less profitable industries owing to their higher level of profitability. 
Consequently, such firms use more internal-capital. Moreover, some industries, such as 
computer-related industries, may be subject to a lack of collateral precisely owing to the fact 
that production is less capital-intensive than in manufacturing industries. This attribute 
coerces them to stock more cash (Levine, 2002; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Taken together, the 
industry factor is likely to play an important role in establishing leverage, investment 
expenditure, and ultimately the performance of a firm. Therefore, this study controls the 
industry differences in analyses. 
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Currently, there are three industry classifications in the world, namely Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS), Global Classification System (GCS), and Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) system. GICS is published by Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI) and Standard & Poor's (S&P), which includes 10 economic sectors, 23 industry 
groups, 59 industries, and 123 sub-industries. Markedly, GCS is published by Financial 
Times and London Stock Exchange (FTSE), which includes 10 economic groups, 39 industry 
sectors and 102 industry sub-sectors. SIC is published by the United States. The database 
OSIRIS allows the classification of a sample by either industry classification scheme. Since, 
the SIC is the most widely used classification for statistics of economic activities (Mannetje 
& Kromhout, 2003), Pakistani firms in this study are classified based on two-digit SIC (The 
three-digits SIC code indicates the sector group at relatively smaller level and the two-digits 
SIC code indicates the sector at broader level). Two-digit SIC distributes non-financial firms 
into 12 categories, which is too detailed for this study; thus, following Aharony et al. (2010) 
and Campbell (1996), the study re-classifies the two-digit SIC to a narrower eight-industry 
category. The following table (Table 3.2) shows the distribution of firms across industries. 
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Table 3.2: Sample distribution across industries 
Industry  Two-digit SIC code Number 
of firms 
Percentage of 
entire sample 
Food & Tobacco 1, 2, 9, 20, 21, 54 48 13 
Basic industries including petroleum 10, 12, 13, 14, 24, 26, 28, 29, 33 67 18 
Construction 15, 16, 17, 32, 52 58 15 
Textiles & Trade 22, 23, 31, 51, 53, 56, 59 132 35 
Consumer durables 25, 30, 36, 37, 39, 50, 55, 57 33 9 
 34, 35, 38   
Transportation 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47 10 2 
Services 72, 73 75, 76, 80, 82, 87, 89 11 3 
Others No specific SIC code 21 5 
Entire sample 
 
380 100 
 
 
Table 3.2 shows that the textile sector has the highest percentage, representing 35% of the 
total sample. It is also worth noting that the first four industries—Food & Tobacco, Basic 
industries including petroleum, Construction and Textile sector—represent more than three 
quarters of the whole sample. Disparity in the concentration of corporate political 
connections across the industries and their impact on the degree of leverage, the operational 
efficiencies and ultimately on the performance is obvious, and would be controlled in 
analyses. 
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3.5 Business groups 
The business group is an important firm ownership characteristic of private firms of most 
countries (Manos et al., 2007). Such groups mostly comprise legally independent firms 
bound together in some formal and/or informal ways. Vigorous research work is being 
carried out, providing a range of reasons for the existence of this organisational form 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Granovetter, 1994; Leff, 1976). In this regard, Granovetter (1995) 
broadly classifies the frequently reported motives of group formation into four main types: 
first, resource dependent firms are rarely self-sufficient, and thus may form alliance with 
other firms upon whom they regularly depend for resources; second, the need for strategic 
alliance amongst firms facing the changing nature of markets and consumer demand; third, 
the need for coalitions emerges when capitalist firms have to ally against others; and fourth, 
rent-seeking objectives from the government through capitations. 
  
Groups around the world vary considerably in form. In a cross-country study carried out by 
La Porta et al. (1999), firm ownership was examined, with firms reported as being typically 
controlled by families through pyramidal ownership structures or hierarchical chains of 
ownership relations. The consequential group of firms—controlled by a single family—is 
referred to as a ‘family business group’ by Almeida & Wolfenzon (2006). Other forms of 
business groups include collections of firms connected through a director interlocks, common 
main bank, common owners, direct/indirect equity holdings, or other non-family social ties 
(Manos et al., 2000). 
 
The existing work on business groups in the emerging markets view the formation of 
business groups as a response to market imperfections. This perspective was initially 
presented by Leff (1976), and subsequently adopted by Caves & Uekusa (1976), Khanna & 
 64 
 
Palepu (2000), and Chang & Choi (1988). This stream of literature emphasises that capital 
market imperfection, such as information asymmetry, lack of adequate disclosure, 
undeveloped financial intermediaries, and weak contract enforcement institutions, together 
generate opportunistic behaviour amongst trading partners and increase the costs of 
transaction. In such an environment, ties can reduce transaction costs by facilitating 
information flow between firms or otherwise by aligning the interests of firms so that they 
strive collectively for mutual benefit (Khanna & Rivkin, 2006). Such groups may also use 
their broad scope to smooth out income flows, thereby ensuring access to internal capital in 
an environment in which external finance is costly and difficult to access. Using insights 
from the financial benefits associated with business group affiliation, it can be argued that the 
firms affiliated with a business group may have better access to internal and external capital 
than the non-affiliated firms.  
 
Business group is, in fact, a very prevalent phenomenon, known in many countries under 
various names, such as the keiretsu in Japan, the chaebol in Korea,  the grupos economics in 
Latin America, the ‘twenty-two families' of Pakistan,16 and so on (Granovetter, 1995). The 
business groups in Pakistan—like many other business groups around the world—are a 
collection of legally independent business entities run by families operating in multiple 
industries. Each business group is associated with a particular family, with the family 
patriarch the dominant shareholder and manager, whereas immediate and distant family 
members assist in operating other firms within the business group (Ghani et al., 2011). It is a 
common practice that family members of a group hold directorships in firms affiliated to the 
same group. In addition to interlocking directorship, various forms of financial tie, such as 
                                               
16
 White (1974) documented forty three of Pakistani family-run groups organised around state-sanctioned 
monopolies, and referred these groups as ‘twenty-two families’. 
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cross-holding of equity, debt guarantees and tunnelling of resources, are the main 
mechanisms through which firms in the groups are linked.  
 
The origin of business groups in Pakistan dates back to the colonial times, when few families 
had begun to evolve at the start of the 18th Century following the loss of monopolistic power 
of English East India Company over trade. At this time, employees of the company who were 
well-equipped with administrative and technical knowledge began to operate as free traders. 
Later, they diversified their business activities and organised themselves into Agency 
Houses 17  (Manos et al., 2000). Following independence in 1947, these Agency Houses 
evolved into business houses. In the post-liberation period, the evolution of business houses 
could be categorised into three phases, beginning with the post-liberation period up to the 
separation of East Pakistan (1947–1971), Bhutto era (1971–1977), and post-Bhutto era till 
today (Rehman, 2006). 
 
In the first phase, the government actively encouraged the development of basic domestic 
industry, and specially promoted the manufactured goods (primarily textile) instead of 
agriculture as the future strategy for economic development. Towards this end, government 
facilitated business families with extensive incentives in the form of tariffs, quotas, tax 
evasions and subsidies. Such financial benefits resulted in the development of a class of 
industrialists—subsequently known notoriously as the twenty-two families. The second phase 
is marked with industrial nationalization. Z.A. Bhutto’s government undertook large-scale 
nationalisation of firms from industry, insurance, and the banking sector, most of which were 
                                               
17
 The role of Agency Houses was to set up a new business with their wealth or in partnership of an individual 
or a firm. Once the business flourished he would sell it off and enters a managing agency contract with the new 
owner and setup a new business (Manos et al., 2007).  
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owned by members of the twenty-two families. By and large, it was generally perceived as an 
attempt to curb the growth of monopoly capital owned by such business groups18 . The 
inevitable outcome of this wave of nationalisation was a flight of capital out of the country. 
The third era began following the fall of Z.A. Bhutto’s regime. The economic policy of this 
period was characterised by greater reliance on private enterprise; therefore, nationalisation 
policies were reversed and industrial policies were framed to restore private sector confidence 
in government’s decision not to nationalise. The massive privatisation of state-owned firms, 
coupled with the eradication of entry barriers in the product market, was observed during this 
same period (Moihuddin, 2007). From the late 1980s, the government19 began to return some 
of the nationalised units back to these families. The government actively implemented 
industrial promotion policies of varying form, duration and degree. Gradually, the business 
environment became more suitable in relation to such business houses. During this period, 
new business families also emerged in the market and existing business groups increased the 
scope of their business activities and capitalised new opportunities offered by the deregulated 
market, this realising superior economic performance. 
 
For over a decade, international attention has focused on corporate accountability and 
reporting standards, especially in family owned (group-affiliated) firms. Initially, firms 
voluntarily comply with non-binding corporate governance codes to achieve high standard of 
corporate governance; over time, however, persistent demand for corporate transparency led 
to evolution from a voluntary notion of corporate governance to one where firms were legally 
obliged to disclose their ownership (Ibrahim, 2006). Following the international trend, in 
                                               
18
 Z.A. Bhutto’s regime nationalized as many as 31 key industries; 13 banks; 12 insurance companies; 10 
shipping companies and two petroleum companies (Ghani et al., 2011) 
19
 This political government was led by Nawaz Sharif, who himself an owner of a leading business house. 
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Pakistan, the SECP (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan) introduced the Code 
of Corporate Governance (CCG) in March of 2002, and subsequently enforced the code 
through listing regulations of all three stock exchanges of the country. According to this code, 
all of the listed firms have to disclose ownership of their shareholders owning 10% or more 
of the voting capital and the annual reports for major shareholders. However, the practice of 
this code is not prevalent, particularly amongst firms affiliated to business groups (Javid & 
Iqbal, 2010).The rationale for non-compliance with CCG can be attributed to the fact that the 
boards of group affiliated firms in Pakistan are generally dominated by executive and non-
executive members of a controlling family, which seeks to maintain managerial (voting) 
control by owning the majority of the stock or otherwise by cross-shareholdings whilst 
owning even a small fraction of ownership. Their hierarchical ownership structures within the 
groups make it difficult for outsiders to track the actual business ownership of individual 
firms. As a result, Pakistani firms affiliated with business groups have lower transparency 
and weaker corporate governance mechanism (Gani & Ashraf, 2005). Considering this 
scenario, in this study, it is not possible to define a firm as group-affiliated on the basis of the 
percentage of ownership.  
 
Alternatively, in an attempt to identify the group affiliation of the sample, this research relies 
on the book by Rehman (2006), which reports the list of the top 38 business groups (based on 
their sizes) and their associated firms in the Pakistani market. This is the updated edition of 
the book that focuses on the 38 top business groups in Pakistan. Amongst those, 8 business 
houses only comprise of non-listed and/or financial firms, and thus we could match our 
sample set only to the remaining 30 business group-affiliated firms. The similar source is also 
used in several other studies, such as those of Masulis et al. (2011), Ashraf & Ghani (2005), 
and Candland (2007). In addition, official websites of these business groups, mentioning the 
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names of affiliated firms, were also cross-checked. This classification yields 105 group-
affiliated firms and 275 firms as non-affiliated. 
 
3.6 Financial disclosure practices in Pakistan 
There are three accounting bodies operating in Pakistan, namely Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Pakistan (ICAP), Institute of Cost and Management Accountant of Pakistan 
(ICMA) and Pakistan Institute of Public Finance Accountant (PIPFA) 20 . After gaining 
independence in 1947, Pakistan kept the Companies Act of 1913 as the system of financial 
reporting until 1971. Due to the rudimentary nature of this act, the government created a 
semi-autonomous body (Security and Exchange Authority, SEA) in 1970 to improve the 
existing disclosure requirements. For the first time, the publication of bi-annual financial 
statements for listed firms was made mandatory on the recommendations of SEA. By this 
time, since Pakistan had no country-level accounting standard of its own, ICAP encouraged 
its members to recommend that their corporate clients prepare their accounts in conformity 
with international accounting standards. Subsequently, Companies Ordinance 1984 was 
enacted in 1984. According to its Section 234, it was mandatory for listed firms to comply 
with International Accounting Standards (IAS); nonetheless, unlisted firms remained exempt 
from compliance with IAS (currently known as International Financial Reporting Standards, 
IFRS).  
 
The two aspects of financial disclosure in Companies Ordinance 1984 were critical, and are 
pertinent to our study: first, the disclosures of the control hierarchy, remuneration of 
directors, chief executive officers, and auditors are required from companies; second, in 
                                               
20
 This section is mainly based on the exploratory study of Ashraf & Ghani (2005). 
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financial reports management were required to disclose various data, namely earning per 
share, any changes known to have occurred during the reporting year concerning the nature 
of the business, and information relating to defaults on payments of leverage (if any).  
 
The next significant improvement in the financial reporting system is the introduction of 
Code of Corporate Governance in 2002. The main intention of this code is to boost the 
confidence of investors in the capital market through the mitigation of moral hazard 
problems. This initiative encouraged firms to disclose previously concealed information 
concerning their credit worthiness, such as loan defaults, tax evasions, and the non-payment 
of dividends to shareholders for a longer period of time. The code calls on listed firms to 
publish un-audited financial statements quarterly; earlier, it was semi-annually. All listed 
firms were required to include in the annual report a statement of compliance with the best 
practices of corporate governance. A brief description of evolution of the institutional 
structure of financial disclosure is presented in Table 3.3.  
 
Table 3.3: Evolution of institutional structure of financial disclosure in Pakistan 
Year Standards adoption 
1984 Companies Ordinance 1984 
1986 IAS 1,2,7-14 
1996 IAS 23-25  
1997 IAS 31,32 
1998 IAS 26-28 
2000 IAS 30, 34, 35, 37, 38 
2002 Corporate Code of Governance 
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Although the accounting practices in Pakistan are based mainly on IFRS, one additional sub-
standard, Islamic Financial Accounting Standards (IFAS), is nevertheless operational, which 
is known to relate to Islamic financial system. IFAS concerns the Islamic modes of financing, 
which provides guidelines to relevant firms in terms of preparing financial statements. More 
specifically, IFAS-1 concerns the instalment sale under Islamic principles, termed as 
‘Murabah’, whilst IFAS-2 relates to lease transactions under Islamic rules, termed as ‘Ijarah’. 
However, IFAS are pertinent only to Islamic financial institutions that are not included in the 
current study; therefore, focus can be directed towards other practicing standards. 
 
Earlier studies argue that the effective implementation of reporting standards ultimately 
depends on institutional stability (Meek & Saudagaran, 1990; Gernon & Meek, 2001). Much 
the same as many other developing countries, Pakistan has a rather weak creditor protection 
mechanism, and company law is regarded as least administrative law (Ashraf & Gani, 2005). 
Consequently, the expropriation of minority shareholders and creditors is extensive. 
Moreover, as discussed earlier, family control is a common feature of the Pakistani capital 
market. The informal hierarchies amongst family firms contradict the formal structural of 
management and governance. Given the complexity of organisational structure within family-
controlled firms, it is difficult to identify and deal with related party transactions21. A recent 
survey of UNCTAD (2009)—which examines the disclosure practices of firms listed on the 
Karachi Stock Exchange in Pakistan—shows that financial transparency (financial and 
operating outcomes) is the most prevalent feature of disclosure; however, disclosure 
regulations regarding the Board members (Board structure, control rights, role of the Board 
                                               
21
 Related party transaction takes place when the groups in the deal have a prior relationship. The Amendment to 
IFRS 8 deals the related party disclosure (Baker and Anderson, 2010).  
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of Directors, information on outside directors) are not followed entirely22 . Largely, this 
survey depicts that many firms are not, at present, in compliance with the disclosure 
regulations.  
 
Finally, in accordance with the views of Ashraf & Ghani (2005), we may conclude that the 
implementation of a financial reporting system may only be possible in the presence of better 
legal rules, and with the stability of regulatory institutions. The judicial inefficiencies, lack of 
investor protection, and weak enforcement mechanisms are essential aspects explaining the 
low quality of financial disclosure within the Pakistani capital market. 
  
                                               
22
 This study is conducted by UNCTAD in corporation with the Institute of Charted Accountants of Pakistan.  
 72 
 
CHAPTER 4: LEVERAGE AND POLITICAL CONNECTIONS: FIRM-LEVEL 
EVIDENCE FROM PAKISTAN 
 
4.1  Introduction 
The intricate nexus between the financial institutions and business world has long been 
acknowledged; however, the East Asian financial turmoil of 1997–1998 brought into sharp 
focus the distinction between the relationship-based financial system prevalent in many 
developing countries, as well as the arm’s-length market-driven system that characterises 
developed economies (Charumilind et al., 2006). Although political connection is pertinent to 
both financial systems, it is widely argued that the prevalence of the political connection is 
considerably higher in developing countries based on a relationship-based financial system. 
The recent studies (Xu et al., 2011; Li et al., 2009; Claessens et al., 2008) carried out on 
contracting in the context of the developing countries find that firms’ reliance on political 
connection is stemmed by a response to the inadequacies in formal institutions that makes 
arm’s-length financing impracticable.  
 
There are a growing number of recent studies focused on the implications of political 
connections that document the various economic benefits as the outcomes of these 
connections (Faccio, 2006; Infante & Piaza, 2010; Cooper et al., 2010)23 . Such studies 
acknowledge the potential link between the political patronage and a firm’s leverage. 
Although prior empirical work provides some degree of insight into the relationship between 
financing decisions and the political connections, however, such evidences are mainly based 
                                               
23
 Though these studies provide several positive outcomes of political connections, i.e. bailout, privileges in 
formal policies, informal grants but we focus on access to finance as a channel through which political 
connections pay off. 
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on the relatively ‘clean’ US system (Houston et al., 2012; Jayachandran, 2006; Roberts, 
1990; Kroszner & Stratmann 1998). Empirical evidence from developing economies may 
provide additional insights into the corporate connection-finance nexus.  
 
In this chapter, this line of inquiry is pursued further through examining the way in which 
corporate political connections determine access to finance in a developing economy—that of 
Pakistan. Moreover, we argue that the Pakistani setting may be of interest for several 
different reasons. First, Pakistan is known for its execrable relations between politicians and 
firms, as has been confirmed by Khwaja & Mian (2005). During the past fifteen years, three 
elected governments were dissolved on identical accusations of maladministration, 
corruption, and political patronage, which reflects the widespread extent of political 
corruption within the economy. Second, considering the limited level of financial institutional 
development, the state-ownership of banks and the weak democratic institutions, the value of 
political connections is likely to be greater than that of other developing countries. Most of 
this value stems from preferential access to credit from government banks owing to the fact 
that their decision-making commonly reflects the policies dictated by the government. Third, 
Pakistan has a higher percentage of politically connected firms, and there are no legal 
restrictions to such connections (Rehman, 2006). Such features of the Pakistani economy 
provide a better prospect for testing at an individual firm level in order to ascertain whether 
or not the firm’s political connections help in preferential lending.  
 
This chapter addresses three fundamental political economy questions. First, do the firms 
with political connections have easier access to leverage than those without such ties? In 
other words, it may be implied that firms with political connections comprise more leverage 
than their non-connected peers. Second, does privileged access to finance (if any) vary 
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according to the strength of the connected politician? Third, are the standard firm-specific 
determinants of leverage that are known to be associated with corporate financing decision 
also significant for politically connected firms in terms of accessing debt.  
 
The aforementioned questions are tested empirically with Pakistani firm-level data. The 
nature of data employed provides two main advantages: firstly, a direct measure of political 
connections is used as opposed to the subjective measures, which are typically based on the 
subjective assessment of certain individuals, and which are reported in survey data or ‘expert 
reports’24; and secondly, the unobserved heterogeneity is mitigated across an extended nine-
year sample period by employing a panel dataset with time-fixed effects25 to exploit the 
variation over years in our estimation.  
 
The results show a positive and significant link between political connections and leverage. 
The connected firms—defined as if its director participates in an election—are more levered 
than non-connected firms, accordingly supporting the political lending conjecture in the 
Pakistani credit market. Once the leverage measure is split based on debt maturity, the 
positive effect of connections remain only for long-term loans, whilst the firm’s political 
connections do not have any effect on short-term finance. The results remain significant 
following the controlling of the firm’s characteristics. The achieved results are robust to 
potential endogeneity issues, alternative estimation techniques and across government 
periods. Furthermore, we find that having connections with a winning politician or a 
politician affiliated with the winning parties (coalition) has a larger impact on the firm’s total 
                                               
24
 Subjective measures, mostly rely on numerical rating index, are widely employed to determine corporate 
political connections in related empirical studies i.e. Fisman (2001); and Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006).  
25
 It is worth mentioning that firm fixed-effects are not utilized in the analysis. The underlying reason is the 
small variation across firms’ characteristics and importantly since we are using industry fixed-effects which, to 
some extent, absorb firm-level differences such as profitability, size of physical assets and growth opportunities.     
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and long-term leverage, thereby implying that the benefits associated with the political 
connections ultimately rest on electoral outcomes.  
 
Finally, in relation to the role of firm-specific characteristics in the financing decisions of 
connected firms, we find the limited support for the importance of these determinants in 
explaining access to leverage. More specifically, firm size and business group affiliation have 
increasing effects on the borrowing capabilities of connected firms. In contrast, connections 
underplay the significance of collateral. Those firms with ties with politicians require much 
less collateral to borrow than those without connections. Finally, the remaining standard firm 
characteristics that are widely used as determinants of leverage—namely profitability, growth 
opportunities, and foreign ownership—do not seem to play an important role in the financing 
decisions of connected firms.  
 
This study contributes to literature in two main ways. First, this study extends the research on 
the effects of political connections (e.g. Braggion & Moore, 2011; Ferguson & Voth, 2008; 
Faccio, 2006; Boubakri et al., 2008) by providing convincing evidence that the political 
connectedness helps in accessing external finance. Moreover, we take a step further and 
conduct a series of tests in an attempt to highlight that such results vary across the strength of 
politicians and firm-specific characteristics. Second, our findings add to the corporate 
investment literature by emphasising the importance of political connectedness in the context 
of corporate financing decisions. Present studies are based primarily on standard corporate 
finance theories, such as Trade-off theory, Pecking order theory and Agency cost theory 
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(Marsh, 1982; Graham, 2000; Jalilvand & Harris, 1984; Harrison et al., 2004)26. However, 
we find that political forces play a significant role in the financing decisions of the firms; 
thus, the political aspect needs to be included in theoretical consideration whilst 
simultaneously examining corporate financing decisions.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 describes the relationship 
between politics and business in Pakistan; in Section 4.3, there is a brief review of some of 
the relevant theories, which lays the foundation for building the hypotheses of the study; 
Section 4.4 describes the data and summary statistics; Section 4.5 explains the empirical 
methodology; the main empirical results are reported and discussed in Section 4.6; and 
finally, Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.  
 
4.2 Business-politics nexus in Pakistan 
Politics in Pakistan has been linked with clientelism, rent-seeking, and corruption; this is 
evident from the Index of Economic Freedom co-published by The Heritage Foundation and 
the Wall Street Journal. The index consistently ranked Pakistan as being one of the most 
corrupt countries in the world.27  During the past decade and a half, three elected prime 
ministers and their respective assemblies have been dissolved on identical charges of 
corruption and political patronage. Such facts illustrate a phenomenon which has passed 
through the Pakistani economy during recent years.  
 
                                               
26
 The origin of Trade-off theory traces back to the famous propositions of Modigliani and Miller (1958). 
Pecking order theory was first set out by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Agency cost theory initially proposed by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
27
 Recently, in year 2009, Pakistan is ranked 139th out of the 180 countries featured in the index. More details 
are available athttp://www.heritage.org/index/freedom-from-corruption 
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Since the establishment of Pakistan, business has been overlapping the political arena. Yusuf 
Haroon, a leading industrialist, was the first Chief Minister of Sindh province, and persons 
such as Ahmad Dawood (founding owner of Dawood group), Naseer A Sheikh (founding 
owner of Colony group), and Rafiq Saigol (founding owner of Saigol group) held important 
official posts in the ruling parties and the governments (Rehman, 2006) 28 . During this 
particular era, approximately half of the total private firms were controlled by five small 
‘communities’ of traditional traders, all of whom were also involved in national or state level 
politics (Maniruzzaman, 1966). 
 
The leading political parties that participated in the general elections in 2002 and 2008 were 
led by politicians representing some of the industrial elite in the country29. The coalition 
governments of Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in 2002 and Prime Minister Yousaf R. Gilani in 
2008 comprised political parties with different policies and ideologies. The majority of the 
cabinet members were drawn from large business conglomerates; they were from families 
that owned big businesses, such as the Saifullah Group (of Anwar Saifullah, Federal Minister 
during 2002–2007), Zardari Group (of Asif A. Zardari, current president), Chauhadry Group 
(of Pervez Elahi, Chief Minister of Punjab during 2002–2007), Service Industries (of Ahmad 
Mukhtar, current water and power management), Ittefaq Foundries (of Sharif family, current 
Chief Minister of Punjab), Kohistan Transport (of Shahid Nazir, member of national 
assembly during 2002–2007), and Riaz Bottlers (of Humayun Akhtar Khan, Minister for 
Trade and Commerce during 2002–2007). In an environment with politicians holding 
business interests, it is difficult to sustain a distinction between ‘business interests’ and 
                                               
28
 Over the time these groups have diversified enormously and become more large and visible. Currently, 
Dawood group comprises of 30 companies, Colony group controls 11 firms, and Saigol group operates 61 
companies.  
29
 Given the duration of our sample period, 2002 to 2010, there are two general elections held in 2002 and 2008 
are pertinent to this study.  
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‘interests of the state’. Thus, it is argued that several politicians systematically misappropriate 
resources on a grand scale through the abuse of allocated role of the state. 
 
Desai & Olofsgard (2011) illustrates that, unlike in developed countries, where cronyism 
takes the form of privileges enshrined in formal policies, discriminatory enforcement of 
formal rules, and informal grants, political favours in developing countries typically adopt the 
form of preferential credit to particular firms (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Li et al., 2009; 
Claessens et al., 2008), tax evasion (Adhikari et al., 2006; Faccio, 2006) and utility bill 
exemptions (Desai & Olofsgard, 2011). Khwaja & Mian (2005) affirm this by showing that 
the predominant means of obtaining political rent in Pakistan is through bank loans. They 
further report that state banks allow for greater extraction of rents by the politician for three 
key reasons: first, loan decisions in state banks are directly influenced by politicians; second, 
they are simply the more dominant domestic players within the banking sector, and, although 
the proportion of private banks has been on the increase since the instigation of financial 
reforms in 1991, the public sector has remained a leading lender; and third, soft budget 
constraints lower the cost of capital for government banks, with the strong support received 
from the government allowing them to remain solvent, despite the higher level of default rate 
on its loans. Moreover, owing to their organisational structure, the lending decisions of 
governmental banks are more prone to being influenced by the politicians. With this noted, 
the top management is appointed by the government, which is charged with devising the 
policies of the bank, and lending decisions of large credit. Therefore, bank management acts 
in ways that are in line with politicians’ interests, and which ultimately benefit their affiliated 
firm. 
 
 79 
 
The politicians in Pakistan have remained powerful enough to enrich themselves and their 
firms through borrowing from banks and defaulting on loans. It is evident from the State 
Bank of Pakistan on political lending that ‘total advances made by the bank in 1990 were 
estimated at Rs 230 billion… (and) only 1200 persons received loans of Rs 10 million and 
above against their firms, with a 48% stake of the entire cake, by receiving Rs 110 billion in 
loan’30. This quote suggests that approximately half of the credit—mainly from governmental 
banks—reaches firms with political connections. Based on this discussion, this relationship 
between businesses and politics is tested empirically in the following sections. 
 
4.3  Theoretical foundations and hypotheses development 
In their landmark paper in 1958, Modigliani & Miller (MM) argue that, in a world of perfect 
markets—a world without taxes, symmetric information, no agency conflicts, etc.—the extent 
of leverage in the capital structure of a firm would not affect a firm’s value. The perfect 
capital market has attracted a wide variety of research that relaxes the assumptions 
underlying MM’s irrelevance proposition. Researchers continue to add elements of the real 
world in quest of how earlier MM’s theoretical predictions change accordingly. This has 
resulted in a number of theoretical frameworks, all of which have their antecedents that seek 
to explain the corporate debt utilisation. Three theories—Trade-off theory, Pecking order 
theory, and Agency theory—are viewed as forming the building blocks for this study31.  
 
According to Trade-off theory, each firm maintains a target debt–equity ratio that stems from 
the trade-off between the benefits of tax deductibility of interest payments and the higher 
bankruptcy risk from debt (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973; Kim, 1978). In contrast, Pecking-
                                               
30
 Also mentioned in Rehman (2006). 
31
 These theories are discussed in detail in Chapter 2, section 2.4.  
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order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984) is based on asymmetric information that exists between 
the management of a firm (insiders) and its investors (outsiders). It predicts a preference 
ranking over financing sources—internal financing first, external debt second—with external 
equity financing a last resort. Finally, Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) concerns the 
relationship between principal shareholders (principal) and managers (agent). The fiduciary 
duty of managers is centred on maximising the wealth of shareholders. Agency theory 
predicts that, since the owners cannot perfectly and costlessly monitor the actions and 
information of managers, managers may therefore seek to maximise their own personal 
benefits as opposed to maximising the welfare of shareholders. Such managerial opportunism 
imposes agency costs to firm.  
 
4.3.1   Access to Credit 
As indicated, the Trade-off theory predicts that the optimal capital structure of a firm is 
determined by balancing the benefits of tax deductibility of interest payments against the 
deadweight bankruptcy costs emerging from higher debt. A large body of literature has 
shown that firm-specific characteristics encompass important implications for financing 
choice (Holmes & Kent, 1991; Watson & Wilson, 2002). Given that a firm’s attributes shape 
the financing choice, the political connections—one of the most important aspects of the 
business world—may also influence financing decisions, and thus the prediction of Trade-off 
theory. More specifically, it can induce impacts in two main ways: firstly, as Manos et al. 
(2007) indicate, connected firms are able to reduce their expenses associated with tax 
liabilities by utilising their political connections; and secondly, connected firms are able to 
reduce bankruptcy cost by ex ante ensuring cheap credit and the ex post securing government 
bailouts. Having said, the Trade-off theory considers the cost of leverage as the cost of 
default—the cheap credit to connected firms indeed decreases the expected cost of financial 
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distress—thus influencing the debt–equity balance. Importantly, utilization of more credit 
facilitates connected firms in reducing the overall cost through paying less tax (tax shelter). 
Following the given arguments of tax deductibility benefits and reduced cost of financial 
distress to connected firms, it is expected that a greater use of leverage be observed amongst 
connected firms.  
 
Pecking order theory—which notably suggests a preference of internal capital over external 
finance (Myers & Majluf 1984; Narayanan, 1988) and leverage—is regarded as a second 
choice owing to the fact that it involves costs to secure it; however, the easy assessable credit 
to connected firms entices managers to make use of higher leverage that contradicts the 
suggestion of the Pecking order theory.  
 
A large body of empirical work has documented that firms with political connections enjoy 
exceptional access to government loans, and are in turn more likely to employ excessive 
leverage in financing decision (Faccio, 2006; Desai & Olofsgard, 2011; Fan et al., 2008, 
2007; Ye et al., 2012; Fisman, 2001)32. This view predicts a positive relationship between a 
firm’s political connections and the degree of financial leverage. Nevertheless, there are 
studies depicting the inverse, or a complete lack of relationship between political connections 
and leverage (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009; Asquer & Calderoni, 2011). In 
light of such diverse findings, it is still too difficult to draw a definitive conclusion regarding 
the impact of connections on a firm’s leverage. Regardless, however, following the widely 
held empirical conclusion and with consideration towards the low costs of financial distress 
for politically connected firms, it can be implied that, ceteris paribus, firms with political 
                                               
32
 Detailed literature review of these studies is provided in the chapter 2, section 2.4. 
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connections enjoy favourable treatment and thus maintain a higher degree of leverage than 
non-connected firms.  
 
Extensive anecdotal evidence indicates that influential firms maintain banks as offshoots of 
their businesses. Thereby, Pakistani private banks, in general, and government banks, in 
particular, appear to lend and extend loans based on personal ties rather than on the basis of 
collateral and future cash flow. For example, The News, a Pakistani newspaper, reported 
how, during 2002-2007, National bank and United bank of Pakistan allotted loans worth Rs. 
120 million to the Chauhadry Group against their textile and sugar mills, on preferential 
terms which were later written off. Similarly, the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), set 
up in 2000 with the aim to prosecute those involved in large-scale corruption, reported that 
during 2002-2007, a sum of Rs. 54 billion was credited on the basis of political influence 
without inquiring the creditworthiness of the firms. These instances indicate that firm’s 
political connections are more important than traditionally known determinants of leverage to 
access debt in the capital market. Formally, this may be stated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Politically connected firms have a higher degree of leverage than non-
connected firms. 
 
4.3.2  Winning Impact 
The literature consistently reports that connected firms benefit more when they are connected 
to the winning candidate or when the candidate belongs to the winning (ruling) party33 (i.e. 
Infante & Piaza, 2010; Asquer & Calderoni, 2011). Winning or being a member of a winning 
                                               
33
 Winning (ruling) party implies that party is a part of coalition government, since as outcomes of both 
elections 2002 and 2008 coalition governments were formed.  
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party (or ruling coalition) ultimately increases the political strength of a politician in 
obtaining even greater preferential access to credit from banks, and thus benefit its connected 
firm; therefore, in essence, the question focuses on whether or not the level of financial 
borrowing of politically connected firms increases when its politician or political party wins 
the election.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The level of leverage is greater for firms connected to a politician who wins or 
belongs to a winning party (or ruling coalition).  
 
4.3.3   Sub-hypotheses 
Theoretical and empirical studies have shown that size, collateral, profitability, growth 
opportunities, and ownership structure; and so on affect access to leverage34. We develop 
further hypotheses regarding these firm-specific variables in context of political lending.  
 
4.3.3.1   Firm Size 
There are several theoretical reasons to believe that firm size affects leverage: for instance, 
firstly, unlike small firms, larger firms may find it relatively less costly to resolve information 
asymmetries with lenders; size may act as a proxy for the information that outside investors 
hold. As Fama & Jensen (1983) and Rajan & Zingales (1995) argue, larger firms tend to 
provide more information to outside lenders than smaller ones; therefore, larger firms are 
offered more capital or are otherwise offered capital at lower costs than smaller firms. 
Secondly, larger firms have higher external financing owing to lower bankruptcy costs and 
                                               
34 Harris & Raviv (1990) provide a comprehensive literature review of related studies discussing the 
determinants of a firm’s access to leverage.  
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operating risk; therefore, firm size may be an inverse proxy for the likelihood of bankruptcy 
(Frank & Goyal, 2009). Fama & Jensen (1983) argue that larger firms tend to be more 
diversified, and are therefore less prone to bankruptcy. If operating risk and bankruptcy costs 
inversely relate to firm size, this should predispose smaller firms to use relatively less 
external finance (Harris & Raviv, 1990). Both arguments notably espouse the Trade-off 
theory, and suggest that size should be positively related with leverage. However, in contrast, 
the Pecking order theory predicts the negative relation by arguing that, since larger firms tend 
to possess lower information asymmetry, they are therefore more able to issue 
informationally sensitive securities, such as equity, and thus should have less debt.  
 
Politically connected firms replace the significance of firm size with connections as a 
guarantee for stability, and thus limit the role of firm size as a determinant of leverage. Faccio 
et al. (2006) showed that government bailouts amongst politically connected firms may 
reduce the risk of default even in small firms. Similarly, Hoshi et al. (1990) report that firms 
with connections to a bank may face lower costs of financial distress, which underplays the 
significance of size in this respect. In a recent study, Poyry & Maury (2010) find the negative 
relation between firm size and the level of debt amongst connected firms. However, 
contrarily, Fraser et al. (2006) find a positive and significant relationship between the size of 
politically connected firms with leverage, and further observe more debt usage in large 
connected firms. With this noted, owing to the inconclusive impact of political connections 
on firm size as a determinant of access to leverage, it is difficult to predict the direction of 
relationship. Nevertheless, following a former strand of literature, the hypothesis for this 
study can predict a negative relationship for politically connected firms. 
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Hypothesis 3a: Firm size is less important to politically connected firms in specific regard to 
debt financing.  
 
A negative and significant coefficient on this variable would indicate the lower importance of 
size for debt financing in the connected firms. On the other hand, a positive and significant 
coefficient would indicate that leverage, as an increasing effect of political patronage, is 
stronger for larger firms.  
 
4.3.3.2   Collateral 
The availability of firm’s tangible assets may influence the firm’s overall access to leverage. 
Tangible assets send a positive signal to the lender since fixed assets constitute favourable 
collateral for debt as in the case of default. Trade-off theory suggests that firms utilise 
physical assets as collateral so as to provide lenders with security in the event of financial 
distress. Pecking order theory also predicts a positive relation between collateral and 
leverage, and further asserts that physical assets, as collateral, reduce information asymmetry 
between the firm and lender. Harris & Raviv (1990) and Titman & Wessels (1988) state that 
tangibility might be a major factor in determining the firm’s debt level. Most empirical 
studies (e.g. Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Marsh, 1982; Walsh & Ryan, 1997) conclude that those 
firms with a high level of tangible assets have a higher level of debt. On the other hand, 
however, Chittenden et al. (1996) find tangibility to be positively associated only with long-
term debt, whilst a negative correlation can be seen when considering short-term debt.  
 
The role of asset tangibility in terms of accessing credit is more vital in market-oriented 
systems than bank-oriented ones (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Berger & Udell (1995) report that 
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firms with close links to lenders may require less physical collateral than those lacking such 
relationships. Whilst extending this view, Poyry & Maury (2010) and Charumilind et al. 
(2006) argue that firms utilise political connection as a substitute of tangible assets, and 
report the negative relation between level of debt and the size of physical collateral. In 
contrast, Fraser et al. (2006) report that the collateral value of a firm’s fixed assets remains 
important in terms of accessing debt—even when having political connections. In particular, 
they argue that connected firms with larger fixed assets—which can be collateralised—are in 
a stronger position to extract additional debt than mere firms with political patronage. Once 
again, such empirical evidence is inconclusive; however, despite such contradictory evidence, 
the weight of available empirical evidence for the impact of political connections finds asset 
tangibility to be negatively correlated with debt. A testable hypothesis for the tangibility of 
assets may be that detailed below: 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Tangible assets are less important to politically connected firms in debt 
financing. 
 
A negative and significant coefficient on this variable would indicate the lesser significance 
of collateral for politically connected firms to access debt. On the other hand, a positive and 
significant coefficient would indicate that leverage, as increasing the effect of political 
patronage, is stronger for firms with large tangible assets.  
 
4.3.3.3   Profitability 
Although much theoretical work has been carried out since that of MM (1958), no consistent 
theoretical prediction has been established thus far for the relationship between profitability 
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and leverage. Nevertheless, the negative relationship predicted by Pecking order theory 
dominates the debate concerning the impact of profitability on capital structure. Following 
the Pecking order prediction, profitable firms should use more retained earnings and tend to 
have less leverage owing to their ability to generate sufficient cash. On the other hand, tax-
based theories suggest that profitable firms should borrow more, ceteris paribus, as they are 
stronger to face financial distress and bankruptcy costs. The empirical findings also show 
mixed results. Studies such as those by Titman & Wessels (1998), Booth et al. (2001), and 
Wald (1999) report a negative relation between profitability and leverage. In contrast, Long 
& Maltiz (1985) highlight a positive effect of profitability on leverage.  
 
For the politically connected firms, Fraser et al. (2006) observes that political patronage 
increases a firm’s leverage if the firm is profitable. Moreover, they also observe a positive 
relationship between profitability and leverage for politically connected firms, mainly 
because of their ability to engage in political activity. Following this prediction, we can 
hypothesise the following: 
 
Hypothesis 3c: Firm profitability is more important to politically connected firms in debt 
financing.  
 
4.3.3.4   Growth opportunities 
 
Generally, theoretical studies predict the negative relationship between growth opportunities 
and the leverage. According to Jung et al. (1996) firms pursuing growth objectives bring 
together the interests of management and shareholders with strong investment opportunities, 
although shareholders of firms lacking investment opportunities tend to utilise debt as a 
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device for limiting the agency costs associated with managerial discretion. The growth 
opportunity is positively related to the level of the asymmetric information problem firms 
face when trying to acquire leverage. Myers (1984) suggests that fast-growing firms tend to 
utilise less leverage owing to having fewer tangible assets, and thus, growth opportunities 
cannot be collateralised. He adds that highly levered firms normally pass up profitable 
investment opportunities owing to agency problems. The Trade-off theory further argues that 
since growth opportunities are capital assets that add value to the firm but which cannot be 
collateralised, therefore firms holding future growth opportunities tend to borrow less. 
Accordingly, a negative association between leverage and growth opportunities is predicted. 
Earlier studies have found growth as being negatively related to long-term debt (Ozkan, 
2001; Graham, 2000; Titman & Wessels, 1988), and positively related to short-term debt 
(Baskin, 1989; Titman & Wessels, 1988). Titman & Wessels (1989) claim that, if firms with 
growth options are forced to acquire external finance, they would be inclined to use more 
short-term debt as opposed to long-term debt.  
 
From a political connections perspective, as growing firms often need to expand long-term 
operating assets, they therefore require more funds for financing, which connected firms are 
able to accumulate easily from external sources. Moreover, such firms do not need to lean 
towards inexpensive retained earnings for further investments since cheaper debt is available 
to them as a result of political influence. Based on this notion, the following may be 
hypothesised:  
 
Hypothesis 3d: Firm growth opportunities are more important to politically connected firms 
in debt financing.  
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4.3.3.5   Foreign ownership 
Foreign ownership brings in not only capital and technology, but also modern management 
and better governance practices. In addition, firms with foreign ownership are associated with 
lower idiosyncratic risk and lower default risk, thus making them more favourable to lend 
credit in credit market. Foreign-owned firms can also access credit through their parent 
company, and thus insure themselves against liquidity constraints. From the agency cost 
perspective, it is relatively more difficult for foreign investors to monitor management owing 
to geographical distance; therefore, there is a demand for higher usage of leverage so as to 
keep management under control. Essentially, evidence suggests that, owing to relatively 
easier access to leverage, foreign firms commonly substitute internal borrowing for external 
borrowing when operating in environments with weak institutions (Desai et al., 2004). With 
this noted several studies (Blalock et al., 2008; Hussain & Nivorozhkin, 1997) report that 
foreign-owned firms with greater access to domestic and overseas financing are highly 
levered. Based on arguments that represent superior capabilities of foreign-owned firms, it 
can be stated that political connections augment such firms’ abilities to acquire credit from 
domestic financial market. Formally, this perspective is hypothesised as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 3e: Firm foreign ownership is more important to politically connected firms in 
debt financing.  
 
4.3.3.6   Business groups 
Existing evidence from the business group literature shows that the leverage of group-
affiliated firms is greater than that of stand-alone firms. The literature supports this statement 
with several arguments. First, firms affiliated with a group can reduce the expected costs of 
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default by providing loan guarantees—thus using the assets of one group member as 
collateral for another—to their group members (Manos et al., 2007). Second, affiliated firms 
can share group-wide reputation, and thus enhance their access to external creditors (Chang 
& Hong, 2000). Third, group affiliation can increase access to external finance through using 
their ability to access policy makers (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998).  
 
From a political economic standpoint, political connection is regarded as the essence of 
business groups as they have superior capabilities of establishing valuable political 
connections (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007); therefore, it is plausible to state that they utilise such a 
capability to leverage their associated firms. Based on this fact, it is hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 3f: Firm business group affiliation is more important to politically connected 
firms in debt financing.  
 
Table 4.1 presents the traditional arguments and implications associated with capital structure 
theories on the relationship between each of the aforementioned firm characteristics and 
leverage.  
 
Table 4.1: Theoretical arguments and predicted signs on the determinants of leverage 
Firm 
Characteristics 
Trade-off theory Pecking order theory Agency cost 
theory 
Our Predicted 
Signs for 
Connected 
Firms 
Size (+) Larger firms tend 
to be more diversified, 
less risky therefore 
less prone to 
bankruptcy. 
(─) Larger firms suffer 
less information 
asymmetry therefore 
equity finance is more 
attractive to them. 
(?) (―) Political 
connections 
substitute the 
importance of 
size 
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Collateral (+) Higher 
collateralisable assets 
can be offered as a 
security to lenders and 
lead to low cost of 
financial distress.  
(+) Lower information 
asymmetries.  
(+) Higher 
tangible assets 
diminish the 
lender’s risk of 
suffering agency 
cost of debt. 
(―) Political 
connections 
substitute the 
importance of 
collateral 
Profitability (+) Profitable firms 
can face bankruptcy 
costs more strongly 
than less profitable 
firms.  
(─) Higher possibilities 
of retained earnings  
(+) Firms employ 
leverage to avert 
managers from 
wasting financial 
resources. 
(+) Profitable 
firms have more 
ability to engage 
in costly political 
activity and 
thereby benefit 
themselves from 
leverage. 
Growth-
opportunities 
(─) Growth 
opportunities are not 
being used as 
collateral and cause 
higher costs of 
financial distress. 
(+) Growing firms need 
more funds, and they 
prefer debt over equity. 
(─) Highly 
levered firms 
pass-up positive 
investment 
opportunities and 
suffer 
underinvestment 
problems.  
(+) Growing 
firms require 
more funds 
therefore tend to 
accumulate more 
leverage 
Foreign 
ownership 
(?) (?) (+) Firms having 
investors located 
abroad use 
leverage to 
monitor 
management.  
(+) Superior 
capabilities of 
foreign firms 
enable them to 
accumulate more 
leverage 
Business group 
affiliation 
(?) (?) (─) Complex 
business structure 
increases the 
information 
asymmetric 
problems 
(+) Superior 
capabilities of 
group affiliated 
firms enable 
them to 
accumulate more 
leverage 
 
4.4  Data 
Data sources 
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Firm-level data used in this study comes mainly from OSIRIS, operated by Bureau Van Dijk, 
which provides financial details and information regarding Board members of over 70,000 
listed firms across the world. In addition, information on business group affiliation is 
obtained from the Rehman (2006), which reports the list of top business groups (based on 
their size) and their associated firms in Pakistan35. Subsequently, in an attempt to identify the 
firm’s connections with politicians, there is a need to garner data on politicians. In this 
regard, we relied on the dataset provided by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP)36. 
The ECP conducts elections for the National and Provincial Assemblies, and further 
maintains the comprehensive information on national and provincial elections, including 
candidates list, complete with their full names, parties’ positions, and electoral outcomes. 
Since there have been only two general (national and provincial) elections within the last 
decade and a half, general elections held in 2002 and 2008, therefore the sample period 
2002–2010 is selected to include these two election periods, and also to maximise the number 
of observations possible throughout the analysis. Importantly, there were around 272 national 
and 577 provincial constituencies in each election, with 6–9 candidates per constituency, and 
a total of over 10,500 candidates for both elections.  
 
Sample selection  
The sample includes non-financial listed firms from Pakistan for the period 2002–2010.The 
decision to restrict the sample only to the non-financial sector is owing to the accounting 
treatment of revenue and profits for financial firms (banks, insurance and investment firms) 
being significantly different to that of non-financial firms. Rajan & Zingales (1995) argue 
                                               
35
 Similar source is used in several other studies to identify the business group affiliation in Pakistan, such as 
Masulis et al. (2011), Ashraf and Ghani (2005), and Candland (2007). 
36Khwaja and Mian (2005) have employed the same dataset to identify the political connections in Pakistani. 
Data can accessible through the following link: http://www.ecp.gov.pk/ 
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that the leverage of financial firms is highly affected by explicit (or implicit) investor 
insurance schemes, such as deposit insurance. In addition, the capital structure of such firms 
is influenced by regulatory requirements; therefore, it is not appropriate to compare the 
financing policies of such firms with non-financial firms. Another decisive factor put forward 
in the data selection criteria is that, for each firm, it is necessary to report a minimum two 
consecutive years’ information in order to assess the changes in the financing structure of the 
firm. Moreover, those firms with missing values for the important variables are also removed 
from the sample. After applying these restrictions, the final sample includes an unbalanced 
panel of 2,199 firm-year observations of 380 firms. 
 
Matching firms to politicians 
Following the mainstream literature (Khwaja & Mian, 2005; Boubakri et al., 2009; Faccio, 
2006), in this study, a firm is defined as connected if it has a politician on its Board of 
Directors. A politician is defined as any individual who stood in the national or provincial 
election, held in 2002 and 200837. A politician’s full name is matched to a firm director if 
their full (first, middle, and last) names match exactly, that firm is then considered as a 
politically connected firm. Whilst so doing, 107 politicians were matched with firms’ 
directors. No politician was matched to more than one firm; therefore, 107 firms were 
identified as politically connected firms. These firms are further divided based on electoral 
outcomes: of the 107 connected firms, 62 are connected to winning politicians (58%), and 87 
relate to politicians of a winning party (69%)38.  
                                               
37
 Note that here we employ the definition of firm’s political connectedness as the personal connection between 
politicians and specific firms (through directors) rather than institutional ownership.  
38
 In order to avoid the human error, we conducted the sample selection procedure with the given restrictions 
and matching of politicians with the firm’s board of directors by applying programming code, which is available 
in Appendix.  
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Sample distribution 
Table 4.2 presents the distribution of the sampled firms through political connections, 
business groups, location, and ownership. In order to identify the group affiliation of the 
sample, a list of top-30 business groups and their associated firms (published in Rehman, 
2006) is used. Following this list, 105 firms are identified as business group-affiliated, with 
275 firms considered as stand-alone firms. Next, firms are divided into two sub-groups based 
on their location: first, the firms located in the two biggest cities in the country—Karachi and 
Lahore—are 57 % of the overall sample and 87% of the connected firms; second, the firms 
located in the rest of the country represent 13% of the connected firms. Finally, the firms 
encompassing foreign ownership constitute 11% of the total sample and 8% of the connected 
firms’ sample.  
 
  
 95 
 
Table 4.2: Description of the sample 
 A. Full sample, politically connected and non-
connected firms  
  
 Total sample  Political connected  Non-connected 
 Number Percentage  Number Percentage  Number Percentage 
Total number of firms 380 100  107 28  273 72 
By business group 
Group-affiliates 
 
105 
 
27 
  
49 
 
46 
  
56 
 
21 
Stand-alone 275 73  58 54  217 79 
By location 
Major cities 
 
219 
 
57 
  
93 
 
87 
  
126 
 
46 
Other cities 161 43  14 13  147 54 
By ownership         
Foreign owned 42 11  9 8  33 12 
Domestic owned 338 89  98 92  240 88 
 
 
 
B. Political connected firms 
    
 Number Percentage       
By politician’s electoral outcomes         
Connected to incumbent 62 58       
Connected to looser 45 42       
By party electoral outcomes         
Connected to winning party 74 69       
Connected to opposition party 23 31       
 
Overall, the sample distribution shows that mainly politically connected firms are affiliated to 
business groups and located in the two largest cities of Pakistan. Moreover, in terms of 
ownership, most of these politically connected firms are domestically owned.  
 
Variables measurement and univariate analysis  
Following Fan et al., (2008) and Khwaja & Mian (2005), leverage is used as a dependent 
variable to measure access to debt-financing. An important aspect of leverage measure is the 
book value and the market value of leverage. Considering the financial market of Pakistan, 
the debt structure of Pakistani firms is based mainly on bank loans rather than corporate 
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bonds, thus making the measurement different. As Arif (2007) reports that most Pakistani 
firms do not issue bonds to raise finance, but rather use bank loans as a financing source; 
therefore, the leverage of Pakistani firms is regarded as a bank loan and calculated by their 
book value. In addition, Myers (1977) justifies the use of book values on the basis that the 
book value of leverage relates to the value of assets in place, and does not normally include 
the capitalisation value of future growth opportunities that makes book values more stable 
measure. Barclay et al. (1995) argue that book values primarily reflect the collateral (fixed 
assets), which rules out the possibility of distortions in values caused by the volatility of 
market prices. Moreover, Kisgen (2005) asserts that financial managers regard book value as 
more reliable since it is not as volatile and does not change as often as market value. 
Therefore, following Chen (2004) and Cassar and Holmes (2003), total leverage is defined as 
the ratio of the book value of a firm’s total debt (short-term and long-term) to the total 
assets39.  
 
Since most firm borrowings in Pakistan are from banks, the leverage variable may be viewed 
as a proxy for bank debt40. Prior studies, such as those of Boubakri et al. (2008), Fan et al. 
(2008), and Khwaja & Mian (2005) report that the percentage of long-term debt is higher 
than short-term debt amongst connected firms. On the other hand, short-term debt might 
mitigate under- and overinvestment problems; since the debt contract arises for negotiation 
before the completion of the projects. Hence, creditors can monitor the operation and 
investment decisions of the firms (Charumilind et al., 2006). In this analysis, leverage is 
therefore further divided on the basis of its maturity. Long-term leverage is measured as the 
                                               
39
  These measures of leverage are used in other empirical studies include Rajan and Zingales (1995); Titman 
and Wessels (1988); Bevan and Danbolt (2002); Dessi and Robertson (2003); and Wald (1999). 
 
40
 Due to the unavailability of data, we could not distinguish between borrowing from state-owned and private 
banks. Therefore, leverage variable includes the loan from both sorts of banks.  
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book value of a firm’s long-term debt divided by its total assets, and short-term leverage is 
measured as the book value of a firm’s short-term debt divided by its total assets. Table 4.3 
provides the definitions and sources of the variables used in this study. 
 
Table 4.3: Variables definitions and data sources 
Variables Definition Source 
POLITICAL 
CONNEACTIONS 
(PC) 
A firm is considered as connected if firm has a politician on its board 
of directors and a politician is defined as any individual who stood in 
the national or provincial election, held in 2002 and 2008. 
OSIRIS 
and ECP 
TOTAL LEV Ratio of book value of firm's total debt (short term and long term) to 
total assets. 
OSIRIS 
LONG-TERM LEV Book value of firm’s long-term debt divided by its total assets. OSIRIS 
SHORT-TERM LEV Book value of firm’s short-term debt divided by its total assets. OSIRIS 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets OSIRIS 
COLLATERAL Ratio of fixed to total assets OSIRIS 
PROFIT  Profit before taxes divided by total assets  OSIRIS 
GROWTH-OPPOR Price earnings ratio  OSIRIS 
FOREIGN A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if at least 10 percent of its stock is 
foreign owned, 0 otherwise. 
OSIRIS 
BUS-GROUP A dummy variable that takes value 1 if a firm is affiliated with top 30 
Pakistani business groups, 0 otherwise.  
Rehman 
(2006) 
LOCATION A dummy variable equals to 1 if a firm’s headquarter is located in two 
largest cities of Pakistan: Karachi or Lahore, 0 otherwise.  
OSIRIS 
 
There are a number of independent variables appearing in the previous studies that are likely 
to affect the extent of political patronage, including size, collateral, profitability, growth 
opportunity, ownership, and business group. In fact, the analysis was restricted to these 
factors owing to the fact that they have been consistently used in previous related studies 
(such as Fraser et al., 2006; Charumilind et al., 2006). The natural logarithm of total assets 
(SIZE) is used as a measure of firm size. The ratio of fixed to total assets (COLLATERAL) is 
used to capture the effect of collateral on the use of leverage. Collateral is considered a 
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guarantee for lenders when a firm seeks external funding, particularly if it controls the 
maturity matching effect on financing structure. Firm profitability (PROFIT) is measured by 
profit before taxes, divided by total assets41. Subsequently, the price earnings ratio is included 
as a proxy for future growth opportunities (GROWTH-OPP). An indicator of growth 
opportunities rests in the fact that it shows the expected value of future profit of a firm; 
therefore, a higher price earnings ratio shows high growth opportunities. In addition, as price 
earnings is given by the ratio of the price that investors are willing to pay to buy a share and 
earnings per share, the market’s prices thus predict the firm’s potential growth opportunities, 
and the stock market capitalises its present value (Kumar & Hyodo, 2001). The impact of 
firm ownership—whether domestically or foreign owned—is controlled by introducing a 
dummy variable. The dummy variable (FOREIGN) takes the value 1 if at least 10% of its 
stock is foreign owned. This definition of foreign ownership is also used in other studies, 
such as Javorcik & Spatareanu (2011) and Kimura & Kiyota (2007). Finally, the effect of 
business group is controlled by a dummy variable (BUS-GROUP), which takes value 1 if a 
firm is affiliated with the top 30 Pakistani business groups (based on their sizes) identified in 
Rehman (2006). More specifically, the book mentions the 38 top business groups in Pakistan. 
Amongst those 8 business houses, notably only comprising non-listed and/or financial firms, 
we could therefore match our sample firms only to remaining 30 business group-affiliated 
firms. Other studies that have used the similar source to identify the business group affiliation 
in Pakistan include Masulis et al. (2011), Ashraf & Ghani (2005), and Candland (2007). In 
order to control for the potential influence of outliers, all variables are winsorised at the 5th 
and 95th values.  
 
                                               
41
 The profitability variable is calculated in OSIRIS database with this definition.  
 99 
 
The comparison of financing pattern and firms’ characteristics between firms with and 
without political connection is presented in Table 4.4. As hypothesised, connected firms tend 
to have relatively more total leverage than the non-connected firms. Specifically, politically 
connected firms have a total leverage to assets ratio of 67%, as compared with a lower 61% 
for firms without connections. This difference is strongly significant at the 1% level. 
Similarly, the mean ratio of long-term loans to total assets of connected firms is 27%, whilst 
that of non-connected firms in only 23%. The difference is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. In contrast, the mean ratio of short-term debt to total assets is slightly higher for non-
connected firms, having 41% compared with 40% of connected firms. However, the 
difference is statistically insignificant. The overall more usage of short-term debt than long-
term debt, irrespective of political connections in the Pakistani market, confirms the 
prediction of financial theory, which accordingly implies that firms in developing countries 
may have less long-term debt simply owing to institutional inefficiencies. Studies such as 
those by Barclay & Smith (1995), and Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic (1999) report that 
firms in developing countries tend to make less use of long-term debt owing to deficiencies 
(i.e. contract enforcement, and information asymmetry) in the credit market. 
  
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics for key variables 
 Total sample  Political Connected firms  Non-connected firms Mean 
difference 
 Mean St. Dev Min Max  Mean St. Dev Min Max  Mean St. Dev Min Max (t-statistics) 
TOTAL LEV 0.64 0.25 0.22 1.26  0.67 0.24 0.22 1.26  0.61 0.25 0.23 1.25 -3.38*** 
LONG-TERM LEV 0.26 0.21 0.07 0.77  0.27 0.21 0.07 0.77  0.23 0.22 0.08 0.74 -2.27** 
SHORT-TERM LEV 0.41 0.20 0.10 0.88  0.40 0.19 0.10 0.88  0.41 0.20 0.10 0.86 0.94 
SIZE 6.30 0.66 5.15 8.22  6.33 0.61 5.15 7.59  6.28 0.68 5.21 8.22 -1.66* 
COLLAT 0.49 0.21 0.09 0.86  0.49 0.21 0.13 0.86  0.48 0.21 0.09 0.84 -0.66 
PROFIT 5.94 10.91 -13.72 11.85  4.39 10.26 -13.72 11.85  6.64 11.12 -7.94 9.85 4.44*** 
GROWTH-OPPOR 8.16 5.78 0.93 11.46  8.28 5.88 0.98 11.46  8.10 5.73 0.93 10.21 -0.65 
FOREIGN 0.13 0.34 0 1  0.10 0.30 0 1  0.15 0.36 0 1 3.22*** 
BUS-GROUP 0.27 0.44 0 1  0.41 0.49 0 1  0.20 0.40 0 1 -10.19*** 
LOCATION 0.60 0.48 0 1  0.86 0.34 0 1  0.49 0.50 0 1 -7.48*** 
      * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%   
 Further, whether the difference in the use of total and long-term debt between the connected 
and non-connected firms attributable, in relation to the differences in firm characteristics, is 
investigated. It is found that firms with political ties are larger—measured by assets size—
than non-connected firms, which may subsequently explain their higher leverage. The 
difference is statistically significant at the 10% level. Interestingly, when compared to non-
connected firms, connected firms are significantly less profitable (in terms of return on 
assets). It implies that less profitable firms establish political connections in order to 
maximise their profits. Furthermore, growth opportunities, as measured by the price earnings 
ratio, and collateral (ratio of fixed to total assets) do not differ across firms’ groups.  
 
In terms of firm ownership, those organisations with political ties are more domestic-owned 
when contrasted alongside firms without such ties. This difference is strongly significant at 
the 1% level. Furthermore, significant differences were found across these groups in terms of 
their business group affiliation and location. Group affiliations are higher amongst politically 
connected firms (almost double) than non-connected firms, and are further located in the 
major cities (two major cities, namely Karachi and Lahore) of Pakistan. The overall findings 
indicate that larger size, low profitability, domestic ownership, group affiliation and location 
are important firm-specific factors contributing to the establishment of political connections. 
This preliminary investigation offers some degree of support for our conjecture that 
connection with politicians is relevant within the credit market.  
 
4.5  Methodology 
4.5.1  Model specification 
In order to test the main hypothesis of this study, which posits that, ceteris paribus, due to 
preferential treatment in the credit market, firms with political connections maintain a higher 
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degree of leverage than non-connected firms, the standard corporate finance model is 
adopted. Following the works of Charumilind et al. (2006), Fraser et al. (2006), Rajan & 
Zingales (1995) and Harris & Raviv (1990), we estimate the following baseline model using 
panel data: 
 
 	 
           
6 7"##$%&'($%&)*
+,                     (1) 
 
where the dependent variable LEVERAGE is the debt of a firm in a given year. PC is our 
variable of interest that is a time-invariant dummy variable, indicating the firm’s political 
connectedness. SIZE is the size of a firm, COLLAT refers to the collateral, PROFIT is the 
profitability, GROWTH-OPP stands for growth opportunities, FOREIGN represents foreign 
ownership, and BUS-GROUP is the business group affiliation of a firm. Finally, DumYear 
are 8 dummies for the period 2002–2010, DumInd are 7 dummies at the two-digit level of 
SIC, and ε is the error term42. The measurement of such variables is discussed in the last 
section. The given model resembles the framework used in the context of political patronage 
studies of Charumilind et al. (2006) and Fraser et al. (2006) except for the inclusion of a 
firm’s foreign ownership and business group-affiliation. As has been discussed earlier in 
Section 4.3.3.5 and Section 4.3.3.6, foreign firms and business group affiliates have superior 
capabilities, all facilitating them in terms of establishing valuable political connections—
particularly in the context of a developing country (as Pakistan), where business group-
affiliation and foreign ownership are recognised as antidotes of market imperfections43 . 
Indeed, many authors such as Khanna & Palepu (2000) and Sembenelli & Schiantarelli 
                                               
42
 Following Aharony et al. (2010) and Campbell (1996), we re-classified two-digit SIC to a narrower 8 
industry-category. Industry classification details are given in the Chapter 3, section 3.4.  
43
 The significance of business groups to firms in developing countries is discussed with sufficient details in 
chapter 3.  
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(2000) regard business group affiliation and foreign ownership as an antidote to market 
frictions44; therefore, such firm-level variables have been incorporated into the model so as to 
control the effects of group affiliation and foreign ownership.  
 
The subsequent analysis tests the impacts associated with the electoral outcomes on the 
leverage of politically connected firms. More specifically, it investigates the empirical 
question: what happens to a politically connected firm’s borrowing when its politician or 
political party wins an election? Winning or being a member of a winning party increases the 
political strength of politician to obtain even greater preferential access to credit from banks, 
and accordingly benefits its connected firm. In order to investigate this empirical question, 
two dummies, POLWIN (for politician winning effect) and PARTYWIN (for party winning 
effect), are employed in the model (1) as an alternative proxy for political connections (PC). 
The positive and significant signs would reflect the exercise of political power.  
 
To test the third objective of this study—the examination of the significance of standard firm-
specific determinants of leverage for politically connected firms in terms of accessing debt—
six interactive variables are introduced within the model (1). More specifically, all firm-level 
control variables used in the model (1) are interacted with the dummy variable (PC), 
capturing the political patronage. The estimated model adopts the following form: 
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44
 Franklin et al. (2005) argue that foreign owned firms use domestic credit simply due to preferential interest 
rates and/or for hedging purposes. 
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To investigate the relationship between political connectedness and leverage, all firms are 
pooled together, connected and non-connected, in all estimations. 
 
4.5.2  Estimation technique 
Regressions are carried out through the use of a pooled regression model. With pooled 
regression, there is the probability that residuals are correlated across years within each firm; 
standard errors can be biased, and either over or underestimate the true variability of the 
coefficient estimates. Therefore, pooled regression is estimated with heteroskedasticity-
consistent robust standard errors clustered at the firm’s level. By so doing, firm (cluster) is 
correlated, although we assume independence across firms (clusters)45.  
 
Related studies examining political patronage extensively employed the pooled regression 
estimation technique with robust standard errors clustered at a firm level. Such studies 
include Khwaja & Mian (2005), Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang (2009), Claessens et 
al. (2008), Poyry & Maury (2010), Dinc (2005), Boubakri et al. (2009), Dombrovsky (2008), 
Jayachandran (2006), and Spienza (2004). In addition, basic pooled regression, without 
clustering robust standard errors, have also been used in others, such as those by Li et al. 
(2009), Charumilind et al. (2006), Ferguson & Voth (2008), Agarwal & Knoeber (2000), and 
Desai & Olofsgard (2011)46.  
 
                                               
45
 In addition, as a robustness check we have re-estimated our basic result using Heckman two-stage analysis 
technique.  
46
 In addition to pooled regression, Agarwal and Knoeber (2000) also employed logit model with a binary 
dependent variable for connected outside directors, and Desai and Olofsgard (2011) estimated the results with 
instrumental variable technique.  
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4.6 Estimation results 
4.6.1  Political connections and leverage 
We test out first hypothesis that politically connected firms have higher degree of leverage 
than non-connected firms. Table 4.5 shows the pooled regression results. For a robustness 
check, the estimations are run both with and without firms’ control variables. All models 
include year and industry-fixed effects which, for the sake of brevity, are not reported. In 
columns 1 and 2, the regression results for the impact of political connectedness—which is 
indicated by dummy variable (PC)—on total leverage are presented. The outcomes in column 
1—not including firm characteristic—strongly support the first hypothesis. The estimated 
coefficient on political connection (PC) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The magnitude of coefficient indicates that firms with political connections have, on average, 
a higher ratio of total debt to total assets with 7.4%. The results hold even when the control 
variables are included in the estimation, as shown in column 2. The estimated coefficient is 
recognised as significant at 5%, with magnitude showing that connected firms have 5.2% 
more total debt than their non-connected peers. So the empirical findings support the first 
hypothesis that connected firms have higher leverage than non-connected firms. Such results 
are consistent with Faccio (2006), Khwaja & Mian (2005), Cull & Xu (2005), Dinç (2005) 
and Johnson & Mitton (2003), all of which illustrate the higher borrowing of connected firms.  
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Table 4.5: Impact of political connections on leverage 
Independent 
Variables 
TOTAL LEV  LONG-TERM LEV  SHORT-TERM LEV 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
PC 0.074*** 
(0.00) 
0.052** 
(0.03) 
 0.046** 
(0.01) 
0.036** 
(0.01) 
 -0.029 
(0.11) 
-0.023 
(0.39) 
SIZE  0.023** 
(0.04) 
  0.029** 
(0.04) 
  0.018** 
(0.02) 
COLLAT  0.090*** 
(0.00) 
  0.121*** 
(0.00) 
  0.096*** 
(0.00) 
PROFIT  -0.019*** 
(0.00) 
  -0.012*** 
(0.00) 
  -0.016*** 
(0.00) 
GROWTH-OPP  -0.022 
(0.56) 
  -0.016 
(0.47) 
  -0.031 
(0.064) 
FOREIGN  0.032 
(0.49) 
  0.028 
(0.19) 
  0.021 
(0.53) 
BUS-GROUP  1.127*** 
(0.00) 
  1.069*** 
(0.00) 
  0.102*** 
(0.00) 
CONSTANT 
 
0.736 
(0.41) 
0.873*** 
(0.00) 
 0.265*** 
(0.00) 
0.382*** 
(0.00) 
 0.524*** 
(0.00) 
0.845*** 
(0.00) 
Time dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industries dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of Obs 2199 2199  2199 2199  2199 2199 
Adjusted R-square 0.169 0.275  0.113 0.270  0.103 0.274 
The table presents the pooled regression. PC is the indicator of political connections. SIZE is the logarithm of 
the book value of total assets. COLLAT is the ratio of fixed to total assets. PROFIT is the ratio of profit to total 
assets. GROWTH-OPP is the price earnings ratio. FOREIGN and BUS-GROUP are dummies indicating foreign 
ownership and business group affiliation. P-values, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm 
level, are reported in brackets. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
The analysis is extended to examine whether such high utilisation of leverage varies across 
debt maturity structure. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is long-term debt to total 
assets, and columns 5 and 6 have short-term debt to total assets as a dependent variable. 
Focus is initially placed on findings for long-term debt. In column 3, the estimated coefficient 
on political connection is both positive and significant at 5% level, thus indicating that firms 
with political ties have higher long-term debt. The magnitude of coefficient implies that 
connections increase a firm’s long-term leverage by 4.6%. Upon repeating the regression 
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with control variables column 4, the sign and statistical significance does not change. 
Subsequently, we turn to the short-term leverage; surprisingly, a negative but insignificant 
coefficient for political connection variable is established (column 5). This suggests that 
political connections do not affect a firm’s access to short-term leverage, which is a result 
remaining unchanged—even after the inclusion of the control variables (column 6). The 
results achieved for short-term debt supports the univariate finding that there is no 
statistically significant difference in relation to short-term debt utilisation amongst connected 
and non-connected firms.  
 
Regarding the effects of firm characteristics on leverage utilisation, overall, the results 
support the predictions of corporate finance literature. The coefficient on size variable (SIZE) 
is positive and significant, irrespective of debt maturity structure. Larger firms in Pakistan 
carry more leverage. Similarly, the coefficients on fixed assets ratio (COLLAT) are positive 
and statistically significant at 1% level in regard to all three estimations (columns 2, 4 and 6). 
Firms with low agency costs are likely to use more leverage. Larger and higher tangible 
assets-possessing firms have smaller information asymmetry, thus resulting in low agency 
costs. The results obtained confirm this conjecture. In a less developed financial market, as is 
the case in Pakistan, firms rely on larger size—which may also be recognised as a proxy for 
the inverse likelihood of default—and collateralisable assets to obtain external credit. These 
results strengthen the evidence provided by Fraser et al. (2006) and Booth et al. (2001), a 
positive role of size and fixed assets in reducing information asymmetry is established. Next, 
the coefficient for profitability (PROFIT) is negative and statistically significant at 1% level 
in all estimations, which indicates that profitable firms in Pakistan—regardless of debt 
maturity—carry less debt. This result is consistent with related studies (Titman & Wessels, 
1998; Fraser et al., 2006; Booth et al., 2001; Wald, 1999), therefore signifying that, despite 
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the tax-shelter gain associated with leverage, profitable firms employ less leverage in their 
capital structure. The coefficients for growth opportunities (GROWTH-OPP) are found to be 
negative but ultimately statistically insignificant across all three regressions, suggesting an 
insignificant role of growth opportunities in accessing leverage amongst Pakistani firms. In a 
similar vein, the insignificant sign of foreign ownership (FOREIGN), in relation to all three 
estimations, indicates that foreign ownership is not an important predictor of access to 
leverage in Pakistan. Finally, affiliation to business groups (BUS-GROUP) is found to be 
positively and significantly (at 1% level) related to all measures of leverage. The firms 
operating in an environment with undeveloped financial intermediaries and weak contract 
enforcement institutions, such as in Pakistan, affiliate to business groups so as to reduce 
financial constraints. The result for group affiliates is consistent with the works of Khanna & 
Yafeh (2007), Khwaja et al. (2009) and Ghemawat & Khanna (1998), all of which report a 
higher level of financial leverage for group affiliates as compared to stand-alone firms. The 
values of adjusted R2, ranging from 11% to 27%, show the satisfactory explanatory power of 
the estimated models. 
 
The overall evidence presented in Tables 4.5 suggests that, as hypothesised, political 
connectedness has a positive effect on the firm’s total leverage. Once the leverage is 
dissected into long-term and short-term debt, this result holds only for long-term debt. Firms 
use their political ties to obtain more long-term leverage. On the other hand, political 
connections are found to have no impact on short-term leverage. These findings remained 
unchanged when the firm control variables are included in the regressions.  In sum, political 
connectedness appears to be a determining factor only for the long-term financing decision of 
firms. The understandable rationale for such results is the fragile political environment within 
the country, as in the last two decades three elected governments were dissolved before even 
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completing their half-terms, consequently connected firms try to finalise the loan deals for a 
longer period to avoid renegotiation. On the other hand, firms avoid short-term debt, as 
politicians do not stay in power for very long, therefore, firms cannot exercise their political 
influence on banks to similar extent as when their connected politicians hold office, 
consequently firms may face difficulty in rescheduling the loan. Taken together, the volatile 
political environment leads political connections to insert positive impact only on long-term 
debt. In general, our results present a further dimension of firm-specific characteristics that 
may influence corporate financing decision. Accordingly, political connection needs to be 
included in the studies of capital structure alongside the traditional determinants of leverage 
proposed by various theories.  
4.6.2   Political strength 
It has been seen that political connections in Pakistan facilitates firms achieving greater 
access to external credit. This study delves a level deeper and extends this analysis by 
examining whether or not such preferential treatment varies according to the strength of the 
firm’s politician, if the politician holds office, or the politician belongs to the ruling party 
(that is, a part of ruling coalition). In order to test this hypothesis, a distinction is made 
between connected firms according to the strength of their politician by introducing two 
dummies in the baseline specification: first, POLWIN distinguishes between firms belonging 
to a winning politician or a losing one; second, PARTYWIN differentiates between firms 
having a politician that is a member of the winning party or opposition party. Two separate 
regressions are run in order to check the effects of the winning of the politician (politician 
winning effect) and effect of belonging to a winning party (party winning effect). 
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Table 4.6: Impact of political strength on leverage 
Independent 
Variables 
Politician winning effect  Party winning effect 
TOTAL 
LEV 
(1) 
LONG-TERM 
LEV 
 (2) 
SHORT-TERM 
LEV 
(3) 
 TOTAL 
LEV 
(4) 
LONG-TERM 
LEV 
 (5) 
SHORT-
TERM LEV 
(6) 
POL-WIN 0.069** 
(0.01) 
0.058** 
(0.03) 
-0.020 
(0.022) 
    
PARTY-WIN  
 
   0.081* 
(0.09) 
0.066* 
(0.05) 
-0.014 
(0.46) 
SIZE 0.041** 
(0.01) 
0.037** 
(0.04) 
0.014* 
(0.09) 
 0.027* 
(0.05) 
0.026** 
(0.02) 
0.013* 
(0.05) 
COLLAT 0.106** 
(0.01) 
0.121** 
(0.02) 
0.102** 
(0.01) 
 0.096*** 
(0.00) 
0.127*** 
(0.00) 
0.081*** 
(0.00) 
PROFIT -0.036** 
(0.04) 
-0.029*** 
(0.00) 
-0.034** 
(0.02) 
 -0.023 
(0.19) 
-0.017 
(0.30) 
-0.024 
(0.21) 
GROWTH-OPP -0.043 
(0.31) 
-0.014 
(0.48) 
-0.025 
(0.32) 
 -0.031 
(0.72) 
0.023 
(0.12) 
-0.029 
(0.41) 
FOREIGN 0.044 
(0.11) 
0.041 
(0.37) 
0.037 
(0.12) 
 0.029 
(0.15) 
0.027 
(0.18) 
0.034 
(0.022) 
BUS-GROUP 1.108** 
(0.01) 
1.185*** 
(0.00) 
0.107*** 
(0.00) 
 1.123*** 
(0.00) 
1.084*** 
(0.00) 
0.093** 
(0.01) 
CONSTANT 
 
0.872*** 
(0.00) 
0.819** 
(0.01) 
0.645** 
(0.03) 
 0.866*** 
(0.00) 
0.781** 
(0.02) 
0.769*** 
(0.00) 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industries 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs 2199 2199 2199  2199 2199 2199 
Adjusted R-square 0.275 0.269 0.271  0.283 0.276 0.264 
The table presents the pooled regression. Columns (1)-(3) report the winning effect of politician. Columns (4)-(6) report the 
party winning effect. POL-WIN is a dummy variable takes value 1 if politician is a winner. PARTY-WIN is a dummy 
variable taking 1 if connected politician belongs to the ruling party. SIZE is the logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
COLLAT is the ratio of fixed to total assets. PROFIT is the ratio of profit to total assets. GROWTH-OPP is the price 
earnings ratio. FOREIGN and BUS-GROUP are dummies indicating foreign ownership and business group affiliation. P-
values, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level, are reported in brackets. * Significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
Results are shown in Table 4.6. Initially, how the winning of a politician affects the total 
leverage of the connected firm is explored. The regression results in column 1 shows a 
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positive and statistically significant relationship between the politician winning effect 
(POLWIN) and total leverage. It implies that firms with a winning politician are able to gain 
greater access to debt. More specifically, firms connected to winning politicians have 6.9% 
higher total leverage than their connected peers with losing politicians. In addition, notably, 
the level of total leverage amongst firms with ties with winning politicians is higher than the 
total leverage of all connected firms, irrespective of their connections with losing or winning 
politician (5.2%, as shown in Table 4.5, column 2). This is not surprising when considering 
the previous results shown in Table 4.5, which also includes the effects of political 
connections with losing politicians that are supposedly lower than winning politicians. 
Overall, this result strongly supports the second hypothesis (winning impact) and further 
confirms the importance of political strength. 
 
Next, similar to the previous estimations routine, the politician’s winning effect is 
investigated in relation to long-term and short-term leverage. With regard to long-term 
leverage, in column 2 the estimated coefficient on firms with winning politicians is positive 
and significant at 5% level. The results suggest that firms affiliated with winning politicians 
use higher long-term leverage. Statistically, those firms connected to winning politicians, on 
average, have a higher long-term leverage of 5.8% than their counterparts affiliated with 
losing politicians. In the subsequent estimation, the winning effect of politicians could not 
bring a positive impact on the usage of short-term leverage of connected firms. Results in 
column 3 show that the coefficient on firms with winning politicians enters negatively, 
though not being statistically different to zero. It implies that in terms of short-term leverage 
the firms connected to winning politicians are not much different than the firms related to 
losing politicians. Regarding firm characteristics in all three regressions, the results for these 
 112 
 
variables are qualitatively similar to those obtained in previous estimations (Table 4.5, 
columns 2, 4 and 6), although the significance of the result is somewhat reduced. 
 
Our next empirical task is centred on examining the effect of politician on leverage if the 
individual belongs to the ruling party. Results in column 4 are shown for total leverage. The 
variable of interest PARTYWIN has a positive coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. 
These results can be interpreted as the affiliation to a politician belonging to a winning party 
(coalition) increases the access to the finance of the connected firm. Statistically, those firms 
connected to governing coalition, on average, have a higher total leverage of 8.1% than their 
peers affiliated with opposition party. One aspect worth noting is that the winning effect of 
the party is more pronounced than the winning effect of the politician. This finding can be 
attributed to the fact that the ruling party manages and distributes financial resources, and 
affiliated politicians have more political power in terms of influencing the lending decisions 
of governmental and private financial institutions. On the other hand, besides winning the 
election, if a politician is not a part of the ruling party, his abilities to extract the political rent 
would ultimately be limited. 
 
As an extension, the party winning effect is examined in regard to long-term and short-term 
leverage. The empirical finding for long-term leverage reiterates the party winning effect for 
total debt by showing a positive coefficient with statistical significance at the 10% level. 
Results imply a 6.6% increase in long-term debt for those firms relating to politicians 
affiliated with the winning party. For short-term leverage, once again, a statistical 
significance could not be found, thus indicating that a politician affiliation to the winning 
party does not necessarily have any impact on short-term leverage of the connected firm. The 
results for a firm’s characteristics in all three regressions with PARTYWIN follow a very 
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similar pattern to that shown in the first three columns, except for the loss of significance for 
profitability in regressions for total debt and long-term debt.  
 
In essence, the overall results presented in Table 4.6 strongly support the second hypothesis 
of the winning effect. The firms with politician who win or belong to a winning party obtain 
even greater preferential access to finance; therefore, their level of total leverage and long-
term leverage is greater. Nevertheless, winning does not necessarily affect the short-term 
borrowing of a connected firm. Interestingly, the party-winning effect is relatively higher 
than the politician winning effect, simply because the politician’s ability to influence 
financial resources increases by relating himself to the ruling party that manages government 
resources. So, it may be inferred that the winning of politician matters, but what actually 
matters most is the winning of the politician’s party. Our results are consistent with the 
findings of Khwaja & Mian (2005), Infante & Piaza (2010), and Goldman et al. (2009). 
  
4.6.3  Firm characteristics and political patronage 
In the previous sections, political connections have been found to facilitate firms in securing 
preferential access to credit. In this subsection, whether political relationships substitute the 
significance of firm characteristics in the decisions of leverage is investigated. In order to test 
this issue, there is the need to simultaneously incorporate connection and firm characteristic 
variables known to be associated with leverage decision. The mechanism outlined in Section 
4.5.1 with Model 2 would allow this investigation to be carried out. The coefficient on an 
interactive variable measures the way in which the relation between the choice of leverage 
and relevant firm characteristic varies for firms with and without political connections.  
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The results are presented in Table 4.7, showing total leverage as a dependent variable in 
column 1. The coefficient of SIZE remains materially the same as in Table 4.5. The 
coefficient of the interactive term PC×SIZE is positive and significant at 5% level. 
Statistically, this indicates that larger firms with political connections carry 7.1% more total 
leverage than smaller firms with connections. This evidence rejects the third sub-hypothesis 
(3a), which states that connections substitute the importance of firm size. Contrarily, we find 
total leverage increasing effect of political patronage is stronger for the larger firms. Next, the 
effect of size on long-term and short-term leverage for connected firms is tested. Empirical 
findings for long-term and short-term borrowings in column 2 and 3, respectively, reiterate 
that larger firms with political patronage carry more long-term and short-term leverage than 
their non-connected counterparts. Here, unlike the results of previous estimations, positive 
and significant signs for short-term leverage are achieved. The magnitude on coefficient is 
low (0.10); however, this signifies the role of political connections amongst large firms in 
accessing short-term leverage. These findings support the prediction of Trade-off theory, 
which proclaims that large firms utilise more leverage. The results obtained are in accord 
with those of Fraser et al. (2006), but contradict the findings of Poyry & Maury (2010) and 
Faccio et al. (2006), which show a limited role of size in the presence of political connections 
to access financial benefits from external market. 
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Table 4.7: Firm characteristics and political borrowing 
Independent Variables PREDICTED 
SIGN 
TOTAL LEV 
(1) 
LONG-TERM LEV 
(2) 
SHORT-TERM LEV 
(3) 
PC + 0.045*** 
(0.00) 
0.071** 
(0.02) 
-0.028 
(0.16) 
SIZE + 0.035** 
(0.03) 
0.024*** 
(0.00) 
0.012** 
(0.04) 
COLLAT + 0.079** 
(0.01) 
0.084** 
(0.02) 
0.073*** 
(0.00) 
PROFIT _ -0.018*** 
(0.00) 
-0.023* 
(0.18) 
-0.032*** 
(0.00) 
GROWTH-OPP _ -0.032 
(0.45) 
-0.026 
(0.30) 
-0.016 
(0.13) 
FOREIGN + 0.019 
(0.11) 
0.034 
(0.17) 
0.029 
(0.51) 
BUS-GROUP + 1.048*** 
(0.00) 
1.056*** 
(0.00) 
0.079*** 
(0.00) 
PC × SIZE _ 0.071** 
(0.01) 
0.046*** 
(0.00) 
0.010* 
(0.09) 
PC × COLLAT _ -0.036* 
(0.06) 
-0.150** 
(0.04) 
0.054 
(0.66) 
PC × PROFIT + -0.014 
(0.61) 
0.054 
(0.68) 
-0.020 
(0.82) 
PC × GROWTH-OPP + 0.102 
(0.17) 
0.054 
(0.21) 
-0.012 
(0.19) 
PC × FOREIGN + -0.075 
(0.60) 
-0.017 
(0.34) 
-0.036 
(0.42) 
PC ×BUS-GROUP + 1.011*** 
(0.00) 
1.125*** 
(0.00) 
0.017*** 
(0.00) 
CONSTANT 
 
 0.751*** 
(0.00) 
0.643*** 
(0.00) 
0.859*** 
(0.00) 
Time dummies   Yes Yes Yes 
Industries dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs  2199 2199 2199 
Adjusted R-square  0.286 0.249 0.275 
The table presents the pooled regression. PC is the indicator of political connections. SIZE is the logarithm 
of the book value of total assets. COLLAT is the ratio of fixed to total assets. PROFIT is the ratio of profit 
to total assets. GROWTH-OPP is the price earnings ratio. FOREIGN and BUS-GROUP are dummies 
indicating foreign ownership and business group affiliation. Robust standard errors in brackets. * Significant 
at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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The interaction term of the political connection dummy and fixed assets PC×COLLAT enters 
the model (having total leverage as dependent variable) with estimated coefficient with 
opposite sign (negative) to that on the explanatory variable on its own. The coefficient is 
statistically significant at 10% level. This evidence is supportive of Hypothesis 3b, which 
suggests that the leverage decision of connected firms, in terms of collateral, is different to 
that of the non-connected firms. Thereby the results suggest relatively greater importance of 
collateral for total debt in non-connected firms, whilst in contrast, connected firms appear to 
use less collateral in their borrowing decisions, which fundamentally contradicts the 
prediction of both Trade-off and Pecking order theories. The above results support the 
findings of Charumilind et al. (2006), which report a similar relation for long-term 
borrowing. With regard to debt maturity, this finding could not be supported in the context of 
short-term borrowing. Coefficients on this interactive term appear to be negative for long-
term debt and positive for short-term debt, but statistical significance is achieved only for 
long-term leverage. The results imply less significance of fixed assets for the connected firms 
in their financing decisions, which therefore exhibit strong support for the connected lending 
hypothesis.  
 
The interaction terms between the political connection and explanatory variables—
profitability (PC×PROFIT), growth opportunities (PC×GROWTH-OPP) and foreign 
ownership (PC×FOREIGN)—enter the model with statistically insignificant coefficients. 
Statistical insignificance is widespread across long-term and short-term debt as well. It 
indicates that profitability, growth opportunities and foreign ownership are not important 
determinants of leverage for the connected firms. The insignificant results for profitability are 
in line with the findings of Charumilind et al. (2006), who established that connected Thai 
firms with greater access to bank loans were no more profitable than firms without 
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connections. Furthermore, regarding growth opportunities and foreign ownership, the 
insignificant relationships for these are not surprising, since statistically similar results were 
also found in Table 4.4 across all estimations. Therefore, it may be interpreted that the growth 
opportunities and foreign ownership are unimportant to the borrowing decisions of not only 
non-connected firms but also to connected firms. The irrelevancy of growth opportunities in 
the loan decisions of connected firms is also shown in Charumilind et al. (2006) and Fraser et 
al. (2006).  
 
Finally, the last interaction term PC×BUS-GROUP tests the effect of political connections on 
the leverage of business group-affiliated firms. The coefficient of the interactive term is 
positive and strongly significant at 1% level; this result also holds for long-term and short-
term debt. Importantly, it implies that group affiliation increases the value of their political 
connections. Business groups in Pakistan are primarily devices through which rents accrue 
disproportionately to the handful of families that control major groups. As discussed in 
Section 4.3, generally, such industrialist families are directly involved in politics, which thus 
facilitates affiliated firms in terms of exerting influence over lenders and extracting political 
rents. Therefore, it is quite understandable that group affiliation augments the effect of 
political connections in terms of preferential lending.  
 
In summary, limited support is found for the third hypothesis as the interaction terms between 
political connections and firm characteristics—profitability, growth opportunities, and 
foreign ownership—are statistically insignificant for all leverage measures. The interaction 
terms between political connections and firm characteristics (collateral and business groups) 
support the sub-hypotheses. Nevertheless, the evidence for size rejects the sub-hypothesis, 
and suggests relatively high importance of size for borrowing in the connected firms. Firm 
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size and group affiliation have an increasing effect on the borrowing capabilities of connected 
firms. These findings provide stronger support for connected lending hypothesis. 
 
4.6.4  Robustness tests 
Endogeneity of political connectedness 
One potential concern in the study of the effect of political connections is endogeneity 
between connectedness and firm leverage. More precisely, some unobserved determinants of 
firm leverage may also explain political connections, leading pooled regression estimates to 
be biased and inconsistent. To take into account the possible endogeneity issue pertaining to 
the relation between political connections and leverage, the regression is re-estimated using 
the Heckman (1979) two-stage model. Though, to control sample selection bias, propensity 
score matching technique is also commonly used in finance literature. This is a statistical 
matching technique which tries to measure the impact of treatment. It yields the predicted 
probability of treatment obtained from the fitted regression model (Rosenbaum and Rubin 
1983).  However, owing to wide utilization and easiness in adoptability coerced us to use 
Heckman model as a sample selection technique. Econometrically, Heckman sample 
selection model is based on the assumption that firms will self select into the political activity 
that offers a better match with their resources and thereby economic output. Without 
modelling such self-selection, a regression of leverage on choice of political connectedness 
may lead to erroneous results for each connected and non-connected category. If self-
selection is not controlled, regression estimates indicate that leverage is independent of 
political activity choice, whether connected or non-connected.   
 
The first stage of the procedure involves a probit estimation in which a dummy variable 
indicating the political connections of a firm is regressed against the same independent 
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variables used in Model 1, plus one additional variable that discerns the firm’s political 
connectedness. That additional variable must be strongly correlated with political 
connections, but ultimately must be uncorrelated with leverage. Following Boubakri (2009), 
Agrawal & Knoeber (2001) and Bertrand et al. (2007), the firm’s location47 is selected as a 
discerning variable (instrument) of political connections. These studies have evidently 
reported that a firm’s location relates only to the political connections—not with other firm 
characteristics (firms located in larger cities are more likely to have connections with 
politicians as headquarters of political parties and their associated politicians are mostly 
locate in large cities). Specifically, in the first-stage regression PC, a dummy variable which 
takes 1 for connected firms, is regressed against several independent variables including 
location, size, collateral, profit, growth-opportunities, foreign and business group. In the 
second-stage analysis, the variable PC in Model 1 is replaced with the fitted value of political 
connections which is obtained from the first-stage probit model and subsequently estimates 
the same regression run for earlier tables.  
 
Results for the second stage of regressions are displayed in Table 4.8. In the second stage, the 
political connections coefficient is positive and significant at 10% level. The magnitude of 
the coefficient reveals that firms with political connections have, on average, a higher total 
debt of 3.4% than their non-connected peers. The resulting debt level for connected firms is 
somewhat smaller than previous findings (5.2%) in Table 4.5. Importantly, inverse Mills ratio 
(λ) is positive but insignificant, thus suggesting that the self-selection bias is not a problem in 
our sample. The results for all control variables remained unchanged with the exception of 
statistical significance dropped. Thus, the results are found to be robust to alternative 
                                               
47Firm location is a dummy variable takes value 1if a firm’s headquarter is located in two largest cities of 
Pakistan: Karachi or Lahore, 0 otherwise. The importance of these two cities as the leading industrial hubs of 
country has been discussed in Rehman (2006).  
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estimation technique, suggesting that politically connected firms appear to have greater 
access to credit—even after taking into consideration the endogeneity issue in the political 
connections.  
 
Alternative definition of growth opportunities 
Unlike previous empirical studies (Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010), the results obtained in all our 
estimations do not show growth opportunities as being an important determinant of access to 
leverage in Pakistan. We suspect that this might be owing to the proxy used for growth 
opportunities (PE ratio). In order to ensure the irrelevance of growth opportunities to the 
financial decision and in order to confirm that political lending results are not specific to the 
growth opportunity measure chosen here, the baseline regression is re-estimated using 
alternative definition, Tobin’s Q, for growth opportunities. Following Opler & Titman 
(1993), Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of total debts 
divided by total assets. The results, as reported in Table 4.8, show that the coefficient of 
growth opportunities remains negative and statistically insignificant, whereas total leverage is 
positively associated with political connections. Hence, overall, the results are robust to the 
alternative definition of the growth opportunities. 
             Table 4.8: Robustness tests 
  Heckman two-stage 
analysis 
 Alternative proxy of 
Growth opportunities 
 First-government 
 period 
 Second-government  
period 
Independent Variables  TOTAL LEV  TOTAL LEV 
 
 TOTAL LEV LONG-TERM  
LEV 
 
SHORT-TERM 
LEV 
 
 TOTAL LEV LONG-TERM  
LEV 
 
SHORT-TERM  
LEV 
 
PC  0.034* 
(0.08) 
 0.042*** 
(0.00) 
 0.051** 
(0.02) 
0.38** 
(0.02) 
-0.022 
(0.47) 
 0.049** 
(0.01) 
0.036** 
(0.01) 
-0.025 
(0.28) 
SIZE  0.078** 
(0.02) 
 0.028*** 
(0.00) 
 0.022** 
(0.03) 
0.026** 
(0.01) 
0.020** 
(0.04) 
 0.025** 
(0.04) 
0.033** 
(0.03) 
0.018** 
(0.01) 
COLLAT  0.024** 
(0.01) 
 0.098*** 
(0.00) 
 0.092*** 
(0.00) 
0.119*** 
(0.00) 
0.093*** 
(0.00) 
 0.086*** 
(0.00) 
0.124*** 
(0.00) 
0.100*** 
(0.00) 
PROFIT  -0.061* 
(0.09) 
 -0.041*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.022*** 
(0.00) 
-0.009*** 
(0.00) 
-0.014*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.018*** 
(0.00) 
-0.015*** 
(0.00) 
-0.011*** 
(0.00) 
GROWTH-OPP  -0.105 
(0.13) 
 -0.022 
(0.87) 
 -0.018 
(0.74) 
-0.015 
(0.32) 
-0.033 
(0.59) 
 -0.022 
(0.40) 
-0.016 
(0.53) 
-0.028 
(0.72) 
FOREIGN  0.021 
(0.44) 
 -0.013 
(0.62) 
 0.030 
(0.47) 
0.028 
(0.26) 
0.019 
(0.66) 
 0.038 
(0.90) 
0.025 
(0.18) 
0.027 
(0.82) 
BUS-GROUP  0.142* 
(0.06) 
 0.093*** 
(0.00) 
 1.125*** 
(0.00) 
1.067*** 
(0.00) 
0.098*** 
(0.00) 
 1.126*** 
(0.00) 
1.049*** 
(0.00) 
0.105*** 
(0.00) 
Inverse Mills ratio(λ)  0.529 
(0.23) 
          
CONSTANT 
 
 0.208*** 
(0.00) 
 0.876*** 
(0.00) 
 0.620*** 
(0.00) 
0.445*** 
(0.00) 
0.504*** 
(0.00) 
 0.405*** 
(0.00) 
0.298*** 
(0.00) 
0.386*** 
(0.00) 
Time dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
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Industries dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs.  2199  2199  2199 2199 2199  2199 2199 2199 
R-square  0.204  0.239  0.283 0.180 0.316  0.221 0.195 0.279 
The first column reports the second-stage results from the Heckman selection model. The second column presents the pooled regression. The dependent variable in both columns is the ratio of total 
leverage to total assets, TOTAL LEV. PC is the indicator of political connections. SIZE is the logarithm of the book value of total assets. COLLAT is the ratio of fixed to total assets. PROFIT is the 
ratio of profit to total assets. GROWTH-OPP is the price earnings ratio. FOREIGN and BUS-GROUP are dummies indicating foreign ownership and business group affiliation. The inverse Mills ratio 
is obtained from the probit regression (first-stage of Heckman selection model). First-government and second-government comprised of periods from 2002-2007 and 2008-2010, respectively. P-
values, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level are reported in brackets. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Political patronage across government periods 
The data sample used in this analysis comprised of two government terms: 2002-2007 and 
2008-2010. Amongst these government periods, the first government is led by a military 
dictator, whereas the second is a democratic civil government. Literature on authoritarianism 
argues that the military dictator distributes state resources amongst its political supporters to 
experience less agitation and stay in power smoothly (Escriba-Folch & Wright, 2010). 
Considering this fact, it is anticipated that the degree of leverage amongst connected firms 
tends to be much higher in the military dictatorial regime than the civil democratic 
government. To empirically test this postulation, the sample is stratified accordingly into two 
government periods, namely, first-government period (dictatorial regime) and second-
government period (democratic regime). Our empirical strategy remained the same; the 
baseline leverage model is re-run for both periods independently.  
Results are shown in Table 4.8. Firms with political connections have higher total leverage 
and long-term leverage regardless of government periods. The magnitudes of coefficients on 
variable PC indicate that there is no significant difference in the impact of political 
connectedness on the utilization of leverage among connected firms across government 
periods. As observed in the earlier tables, short-term leverage is not found significant in both 
government periods. Regarding control variables, the results remain virtually the same as 
those in Table 4.5. Overall, the sub-period regression results corroborate the findings in Table 
4.5, providing support for the fundamental argument that politically connected firms maintain 
higher leverage. However, results do not lend support to our conjecture for government 
periods and show no considerable difference in the extent of political patronage in terms of 
leverage across contrasting government periods.   
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4.7  Conclusion 
This chapter examines the link between firm leverage and political connections in Pakistan 
using a comprehensive sample of listed firms over an extended nine-year period. The results 
indicate that connected firms differ significantly in their borrowing decisions from those not 
connected. In particular, a positive and significant link between the total leverage and the 
political connections was found. Accordingly, connected firms maintain higher leverage than 
non-connected firms. The analysis is extended so as to examine whether this higher 
utilisation of leverage varies across debt maturity structure. Notably, political ties are found 
to be valuable only in the context of long-term leverage. As connectedness inserts no impact 
on short-term debt, the level of short-term debt is not higher for connected firms compared 
with their non-connected peers. Regarding the effects of firm characteristics on debt level, we 
find that size, collateral, and business groups have positive and statistically significant 
relationships with leverage. In contrast, profit negatively affects the firm’s financing decision. 
Finally, surprisingly growth opportunities are not revealed as an important determinant of 
financing decision of Pakistani firms. The results are robust in terms of testing for potential 
endogeneity and an alternative measure of growth opportunities. These results show the 
relative importance of political connections as a determinant of leverage.  
 
Subsequently, the impact of politicians’ political strength on the borrowing patterns of 
connected firms is examined. Empirical findings suggest that firms affiliated with a politician 
holding office, or who belongs to the ruling party are able to achieve greater access to debt. 
Specifically, such firms maintain higher total and long-term leverage; however, short-term 
leverage does not seem to be affected from the political power of a politician. It is worth 
noting that the party-winning effect is more pronounced than the politician-winning effect 
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owing to higher political power being associated with politicians belonging to a winning 
party, which in turn enables them to exert influence on the lending decisions of creditors. 
 
Finally, we investigate whether political relationships substitute the significance of firm 
characteristics in financing decisions. The results suggest that larger and group-affiliated 
connected firms tend to carry more leverage, irrespective of debt maturity, than mere firms 
with connections. Moreover, connected firms appear to use less collateral in their borrowing 
decisions. Overall, the results for firm characteristic strengthen our connected lending 
conjecture.  
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CHAPTER 5: POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE—THE CASE 
OF A DEVELOPING COUNTRY 
 
5.1  Introduction 
Corporate financing decisions are amongst the most important decisions made by firm 
management. Finance theory has long argued that corporate financial policies—particularly 
the use of leverage—affect firms overall performance (Campello, 2005; Kovenock & 
Phillips, 1997; Maksimovic, 1988). The central argument of studies investigating this 
relationship rotates around the risk-shifting incentives offered by leverage usage to equity 
holders, as well as the strategic consequences of such incentives that ultimately either boost 
or hinder firm performance. Accordingly, we believe that the high leverage connected firms 
maintain—as evident in Chapter Four—may also have a significant impact on firm 
performance; this is also the motivation for this chapter. Additionally, although the idea of 
corporate political connections, as a source of preferential leverage, is a powerful theoretical 
construct and a useful first step, one must nevertheless reach beyond the leverage and 
investigate the way in which it impacts firm performance.  
 
The existing empirical evidence acknowledges both positive and negative returns to political 
connections in terms of corporate profitability (Boubakri et al., 2008; Dombrovsky, 2008; 
Fan et al., 2008). Considering the positive impact, there are several reasons behind why 
politically connected firms might have superior performance to their non-connected 
counterparts. Firstly and most importantly, the preferential access to credit leads to a 
competitive advantage for a firm, which can be translated into better performance (Faccio, 
2006; Yeh et al., 2012; Li et al., 2008). Secondly, politicians are often outsiders to the 
corporate world, and may prove beneficial to firms by providing an independent view that 
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eventually positively affects firm performance (Niessen & Ruenzi, 2010). Thirdly, politicians 
are generally better informed about the future economic policies, and so their insight might 
have a positive impact on firm performance. On the other hand, studies advocating the 
negative relationship between political connections and firm performance argue that a 
politically connected Board does not have managerial incentives to maximise shareholders’ 
wealth and improve overall firm performance (Boubakri et al., 2008). Furthermore, other 
studies, such as that of Dewenter et al. (1997) suggest that politically connected firms forgo 
maximum profit in the pursuit of social and political objectives. Taken together, available 
empirical studies present a mixed picture of the influence a firm’s performance should have 
as a result of their political connections.  
 
In this chapter, we report further empirical evidence on the performance of politically 
connected firms through employing Pakistan as our empirical setting because of number of 
reasons. First, political connections are commonplace in Pakistan and have a greater impact 
on firm behaviour. Considering the weak legal system and the higher degree of corruption, 
the value of political connections is likely to be greater than in more developed countries 
(Khwaja & Mian, 2005). Second, in contrast to the previous studies from developing 
economies that took political patronage in a limited sense, where corporate political benefits 
can only be extracted through affiliating with a single powerful politician (i.e. Suharto in 
Indonesia and Mahathir in Malaysia)48, many politicians are in a position to benefit their 
affiliated firms in Pakistan. In addition, the ability to extract political benefits varies 
depending on the political strength of a politician. In this respect, Pakistan offers useful 
variation in the type of political connections that can be used to examine this phenomenon. 
Third, in this decade, Pakistan undertook drastic steps to curb political corruption. A new law 
                                               
48
 These studies include, Fisman (2001), Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006); and Johnson and Mitten (2003).  
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stipulates that public officials must declare their assets. Moreover, the National Anti-
Corruption Strategy (NACS) was introduced in 2002 with the aim of eliminating corruption 
from the political system. Nevertheless, many sceptics question the efficiency of such 
initiatives, as the accountability process is obstructed in a number of different ways, such as a 
constitutionary bill, which was first introduced to exempt judiciary and armed forces from 
accountability, and the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), which granted amnesty to 
politicians accused of corruption and embezzlement. Accordingly, whether connected firms 
in Pakistan benefit from political favours under the reformed period is an open question. 
These features provide a natural and excellent research setting when examining the 
relationship between the business and the politics, which can help us in terms of developing a 
deeper understanding of the consequences of political affiliations.  
 
Using the panel data of Pakistani listed firms during 2002–2010, evidence is provided that 
politically connected firms—defined as if the director participates in an election—shows 
poorer performance than those without connections. These results are estimated with 
instrumental variable techniques, and are robust in regard to alternative performance 
measures (return on equity, and Tobin’s Q), endogeneity problems, and various specifications 
that control for a number of variables, and which are likely to be correlated with corporate 
performance.  
 
Through this analysis, it is recognised that the data sample period of 2002–2010 covers two 
elected government terms. Amongst these governments, the first elected government is led by 
a military dictator, whilst the second is a democratic civil government49 . Literature on 
                                               
49
 By a democratic regime, we mean a form of government where a set of institutions that allow the citizens to 
select the makers of public policy in free and competitive elections, whereas autocratic (military dictatorial) 
government is considered as a form of government where the political power is limited to a one person and 
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authoritarianism asserts that the military dictator builds supporting political coalitions whose 
loyalty is largely dependent on obtaining patronage resources from the dictator (Escriba-
Folch & Wright, 2010). To ensure such coalition remains intact, it is necessary for the 
dictator to distribute benefits to the coalition. The extent of political patronage therefore tends 
to be much higher in the military dictator regime than the civil democratic government. If this 
is the case, then considering the positive affect of political connections on firm performance, 
it can be argued that the value of political connections in terms of a firm’s performance 
should be greater in a dictatorial regime. To empirically test this conjecture, the sample is 
stratified into two broad categories based on time period—‘first-government’ period 
(dictatorial authoritarian regime) and ‘second-government’ period (democratic regime)—with 
the firm’s performance model run separately for each sample50. In contrast to our prediction, 
results show that a negative impact of connections is more pronounced in the dictatorial 
period, providing evidence of severe managerial inefficiencies and rent-extraction by the 
affiliated politicians in the dictatorship regime.   
 
There is vast literature suggesting that firms with more growth opportunities employ lesser 
leverage and adopt policies so that they can be less dependent on external finance, such as 
through the distribution of fewer dividends, and the utilisation of more stock option plans in 
order to achieve employee motivation (Smith & Watts, 1992; Gaver & Gaver, 1993; Lehn et 
al., 1990). Given their distinctive financing strategies, it may also be argued that firms with 
high-growth options are less likely to depend on political connections—as is evident from 
Khwaja & Mian (2005), who show that political connections matter most through preferential 
access to credit in Pakistan; therefore, performance would not be deteriorated to a similar 
                                                                                                                                                  
came to power through uncompetitive elections that have restricted entry for candidates (Gleditsch and Ward, 
2006). The political setup of the given sample period is discussed in the next section.  
50
 Throughout this chapter we have used ‘first-government’ period and dictatorial regime; and ‘second-
government’ period and democratic regime, interchangeably.  
 130 
 
extent as low-growth firms. This notion is tested empirically, and our results reveal that 
growth opportunities play an important role in determining the impact of political 
connections on firm performance. Consistent with this conjecture, the results suggest that the 
performance of firms with more growth opportunities is not distorted by political 
connections. In the final part of this chapter, the role of firm-specific characteristics on the 
performance of connected firms is investigated. The results provide limited support for the 
importance of these determinants in explaining performance. In particular, only business 
group-affiliation has an increasing effect on the performance of connected firms while, for 
firm size, results suggest that large firms are subject to more severe performance distortions 
than small firms.  
 
This chapter attempts to make two principal contributions to the literature. The first is a 
provision of new evidence to the promising and growing literature linking politics to firm 
performance. In contrast to prior studies that have implicitly assumed the analogous impact of 
political connections across different political environment, this study emphasises the varying 
nature of political environments and their ultimate impacts on firm performance. In fact, this 
study is amongst the first, to our knowledge, to analyse the way in which political 
connectedness affects firm performance in two contrasting political environments. The 
second contribution is centred on examining the role of growth opportunities in moderating 
the degree of influence political connections has on firm performance. Although prior work 
has extensively investigated the relationship between growth opportunities and firm 
performance (Ho et al., 2004; Gaver & Gaver, 1993), the extent to which firm political 
connections affect the relationship has received little attention thus far—a gap this study 
helps fill. In sum, this study constitutes a first step towards reconciling the contradictory 
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findings on the impact of political connections on firm performance by introducing the 
political environment and growth opportunities into this arena.   
 
This chapter unfolds as follows: Section 5.2 describes the Pakistani political setup and the 
two contrasting political regimes; Section 5.3 outlines the hypotheses of the study that have 
to be tested throughout the analysis; Section 5.4 describes the data, and further presents the 
empirical design; and Section 5.5 provides the descriptive statistics on used variables. 
Empirical findings are then reported and discussed in Section 5.6. Lastly, Section 5.7 presents 
the conclusions of the study. 
  
5.2  The Pakistani political system and two contrasting political regimes  
In this section, a brief overview is provided of the electoral system in Pakistan and the 
political settings of two political regimes: the dictatorial regime (2002–2007) and the 
democratic regime (2008–2010). Pakistan is known to encompass a federal system of 
government with a bicameral Senate or upper house (104 seats), and the National Assembly 
or Lower House (342 seats). The majority of the lower house seats are elected on a first-past-
the-post basis for a five-year term. Much like the United Kingdom, the Cabinet of Pakistan is 
also headed by the Prime Minister, and is an instrument of executive power. The Senate is 
equally representative of all four provincial assemblies and Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA); therefore, the total numbers of seats is periodically adjusted in order to reflect 
population shifts51. Mainly, the Senate has an advisory role, whilst the National Assembly 
does most of the work and is responsible for the fiscal billing. In terms of provincial 
elections, Pakistan comprises four provinces: all four have their own elected provincial 
                                               
51
 The current Senate consists of 104 senators, having equal representation of all four provincial assemblies (23 
members from each province), FATA (8 members) and capital territory (4 members).  
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assemblies and governments, which are headed by their Chief Ministers. The elections for 
provincial assemblies are held concurrently with the National Assembly election. The main 
parties consistently participating in the elections include the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), 
Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q), 
Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), and Awami National Party (ANP). 
 
Since independence in 1947, Pakistan has been struggling to establish a parliamentary 
democracy in a federal setting, which has been fundamentally handicapped by the inter-
ethnic strife, social strains, and fragmented elites (Monshipouri & Samuel, 1995). A weak 
democratic setup and corrupt political leadership always provides military rulers with an 
excuse to meddle in national political affairs. Accordingly, the military has ruled the country 
for more than half of Pakistan’s entire existence (Haqqani, 2006). Such dictators have sought 
to take every step possible to weaken the democratic system in order to remain in power 
(Behuria, 2009; Hussain, 2009). General Musharraf’s period conformed to the earlier pattern. 
As Musharraf assumed power in October 1999 following the dislodging of the elected 
civilian government, the constitution was suspended, and the national and provincial 
assemblies were dissolved in order to impose military rule52.    
 
General Musharraf carefully wrapped the dictatorship in constitutional and civil rule. In this 
regard, in 2002, he designed the transition process to share power with a group of politicians 
whilst himself remaining as an effective president. In so doing, prior to conducting the 
election in October 2002, he searched for like-minded politicians with the aim of establishing 
a party that would serve as the establishment party in coming elections (Rizvi, 2010). It did 
                                               
52
 Given the duration of our sample period, 2002-2010, there are two general elections held during this period, 
we therefore restrict our discussion only to political settings of these two elections.  
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not take long for him to conjure up in parliament a political party of loyalists in an 
environment where changing political loyalty was quite common in pursuit of personal 
benefits (Behuria, 2009). Consequently, a breakaway faction of the PML-N formed the new 
party labelled as the PML-Q. In the aftermath of the election, as expected, the PML-Q 
emerged as the single largest party in National Assembly, which subsequently established a 
coalition government with two other leading parties—MQM and ANP. Against this support, 
large-scale patronage-type benefits were distributed amongst those who supported the 
military regime through the immense clientelistic network. The coalition government 
completed its five-year term under the command of General Musharraf, with the next general 
elections announced for January 8, 200853. However, at this time, the demands of the political 
parties to hold a fair and free election were immense. In addition, the pressure from 
international community to ensure genuine democracy compounded with the domestic 
juridical conflicts caused a veritable menace to the dictatorial regime. The outcomes of the 
general elections on February 18, 2008 turned the tide against Musharraf, and accordingly led 
to a hung house, with PML-N and PPP sharing a comfortable majority. These two parties 
subsequently decided to enter into an alliance in order to form a coalition government 
(Behuria, 2009). Within six months of the new government, Musharraf was eventually forced 
to resign from the presidency54.  
 
The economy of Pakistan has been largely dependent on agriculture from its very 
establishment, which has given rise to two main elite groups—migrated industrialists and 
landowners; these quickly and overwhelmingly controlled most of the country's industry and 
                                               
53
 General elections were postponed for 40 days due to the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir 
Bhutto on December 27, 2007. 
54
 Recall that we see democratic government as a form of government which is selected through competitive 
elections and political power is in the hands of selected individuals. In contrast, autocratic government is a form 
of government where the political power is limited to a one person and came to power through uncompetitive 
elections that have restricted entry for candidates.  
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commerce (Monshipouri & Samuel, 1995). Subsequently, most industrialists entered 
politics—arguably with the aim of protecting and expanding their interests. For example, at 
the creation of Pakistan, Yusuf Haroon, a leading industrialist, was the first Chief Minister of 
Sindh province, and persons like Ahmad Dawood (founding owner of Dawood group), 
Naseer A Sheikh (founding owner of Colony group), and Rafiq Saigol (founding owner of 
Saigol group) held important official posts in the ruling parties and governments (Rehman, 
2006). The existing leadership of the foremost parties, namely PPP, PML-N, PML-Q and 
ANP, is also controlled by the big businessmen55. To be sure, PPP leadership has been 
dominated by the landowners in the beginning, but currently it is headed by Asif A. Zardari, 
who is a leading industrialist. Politicians in the legislature and in government who have a 
business background have readily represented their particularistic interests. For example, The 
News, a Pakistani newspaper, reported how, during 2002–2007, National bank and United 
Bank of Pakistan allotted loans worth Rs. 120 million to the Chauhadry Group (President of 
PML-Q) against their textile and sugar mills on preferential terms, which were later written 
off. Based on this discussion, this relationship between the business and the politics will be 
examined empirically in the coming sections.   
 
5.3  Theory and hypotheses development  
In this section, the main hypotheses to be tested in this chapter are developed. These 
hypotheses are as follows: 
 
                                               
55
 Nawaz Sharif (owner of Ittefaq Foundries) is the president of PML-N and Chauhadry Shujaat Hussain (owner 
of Chauhadry Group) is the president of PML-Q.  
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5.3.1  Firm performance 
The Agency theory argues that the separation of firm control and ownership potentially leads 
to managerial self-serving actions; therefore, a monitoring mechanism is required in order to 
protect shareholder interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Researchers recognise that, when 
monitoring is costly and actions are partly unobservable, managers may exert less effort, 
consume perquisites, or seek to maximise their own utility as opposed to shareholders’ value 
(Fama, 1980). The agency conflict can be resolved by providing managers with various 
incentives so as to align their goals with those of shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
However, there are various other mechanisms that may help to overcome agency issues and 
accordingly improve firm performance, such as proficient monitoring, threat of takeover, 
bankruptcy, or reputational capital (Desai et al., 2003; Holmstrom, 1979). Monitoring 
practices that align shareholders’ and managers’ interests and accordingly avert managers 
from self-serving objectives should be positively related to firm performance.  
 
In this setting, we argue that politicians, as directors, may be able to monitor and control the 
management in better manner owing to their presumed independence relative to insiders, and 
that this would ultimately improve firm performance. In the spirit of Fama & Jensen (1983), 
it is argued further that politicians, as directors, have a greater incentive to monitor firm 
decisions on the behalf of all shareholders as these politicians have to establish reputations in 
general public as decision experts56. The types of resources politically connected directors 
bring to a firm may include intangible reputation, as well as various tangible economic 
benefits (Peng, 2004). More specifically, in less developed economies, politicians 
                                               
56
 A recent example illustrating the value of politician’ reputational capital as a director is the rising fame of 
Pakistani politician Imran Khan (party leader of Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf) in the general public who has served as 
a director of two most proficient institutions, namely, Shaukat Khanum Hospital and Namal University. 
Generally, his established decisional efficacy in running the companies is considered as an evidence of required 
abilities to run to country in an excellent manner.    
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predominantly act as sources of financial favours, and help in terms of obtaining debt on 
more favourable terms, which can be translated into better firm performance through the 
utilisation of such favours (preferential credit), thus facilitating the financing of available 
investment opportunities. With this in mind, it is expected that a positive effect will be 
observed of such corporate political connections on firm performance.  
 
A number of recent studies recognise the economic advantages the firms can gain from 
establishing connections with politicians. Anecdotal evidence suggests that political 
connections matter most through preferential access to finance. Findings by Faccio (2006), 
Khwaja & Mian (2005), Yeh et al. (2012) and Houston et al. (2012) document that connected 
firms enjoy easier access to debt financing, mostly from banks, even though they are not 
worth this extra credit57. Considering the effect of political connections one step further, it is 
plausible to believe that such preferential lending may also affect firm performance. If 
efficiently allocated, such inexpensive credit could provide connected firms with a 
comparative advantage over competitors; these advantages should reflect favourably on their 
performances. In this vein, Boubakri et al. (2009) find that politically connected firms 
increase their performance after establishing political connections. Similarly, Ferguson & 
Voth (2008), Li et al. (2009), Braggion & Moore (2011) and Dombrovsky (2008) report that 
connected firms outperform those firms without connections.  
 
On the other hand, studies such as that carried out by Asquer & Calderoni (2011) report the 
negative effect of political connections on Italian firms’ performance. Similarly, Bertrand et 
al. (2007) note that firm connectedness leads to a lower rate of return on assets. They 
attribute this finding to the fact that connected firms design their policies in pursuance of 
                                               
57
 The detailed discussion of these empirical findings is provided in the chapter 2, section 2.4.  
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political objectives, and thus forgo firms’ own profit maximisation objectives. In a recent 
study, Faccio (2010) provides similar evidence, showing that connected firms have lower 
performance rates than non-connected firms.  
 
Putting the above contradictory findings together, it may be stated that the body of empirical 
evidence is inconclusive for the impact of political connections on performance. 
Nevertheless, following basic intuition, political connectedness accumulates benefits from 
politicians that should be reflected in the performance of connected firms; thus, we anticipate 
positive impact of political connections on performance. Thus, the main testable hypothesis is 
as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 1A: Politically connected firms have better performance than non-connected 
firms.  
 
In contrast, there are studies advocating the negative relationship between political 
connections and firm performance which argue that a politically connected Board does not 
have managerial incentives to maximise shareholders’ wealth and improve overall firm 
performance (Boubakri et al., 2008). Furthermore, other studies, such as that of Dewenter et 
al. (1997) suggest that politically connected firms forgo maximum profit in the pursuit of 
social and political objectives. More importantly, considering low institutional development 
and higher extent of corruption in less developed economy such as Pakistan the impact of 
political connections tends to be negative. Following these arguments, our competing 
hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
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Hypothesis 1B: Politically connected firms have poorer performance than non-connected 
firms.  
 
The literature on authoritarianism asserts that nondemocratic regimes require solicit 
economic cooperation so as to remain in power (Escriba-Folch & Wright, 2010; Wintrobe, 
1998). Central to these studies is the contention that dictators can reduce the likelihood of 
being deposed through cooperating with potentially threatening political elements. In so 
doing, dictators mostly build supporting coalition—the loyalty of which is largely dependent 
on obtaining patronage resources from the dictator. The instruments by which dictators buy 
the loyalty of politicians include policy concessions, favourable lending, and the distribution 
of spoils (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007). In such a scenario, all factions within regime have 
incentives to cooperate with the intention of staying in power; therefore, they exploit the 
system collectively.  
 
Based on the aforementioned arguments, it is expected that a higher extent of political rent 
will be observed in the first government period owing to the fact that it was a dictator-backed 
government. Given that political connections induce a positive effect on firm performance, it 
is most likely that the performance of connected firms is better in the first government period 
than in the second democratic government period (due to more political favours). This 
prediction is presented in the hypothesis below:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Politically connected firms have better performance in the first-government 
period (dictatorial regime) than connected firms in the second-government period 
(democratic regime).  
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5.3.2   Impact of growth opportunities and firm performance  
It has been widely argued that the impact of imperfection in capital market is more acute on 
high-growth firms (Himmelberg & Peterson, 1994; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). The argument 
stems from the fact that growing firms hold most of their value in growth opportunities that 
are likely to have little or no collateralisable net worth, which subsequently increases the 
costs of external finance for these firms. Consequently, growing firms with insufficient 
tangible assets are likely to pass up valuable investment opportunities. Under such 
circumstances, firms with growth opportunities adopt policies that mitigate underinvestment 
problems, such as greater reliance on internal capital and less on leverage, and pay a lower 
level of dividends so as to increase the internal capital stock (Chow et al., 2011; Gaver & 
Gaver, 1993). Considering this fact, firms with higher level growth options rely less on 
leverage, and thus it may be hypothesised that such firms are less likely to depend on political 
connections, and their performance therefore would not be deteriorated to a similar extent as 
low-growth firms.   
 
Hypothesis 3: Politically connected firms with more growth opportunities have higher 
performance than connected firms with less growth opportunities.  
 
5.3.3  Interaction effect of political connections and firm size 
It is unclear that every firm responds to political relationships in the same way, and this is 
precisely where firm-specific attributes may be important. Firm size is an important factor 
with the potential to determine the outcome level firms obtain through political influence. 
Previous research recognises that better financial resources enable large firms to accumulate 
stronger political connections and to accordingly extract more political rents out of these 
links. For instance, Faccio (2006) indicates that political connections are more widespread 
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amongst large firms, and their level of leverage is greater than small firms. Similarly, Fraser 
et al. (2005) report a higher value of political connections for the large firms. In contrast, 
researchers argue that, besides connection advantage, large organisations may also have 
alternative resources when striving to attain competitive advantage over smaller counterparts, 
such as private funds and foreign listing. As a result, large firms may experience greater 
diminishing returns from their political affiliations, whilst small firms will take connections 
as being more valuable so as to enhance their competitive positions within the market (Jia et 
al., 2011). In this regard, Faccio et al. (2006) observe that the extent of political favours in 
terms of government bailouts do not change across firm size. Similarly, Poyry & Maury 
(2010) report a negative relationship between firm size and preferential treatment for 
connected firms. They attribute their findings to the fact that, since large firms possess more 
resources, they are more likely to get more political interferences owing to the fact that such 
firms are more of a lucrative target of political patronage than small firms. Following the 
arguments of this strand of literature, the following may be tested: 
 
 Hypothesis 4: Firm size relates negatively to the performance of politically connected firms.  
 
5.3.4   Interaction effect of political connections and foreign ownership 
Different forms of ownership also play an important role in determining what firms have to 
gain from political connections. A substantial literature shows that firms with foreign 
ownership possess not only modern technology and better management, but also the ability to 
influence policy decisions (Chhibber & Majumdar, 2005; Dunning, 1993). Such 
characteristics make them likely to perform better than domestic firms. Studies such as those 
by Harris & Robinson (2003), Harris (2002) and Girma et al. (2005) find evidence that 
foreign-owned firms perform better than domestic counterparts.  
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From a political economic standpoint, both domestic- and foreign-owned firms may reap 
substantial benefits from political connections. Nevertheless, the extent to which political 
gain varies across ownership type depends a great deal on the superior capabilities of the 
firms. Thereby, the distinctive features associated with foreign-owned firms enable them to 
use political ties to grab more advantageous positions in the market through translating the 
benefits of connectedness into better performance. Accordingly, in an attempt to test this 
conjecture, the following hypothesis is formulated:    
 
Hypothesis 5: Foreign owned politically connected firms exhibit better performance than the 
domestic connected firms.  
 
5.3.5   Interaction effect of political connections and business group affiliation 
In the literature, the significance of business groups is supported mainly through economic 
perspective (Leff, 1978; Khanna & Palepu, 2000). This perspective conceives business 
groups as being an ultimate response to market failures and associated costs. In such an 
environment, group affiliation facilitates firms in terms of reducing transaction costs by 
easing information flows between firms or otherwise by aligning the interests of firms and 
striving collectively towards mutual benefit (Khanna & Rivkin, 2006). Moreover, such 
groups may also use their broad scope to smooth out income flows, and thus ensure access to 
internal capital in an environment in which external finance is costly and difficult to access. 
Collectively, group affiliation is expected to lead to capability spillovers amongst affiliates, 
which may positively affect the economic performance of individual firms.  
 
From the political connections perspective, business groups are considered to be the product 
of favourable government policies that encourage the formation and development of groups 
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(Colpan et al., 2010). As such, close political ties are regarded as being the ultimate outcome 
of such a formation, which is somewhat a precondition for business groups to develop and 
sustain within the market (Khanna, 2000). Due to the significant position in the economy, 
business groups always remain in the position of capitalising the economic rent derived from 
political ties, which ultimately improve the competitiveness and performance of group 
affiliates. The above arguments lead to the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 6: Group affiliated politically connected firms exhibit better performance than 
the stand-alone connected firms.  
 
5.4  Research design 
5.4.1   Data sources and sample selection criteria 
The data for this study is taken through various sources 58 . Data on firm financial 
characteristics is taken from the OSIRIS, a commercial database supported by Bureau van 
Dijk, over the period 2002–2010. Thereafter, information on business group affiliation is 
collected from the book Rehman (2006). The data on politicians—which is reviewed with the 
objective to identify the firms with ties to politicians—is obtained from the official website of 
Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), which conducts elections for the National and 
Provincial Assemblies59 . Financial institutions and banks are excluded from the data, in 
addition to any observations with missing values in the variables used in this study. 
Moreover, each firm is required to have a minimum two consecutive years’ information to 
assess the changes in the financing structure of the firm. Following the application of these 
                                               
58
 For the ease of readers, the data sources and sample selection criteria is rewritten here in this chapter. 
59
 Data is available at the following URL: http://www.ecp.gov.pk/ 
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sample selection criteria, the resulting sample comprises 2,199 firm-year observations of 380 
non-financial listed firms during the period 2002–2010.  
 
In order to identify the politically connected firms, the list comprising names of politicians—
those who participated in the 2002 and/or 2008 elections—was obtained from the Election 
Commission of Pakistan and matched with the full names of the firms’ directors (obtained 
from the OSIRIS) one by one. By so doing, 107 politicians were matched to firms’ directors. 
No politician was matched to more than one firm; therefore, 107 firms were identified as 
politically connected firms. Moreover, so as to identify foreign ownership, following Javorcik 
& Spatareanu (2011) and Kimura & Kiyota (2007), we define a firm to be foreign-owned if at 
least 10% of its stock is foreign-owned. Following this definition, 42 firms are identified as 
foreign-owned whereas 338 firms are considered domestic firms. To establish the business 
group-affiliation of our sample, a list of top-30 business groups and their associated firms is 
used, which is available in a book by Rehman (2006); notably, this is the updated edition of 
the book that focuses on the 38 top business groups in Pakistan. Amongst those 8 business 
houses, comprised only of non-listed and/or financial firms, the sample set could be aligned 
only to the remaining 30 business group-affiliated firms. Following this measure, 105 firms 
in the sample are identified as business group-affiliated, whilst 275 firms are considered 
stand-alone firms. Other studies known to have utilised similar sources to identify the 
business group affiliation in Pakistan include Masulis et al. (2011), Ashraf & Ghani (2005) 
and Candland (2007). 
 
Table 5.1 presents the distribution of the sample across political connections, ownership, and 
business group-affiliation. It reveals that 28% of firms are politically connected, of which 
46% are affiliated with business groups and 8% are foreign-owned. 
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Table 5.1: Sample distribution across connected and non-connected firms 
 Total sample  Political connected  Non-connected 
 Number Percentage  Number Percentage  Number Percentage 
Total number of firms 380 100  107 28  273 72 
 
By ownership 
        
Foreign owned 42 11  9 8  33 12 
Domestic owned 338 89  98 92  240 88 
         
By business group 
Group-affiliates 
 
105 
 
27 
  
49 
 
46 
  
56 
 
21 
Stand-alone 275 73  58 54  217 79 
 
5.4.2   Measurement of key variables 
Measure of firm performance 
Accounting measures are regarded as the most accepted performance measure in literature. 
Accounting measures are recognised as backward-looking as they evaluate the 
accomplishment of management and accordingly reflect the efficiency of resource utilised in 
terms of producing output and creating shareholder value. In contrast, economic measures, 
i.e. economic value added, are forward-looking, and estimate what management will 
accomplish (Kao et al., 2004). The utility of accounting measures offers a set of advantages: 
the first advantage lies in their simplicity and meaningfulness; second, such measures are 
revealed through an quantitative representation of results of internal and external decisions; 
third, they are regarded as instruments centred on identifying irregularities in the managerial 
behaviour; fourth, all stakeholders seem united in their interests in associating these measures 
since such tools facilitate answering critical financial questions posed to all parties about firm 
performance (Voulgaris & Doumpos, 2000).  
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There are various accounting measures for firm performance employed in the existing 
literature (Krishnan and Moyer, 1994; Gleason et al., 2000; Boubakri et al., 2008, Fan et al., 
2008; and Dombrovsky, 2008). Profit maximization, shareholder wealth maximization, return 
of assets and return on investment are examples of financial performance measures. On the 
other hand, firm performance is measured in terms of growth opportunities, such as, growth 
in sales, growth in market share, employment growth, and sales per employee are examples 
of operational effectiveness measures. Similarly, the concept of measuring total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth has also garnered its significance in productivity measurement 
debate which was initiated by the work of Abramovitz (1956). TFP measures the increase in 
total output which is not explained by increase in total input (i.e. residual of the production 
function). Mathematically, the level of TFP is the ratio of total output to weighted sum of 
input, whereas the growth in TFP is the growth rate in total output less the growth rate in total 
input. Hulten (2000) reports main strengths of TFP as follows: firstly, it provides a complete 
assessment of performance trend; secondly, it accounts for the changes in various factors of 
production; finally, TFP offers a ready means of benchmarking for organizational 
performance comparison. Alongside its strengths, there are limitations of TFP as well. For 
instance, TFP is sensitive to measurement technique and assumptions. In addition, TFP does 
not allow for different conditions, output mixes and technology.  
 
Another eminent measure of firm performance is technical efficiency which is based upon 
deviations of observed output from the best production or efficient production frontier 
analysis. The fundamentals of frontier analysis lie on the estimation of distance of the 
observations to the estimated inefficiency (Zhang and Garvey, 2008). Generally, frontier 
analysis technique can either be parametric or non-parametric. Data envelopment analysis 
(DAE) comes under the non-parametric approach which classifies any deviation between the 
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actual production and the frontier as inefficiency without any likelihood of randomness. The 
principal advantage of DAE technique is that it does not require the specification of a 
particular functional form for the technology. However, owing to its discrete nature, it is 
unable to measure statistical noise. On the other hand, stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) is 
classified as parametric and stochastic approach and includes a source of randomness in 
production which makes this measure more consistent under normal working conditions. 
However, SFA is considered as more complicated and requires multiple output distance 
functions which raise issues for outputs with zero values (Fecher et al., 1993).     
 
Although there are various accounting measures centred on quantifying performance in the 
literature, for the purpose of this study, however, three measures are adopted—return on 
assets, return on equity, and Tobin’s Q—in common with similar works studying the 
outcomes of political connections on firms’ performance (Boubakri et al., 2008; Fan et al., 
2008; Dombrovsky, 2008). Return on assets is the ratio implemented in order to assess the 
ability of firms to generate return on the total assets available for application (Tezel & 
McManus, 2003; Krishnan & Moyer, 1994). This is defined as profit before taxes over total 
assets. Return on equity is the measure used to assess the return on money that shareholders 
have invested (Brigham et al., 2004). In this study, it is defined as profit before taxes divided 
by the book value of total shareholders’ equity. Tobin’s Q is a market-oriented measure of a 
firm’s performance, serving as a proxy for a firm’s ability to generate shareholder wealth 
(Rose, 2007). Tobin’s Q is constructed as the market value of equity plus book value of total 
debts divided by the book value of total assets. Table 5.2 provides the measurement of the 
aforementioned variables. 
 
 
 147 
 
Measure of political connectedness 
Following mainstream literature (Khwaja & Mian, 2005; Boubakri et al., 2009; Faccio, 
2006), a firm is defined as connected if it has a politician on its Board of Directors. A 
politician is defined as any individual who stood in the national or provincial election, held in 
2002 and 2008. A politician’s full name is matched to a firm’s director if their full (first, 
middle and last) name matches exactly. In such a situation, the firm is then considered a 
politically connected firm.  
 
Table 5.2: Variables definitions and data sources 
Variables Acronym Definition Source 
 Return on assets PERFORMANCE Profit before taxes divided by total assets  OSIRIS 
Return on equity PERFORMANCE Profit before taxes divided by book value of total shareholder’s 
equity 
OSIRIS 
Tobin’s Q PERFORMANCE Market value of equity plus book value of total debts divided by 
book value of total assets. 
OSIRIS 
Political 
connections  
PC A firm is considered as connected if firm has a politician on its 
board of directors and a politician is defined as any individual who 
stood in the national or provincial election, held in 2002 and 2008. 
OSIRIS 
and ECP* 
 Leverage  LEVERAGE Ratio of book value of firm's total debt (short term and long term) 
to total assets. 
OSIRIS 
Size SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets OSIRIS 
Foreign ownership FOREIGN A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if at least 10 percent of its 
stock is foreign owned, 0 otherwise.   
OSIRIS 
Business group BUS-GROUP A dummy variable that takes value 1 if a firm is affiliated with top 
30 Pakistani business groups, 0 otherwise.  
Rehman 
(2006) 
* Official website of ECP (Election Commission of Pakistan) provides the list of individuals participated in previous 
elections since 1970.  
 
5.4.3   Estimation model 
The regression model used to estimate the impact of political connections on firm 
performance resembles those of Wu et al. (2010), Boubakri et al. (2008) and Dombrovsky 
(2008). It encompasses the following general form: 
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PERFORMANCEit = α + β1 PCit +β2 SIZEit +β3 LEVERAGEit +β4 FOREIGNit +β5 BUS-
GROUPit + YearDum + +IndDum +ε     (1) 
Regression Model 1 is also employed for the two subsamples based on government terms.60 
The dependent variable (PERFORMANCE) capturing performance of firm i in year t, 
measured as return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). PC is a dummy variable 
measuring the political connections of firms. The definitions of dependent variables and 
political connections are discussed in Section 5.4.1.   
 
Several variables of potential importance are included in the model. First, firm size (SIZE) is 
included so as to control for economies of scale effect on performance. The distinctive 
characteristics of large firms, such as diverse capabilities, economies of scale, and the 
formalisation of procedures, all facilitate them in generating larger returns on assets and 
equity (Chhibber & Majumdar, 1999). Chen et al. (2009) affirm this conjecture, and further 
report a positive association between a firm’s size and performance. With this noted, a natural 
log of total assets is used as a proxy of firm size. Second, leverage (LEVERAGE) is an 
important determinant of a firm’s performance in this particular context. Theoretically, free 
cash flow reasoning suggests that debt mitigates agency problems, and thus increases firms’ 
performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In an environment with weak legal institutions and 
widespread managerial opportunistic behaviour, such as that in Pakistan, it is essential for 
firms to utilise debt and have some level of monitoring by the lender, which would ultimately 
induce a positive impact on firm performance. Through this analysis, it is measured as the 
ratio of total debt to total assets. Third, so as to control for the effect of foreign ownership on 
a firm’s performance, a dummy variable is used to capture foreign ownership (FOREIGN). 
The dummy variable takes the value of 1 if at least 10% of a stock is foreign-owned and zero 
                                               
60
 Since our sampled firms, both connected and non-connected, are same in both government periods therefore 
sub-samples comprised of same firms but with different observations periods.  
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otherwise. The impact of firm ownership status—whether domestically or foreign-owned—
on its performance has also been discussed at great length, often as a part of the general 
debate on the control of foreign direct investment in host countries (Malek, 1974). The most 
commonly cited argument for the positive impact of foreign ownership on performance rests 
on their superior capabilities in production (Aitken & Harrision, 1999; Dunning, 1981). The 
possession of such capabilities may ultimately result in the display of superior performance 
relative to domestically owned firms. However, some critics have long since argued that 
foreign-owned firms—mostly operating as foreign subsidiaries—tend to shower lower 
performance than domestic firms (i.e. Malek, 1974). This statement is supported mainly 
through two arguments: firstly, many manufacturing foreign subsidiaries are established with 
a predominant interest so as to gain tariff-free access to the host country. Secondly, in some 
cases, foreign-owned subsidiaries commonly suffer from higher costs of production relative 
to their parent firm, which subsequently affects their productivity. Both circumstances 
ultimately tend to deter the performance of foreign-owned firms. Fourth, the effect of 
business group-affiliation is controlled by including a dummy variable (BUS-GROUP), 
which takes the value of 1 for the firms affiliated to a business group, and zero if otherwise. 
Finally, a series of dummy variables is applied to control for time- and industry-specific 
factors. In order to minimise the impacts of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 5th and 
95th percentiles. 
 
5.4.4  Estimation technique 
It has been argued that firm performance may have a substantial impact on lenders’ decisions, 
which thus creates a two-way causality where the degree of leverage may impact corporate 
performance and vice versa (Dessi & Robertson, 2003). If this is the case, the error term of 
Equation 1 will be correlated with the endogenous variable, LEVERAGE, generating biased 
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estimates if the equation is estimated by OLS. In an attempt to confirm such a theoretical 
prediction, endogeneity is tested in the model by using Hausman (1978) test. The test of 
endogeneity of leverage examines the null hypothesis that leverage is an exogenous variable. 
A statistically significant result confirms the theoretical prediction; thus, instrumental 
technique is required for estimation.   
 
Earlier studies, such as those by Demsetz (1983), Cho (1998) and Demsetz & Villalonga 
(2001) address the endogeneity issue using an instrumental variable approach—the two-stage 
least square (2SLS) technique. Therefore, the instrumental variable 2SLS approach is 
employed, which notably requires an instrumental variable that correlates strongly with 
leverage, but which does not correlate with firm performance. Following the work of 
Campello (2005), it is argued that, in the presence of contracting imperfections (as in our 
case), it is relatively common for lenders to request collateral in an attempt to back all 
promised repayments. The extent of external finance is therefore seen to correlate with the 
amount of collateral (fixed assets). Importantly, although firms’ asset tangibility correlates 
with financing but it does not influence firm performance. Campello (2005) suggests that 
tangibility of assets determines firm’s financing capabilities; however it does not influence 
firm’s performance other than through the connection with financing itself. Moreover, in our 
study, the correlation between asset’s tangibility and performance is found 0.16 indicating 
very weak correlation; whereas the correlation coefficient between asset’s tangibility and 
leverage is 0.74 suggesting strong correlation between them. Hence, the firm’s collateral—
markedly measured as ratio of fixed to total assets—is a suitable instrument candidate for 
leverage in the performance equation61. Econometrically, firms’ leverage is regressed against 
                                               
61
 In estimation, the validity of instrument is also checked by several tests which give confidence in the validity 
of collateral as instrument.  
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collateral and other independent variables used in performance Equation 1. Subsequently, the 
fitted value of leverage is used as regressor in the second-stage equation.  
 
In this empirical strategy, the impact of political connections on firm performance is 
examined with the use of Equation 1 for the entire period 2002–2010. Subsequently, the 
sample is stratified into two government periods based on their political nature, with the 
effect of political connectedness on firm performance estimated in each period independently. 
The first and second governments comprised periods 2002–2007 and 2008–2010, 
respectively. One potential concern in this analysis is that firm performances are not 
comparable across the two samples because of different length of government periods. In 
order to deal with this problem, following Belghitar & Khan (2012) and Ozkan & Ozkan 
(2004), we estimate a cross-sectional performance equation using the average values of each 
of the firm’s characteristics over a five-year period (2002–2006) in the first period and two 
years (2008–2009) in the second period. More specifically, in the first-government period, 
firm performance is measured (the dependent variable) in 2007, with explanatory variables 
measured over the period 2002–2006. Similarly, for the second-government period, firm 
performance (the dependent variable) is measured in 2010 and explanatory variables over the 
period 2008–2009. By so doing, we are able to compare the average impact of firm 
characteristics on performance across periods. One additional benefit of implementing this 
methodology is that, through the use of past values, the possibility of observed relations 
reflecting the influences of performance on firm characteristics is reduced, especially in 
regard to political connections.  
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5.5  Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.3 compares the means of variables of firms connected to politicians, and those that 
are not. It also reports the differences in mean values for variables between the first-
government period and the second-government period. Given the distinctive nature of these 
governments, it is expected that a significant difference in the firms’ characteristics be 
observed across these periods.  
 
In Panel A, the results show a clear tendency for connected firms to be less profitable than 
non-connected ones. Moreover, the differences in profitability also appear to be statistically 
significant. More specifically, the average return on assets for connected firms is 4.39, which 
is recognised as significantly smaller than the value for non-connected firms (6.64). Return 
on equity shows an even greater difference. For non-connected firms, the mean value of 
return on equity is 12.72, which exceeds the mean for connected firms (9.48). Subsequently, 
profitability in terms of Tobin’s Q also exhibits a similar pattern of performance; connected 
firms maintain a lower profitability than non-connected firms. Regarding other 
characteristics, the statistically significant value on firm size indicates that politically 
connected firms are larger in size than their non-connected peers. The results on leverage 
suggest that politically connected firms have higher leverage ratio (0.67) than non-connected 
firms (0.61), thus providing evidence of political patronage. They also have greater growth 
opportunities, measured as price–earnings ratio, than non-connected firms, although the 
difference is recognised as statistically insignificant. Finally, firm investment is higher 
amongst non-connected firms, and so the result is significant at 5% level.   
 
Subsequently, the means of the variables for the two government periods are reported. Panel 
B and Panel C of Table 5.3 show that, although both the connected and non-connected firms 
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experienced large changes in performance measures across government periods, the 
difference in means between the connected and the non-connected firms for each of the 
performance measures nevertheless shows a consistent pattern. In both periods, the connected 
firms underperform in contrast to non-connected firms, and the difference is statistically 
significant. Furthermore, connected firms hold a higher level of leverage than non-connected 
firms throughout both periods. Leverage value is 0.65 for connected firms and 0.62 for non-
connected firms in the first period, with an average 0.67 for connected firms and 0.64 for 
non-connected firms in the second period. Similar to Panel A, the mean difference of growth 
opportunities across connected and the non-connected firms in both periods is found to be 
statistically insignificant. The results for the firm’s size also follow the earlier pattern; 
however, the mean difference across the connected and non-connected firms is not 
statistically significant in the first period.  
 
.    
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Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics 
 Panel A: Full sample 
 
 Panel B: First government period (2002-
2007) 
 Panel C: Second government period 
(2008-2010) 
t-stats 
(panel B&C) 
 Total 
sample 
PC Non-PC t-stat  Total 
sample 
PC Non-PC t-stat  Total 
sample 
PC Non-PC t-stat PC 
Return on 
assets (ROA) 
 
5.94 
(10.91) 
4.39 
(10.26) 
6.64 
(11.12) 
4.44a  7.27 
(10.77) 
5.58 
(10.05) 
8.08 
(11.01) 
3.93a  4.06 
(10.84) 
2.47 
(10.33) 
4.70 
(10.98) 
2.81a -3.88a 
Return on 
equity (ROE) 
 
11.72 
(16.73) 
9.48 
(15.70) 
12.72 
(17.08) 
4.21a  14.04 
(16.04) 
11.70 
(14.89) 
15.17 
(16.79) 
3.60a  8.40 
(16.82) 
5.89 
(16.32) 
9.42 
(16.93) 
2.86a -4.77a 
Tobin Q 
 
0.64 
(0.25) 
0.63 
(0.24) 
0.67 
(0.24) 
3.16a  0.63 
(0.24) 
0.62 
(0.23) 
0.65 
(0.24) 
2.17b  0.66 
(0.26) 
 
0.65 
(0.26) 
0.70 
(0.25) 
2.85a -2.77a 
Size (Size) 6.30 
(0.66) 
6.33 
(0.61) 
6.28 
(0.68) 
-1.66c  6.24 
(0.63) 
6.26 
(0.59) 
6.23 
(0.65) 
-0.65  6.38 
(0.69) 
 
6.45 
(0.62) 
6.35 
(0.72) 
-2.07b 4.05a 
Leverage 
(Leverage) 
 
0.64 
(0.25) 
0.67 
(0.24) 
0.61 
(0.25) 
-3.38a  0.63 
(0.24) 
0.65 
(0.23) 
0.62 
(0.24) 
-2.20b  0.66 
(0.26) 
0.67 
(0.25) 
0.64 
(0.26) 
-2.86a 2.80 
Growth 
opportunities 
(Growth-Opp) 
 
8.16 
(5.78) 
8.28 
(5.88) 
8.10 
(5.73) 
-0.65  8.57 
(5.35) 
8.72 
(5.38) 
8.50 
(5.33) 
-0.68  7.55 
(6.30) 
7.57 
(6.57) 
7.59 
(6.20) 
-0.01 -2.49 
Observations 
 
2199 682 1517   1292 421 871   907 261 646   
Standard deviations are in parenthesis. PC and Non-PC represents politically connected and politically non-connected firms, respectively. Upper-scripts a, b, and c indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
 Finally, when reviewing the last column of Table 5.3, the mean differences of variables of 
connected firms across government periods can be seen. The results suggest that connected 
firms show better performance in the second period than in the first period, with the 
difference recognised as statistically significant at 1% level. This finding holds for all three 
performance measures. On the other hand, however, statistically significant mean difference 
for firm size indicates that connected firms are larger in the first period. Next, unexpectedly, 
the level of leverage—a foremost form of political gain—is not recognised as being different 
across the periods, therefore representing that the extent of political patronage is similar in 
both government periods. Overall, the results suggest that, despite the similar political 
favours (in form of leverage) in both periods, the connected firms demonstrate superior 
performance in the second government period. These findings not only contradict the 
prediction of literature on authoritarian patronage politics by evidencing similar political 
lending in both governments, but also could not provide support for our prediction for the 
better performance of the connected firms in the dictatorial government. 
 
5.6  Empirical results and analysis  
5.6.1   Political connections and performance 
In this section, regression analysis is performed in order to examine the effect of political 
connections on firm performance. Table 5.4 presents the results of 2SLS regressions using 
the ROA and ROE as dependent variables. Model 1 takes political connections as a key 
variable for testing Hypothesis 1. So as to explore the difference in the effects of political 
connections on firm performance across government periods, Model 1 is estimated for the 
sub-samples of the first-government period and the second-government period. Panel A 
reports the estimates of the entire sample, whereas Panel B and Panel C present the results for 
the first-government and second-government period sub-samples, respectively. All 
specifications include industry and year dummy variables.  
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As shown in Column 1 of Table 5.4, the coefficient of PC is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level, which indicates that firms with political connections have a lower 
return on assets than those without connections. More specifically, the connected firms yield, 
on average, 23.6% lower return on their available assets than non-connected firms. To 
establish this finding more firmly, the model is re-estimated with the alternative measure of 
firm performance—ROE. The effect of political connections on ROE is also found negative. 
The results in Column 2 show that firms with political connections underperform when 
compared with those without political connections by 18.2%. This suggests that politicians 
exacerbate agency problems by coercing management to engage in self-interested actions that 
protect the interests of politicians, thus deteriorating firm performance. Our finding is in line 
with those of other studies, such as Fan et al. (2008), Faccio (2006, 2010), and Khwaja & 
Mian (2005), all of whom report poor performance for connected firms.  
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Table 5.4: Estimation results of basic model examining the impact of political 
connections on performance 
 
The control variable for firm size (SIZE), as expected, is found positive and significant at 5% 
level, supporting the notion that large firms have more resources and market power to exhibit 
  Panel (A) 
Entire period 
 Panel (B) 
First-government 
 Panel (C) 
Second-government 
Independent Variables  ROA 
(1) 
ROE 
(2) 
 ROA 
(3) 
ROE 
(4) 
 ROA 
(5) 
ROE 
(6) 
PC  -0.236** 
(0.02) 
-0.182** 
(0.01) 
 -0.173** 
(0.01) 
-0.141* 
(0.06) 
 -0.132* 
(0.06) 
-0.125** 
(0.04) 
SIZE  0.068** 
(0.04) 
0.086* 
(0.09) 
 0.074* 
(0.07) 
0.091* 
(0.08) 
 0.066* 
(0.06) 
0.084* 
(0.09) 
LEVERAGE  -0.115** 
(0.03) 
-0.079*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.118** 
(0.04) 
-0.127** 
(0.01) 
 -0.198 
(0.11) 
-0.180 
(0.10) 
FOREIGN  0.075* 
(0.09) 
0.114** 
(0.06) 
 0.239 
(0.14) 
0.262 
(0.18) 
 0.170* 
(0.09) 
0.144** 
(0.04) 
BUS-GROUP  0.093 
(0.56) 
0.074 
(0.33) 
 0.037 
(0.51) 
0.029 
(0.36) 
 0.086 
(0.59) 
0.114 
(0.38) 
CONSTANT 
 
 0.459*** 
(0.00) 
0.654*** 
(0.00) 
 0.257*** 
(0.00) 
0.434** 
(0.04) 
 0.503** 
(0.03) 
0.320** 
(0.01) 
Time dummies   Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industries dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of Obs.  2199 2199  1292 1292  907 907 
Number of Firms  380 380  380 380  380 380 
R-square  0.131 0.244  0.106 0.121  0.246 0.150 
F-statistics  254.84 391.26  26.05 23.72  27.01 32.64 
Hansen-Sargan test (p-
value) 
 0.106 0.409  0.138 0.164  0.104 0.239 
Panel (A) shows second-stage results of 2SLS regression results for the entire period (2002-2010). Panel (B) and (C) 
show the cross-sectional regression results for the first-government (2002-2007) and the second-government (2008-
2010), respectively. The dependent variable in Panel (B) is measured in 2007, and the averages of the independent 
variables are measured over the period 2002-2006. Similarly, in Panel (C) the dependent variable is measured in 2010 
and the averages of the independent variables are calculated over the period 2008-2009. The dependent variable in all 
regressions is return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). In the first-stage leverage is instrumented with 
collateral, defined as the ratio of tangible to the total assets, and all other independent variables used in the baseline 
model.  F-test tests for weak identification. The Hansen-Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions with the 
null hypothesis that instruments are valid. P-values, adjusted for heteroskedasticity, are in brackets. * Significant and 
10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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better performance. Next, unexpectedly, leverage (LEVERAGE) has a negative and 
significant effect on firm performance, indicating that higher leverage exerts a negative 
influence on performance. The negative relationship may be attributed to the high cost of 
borrowing in the Pakistani market. The real cost of borrowing in Pakistan is 15%–20%, 
which is phenomenally high by international standards. For high-levered firms to pay such 
high interest rates, gross margin on sale has to be exceptionally high, which is arduous in a 
market where demand constraints are significant and the benefits of liberalisation has not yet 
been fully recognised. Consequently, levered firms are considerably less profitable than firms 
with a low degree of debt. Next, foreign ownership (FOREIGN) is found to have positive and 
significant effects on both the measures of performance, thus indicating that foreign 
ownership is an important determinant of firm performance. Owing to firm-specific assets 
associated with foreign ownership, such as superior technology, managerial ability, and 
effective corporate governance, there is a competitive advantage over domestic-owned firms 
that may result in better performance. The result strengthens the evidence provided by 
Chhibber & Majumdar (2005), where superior performance by foreign-owned firms is 
observed. Lastly, business group affiliation (BUS-GROUP) is positively but insignificantly 
associated with performance indicating that business group affiliations have no impact on the 
firm performance. We can justify our result with the negative traits associated with business 
groups, related mainly to their monopoly powers, moral hazard, and inefficient investment. 
One much discussed negative trait that is also prevalent in the Pakistani market is the 
pyramidal structure of business groups (Ikram & Naqvi, 2005). Such a structure enables an 
apex firm to control other grouped firms without having made commensurate capital 
investments (Guest & Sutherland, 2010). This form of structure distorts firm performance and 
ultimately destroys firm value. The irrelevance of group affiliation supports the finding of 
Gohar & Karacaer (2009), who state similar results for Pakistani group-affiliated firms.     
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We now proceed to analysis whether performance of connected firms systematically differs 
across government terms. In this regard, as hypothesised, given the different political nature 
of governments, the impact of connections is expected to be different in both government 
periods. In order to carry out such an analysis, our sample is stratified into two broad 
categories as the first-government period (2002–2007) and the second-government period 
(2008–2010), with the cross-sectional regression estimated separately based on Equation 1 
for each sample. More specifically, in the first-government period, firm performance (the 
dependent variable) in 2007 is measured, and explanatory variables over the period 2002–
2006, and for the second-government period, firm performance (the dependent variable) in 
2010 is measured, and explanatory variables over the period 2008–2009.  
 
Panel B and Panel C present the estimation results for the cross-sectional performance 
equation. The estimated coefficient on political connections is negative and significant in 
both periods. The magnitude of the coefficients for ROA indicates that connected firms 
underperform when compared with non-connected firms by 17.3% in the first-government 
and 13.2% in the second-government. The effect of political connections on ROE follows a 
very similar pattern. The magnitude of coefficients indicates that the firm with political 
connections have, on average, a lower performance of 14.1% and 12.5% in the first and the 
second government periods, respectively, when compared with their non-connected peers. 
This finding suggests that performance is even more distorted in the first-government period, 
which encompassed military dictatorship, than in the second-government. Our finding 
contradicts the hypothesis (2), which asserts that connected firms have better performance in 
the first-government.  
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Regarding the effect of firm control variables, results are generally similar to those shown in 
Panel A with the exception of foreign ownership and leverage. Firm’s foreign ownership is 
an important predictor of performance only in the second-government period, whereas 
leverage is found to be negatively related to performance only in the first-government period.  
 
It is critical to note that the size of coefficients on PC is greater in the estimations than those 
reported in other similar studies, such as in Fan et al. (2007). This difference in magnitude of 
coefficients may be attributed mainly to the different estimation techniques as the 
instrumental variable technique was employed, in contrast to earlier studies, which mainly 
used OLS regression. A large coefficient on the second stage is extremely common in 2SLS 
estimations, and is generally attributed to the fact that instrument is seen in 2SLS as a 
corrective to measurement error and thus leads to a larger substantive effect (Malesky, 2009). 
The value of adjusted R2 ranges from 0.106 to 0.246, showing the satisfactory explanatory 
power of the estimated models. Several tests were conducted, which together provide support 
for our instrument choice. First, the Hausman test was implemented with the null hypothesis 
that regressor (leverage) is exogenous; that is, an OLS estimation of the same equation would 
yield consistent estimates. The significant p-values in all estimates suggest that OLS 
regressions that fail to control endogeneity problems would ultimately produce biased results. 
The relevance of the instrument may be readily tested by F-test for the joint significance of 
the instruments (Stock & Yogo, 2005). The statistics of F-test do not reject the hypothesis 
that the instrument is both relevant and significant. The Hansen-Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions is performed. The high p-values do not reject the joint hypothesis that 
the instruments are uncorrelated with the error. Such tests confirm the relevance of collateral 
as the instrument for leverage.  
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Taken together, the regressions in Table 5.4 suggest that political connections deter firm 
performance, which supports Hypothesis 1B. This suggests that political benefits are not 
translated effectively to improve performance. Furthermore, the deteriorating effect of 
political connections is even stronger in the first-government period, which is the opposite of 
what might have been expected on the basis of autocratic’s notion (Hypothesis 2).  
 
5.6.2   Impact of firm characteristics 
In this section, the indirect effect of political connections is examined via firm-specific 
characteristics on the performance of connected firms. More specifically, based on earlier 
findings, whether or not the negative relationship between political connections and firm 
performance varies across firm groups is investigated in mind of size, ownership, and group 
affiliation. In order to examine this premise, we introduce three interactive terms in the 
baseline Model 1: PC×SIZE, PC×FOREIGN, and PC×BUS-GROUP and re-estimated the 
2SLS and cross-sectional regressions. The coefficient, on a given interactive term, measures 
the way in which the relation between political connections and performance differ across the 
relevant firm characteristics. The estimated results are presented in Table 5.5.  
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Table 5.5: Impact of firm characteristics on connections-performance relationship 
  Panel (A) 
Entire period 
 Panel (B) 
First-government 
 Panel (C) 
Second-government 
Independent Variables  ROA 
 (1) 
ROE 
(2) 
 ROA 
 (3) 
ROE 
(4) 
 ROA 
 (5) 
ROE 
 (6) 
PC  -0.281** 
(0.01) 
-0.177** 
(0.02) 
 -0.168*** 
(0.00) 
-0.129** 
(0.01) 
 -0.127** 
(0.01) 
-0.116** 
(0.02) 
SIZE  0.059** 
(0.03) 
0.072* 
(0.08) 
 0.071** 
(0.04) 
0.098* 
(0.07) 
 0.051** 
(0.02) 
0.076** 
(0.04) 
LEVERAGE  -0.137** 
(0.04) 
-0.172*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.105 
(0.16) 
-0.114 
(0.20) 
 -0.181 
(0.11) 
-0.168 
(0.19) 
FOREIGN  0.065 
(0.51) 
0.071 
(0.44) 
 0.203 
(0.56) 
0.250 
(0.38) 
 0.171 
(0.58) 
0.142 
(0.47) 
BUS-GROUP  0.076 
(0.61) 
0.103 
(0.29) 
 0.031 
(0.69) 
0.026 
(0.20) 
 0.092 
(0.53) 
0.108 
(0.22) 
PC×SIZE  -0.071** 
(0.02) 
-0.056** 
(0.01) 
 -0.042** 
(0.02) 
-0.068** 
(0.01) 
 -0.021** 
(0.03) 
-0.036** 
(0.02) 
PC×FOREIGN  0.059 
(0.022) 
0.071 
(0.015) 
 0.129 
(0.065) 
0.187 
(0.138) 
 0.090 
(0.072) 
0.063 
(0.055) 
PC×BUS-GROUP  0.109* 
(0.08) 
0.183* 
(0.09) 
 0.081 
(0.11) 
0.101 
(0.14) 
 0.058 
(0.10) 
0.047 
(0.12) 
CONSTANT 
 
 0.334*** 
(0.00) 
0.270*** 
(0.00) 
 0.416** 
(0.03) 
0.252*** 
(0.00) 
 0.301** 
(0.02) 
0.382*** 
(0.00) 
Time dummies   Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industries dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of Obs.  2199 2199  1292 1292  907 907 
Number of Firms  380 380  380 380  380 380 
R-square  0.392 0.107  0.251 0.205  0.138 0.101 
F-statistics  703.10 581.43  22.06 25.10  23.57 29.43 
Hansen-Sargan test (p-
value) 
 0.204 0.185  0.102 0.216  0.239 0.108 
Panel (A) shows second-stage results of 2SLS regression results for the entire period (2002-2010). Panel (B) and (C) show the cross-
sectional regression results for the first-government (2002-2007) and the second-government (2008-2010), respectively. The dependent 
variable in Panel (B) is measured in 2007, and the averages of the independent variables are measured over the period 2002-2006. 
Similarly, in Panel (C) the dependent variable is measured in 2010 and the averages of the independent variables are calculated over the 
period 2008-2009. The dependent variable in all regressions is return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). In the first-stage 
leverage is instrumented with collateral, defined as the ratio of tangible to the total assets, and all other independent variables used in the 
baseline model.  F-test tests for weak identification. The Hansen-Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions with the null 
hypothesis that instruments are valid. P-values, adjusted for heteroskedasticity, are in brackets. * Significant and 10%, ** significant at 
5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Column 1 and Column 2 in Table 5.5 report the results for ROA and ROE, respectively. The 
political connections variable maintains negative and significant relationships with both 
performance measures. The coefficients of the non-interactive variables for both performance 
measures remain materially the same as in Table 5.3 with the exception of the foreign 
ownership that loses statistical significance in both columns. Regarding the variables of 
interest, estimated coefficients on the interaction terms between size and political connections 
and business group and political connections are statistically significant. Consistent with the 
hypothesis, the negative coefficient on interactive term (PC×SIZE) suggests that firm size 
induces a negative impact on the performance of politically connected firms. This result may 
be interpreted as owing to substantial resources. Large firms are subject to high-level 
operational inefficiencies caused by politicians, which lead to poor performance. This result 
is in line with those garnered by Poyry & Maury (2010) and Jia et al. (2011). Following, the 
positive coefficient on (PC×BUS-GROUP) indicates that the performance of connected firms 
increases if they also belong to business groups. The result supports the interrelation of 
business groups and political connections, as shown by Khanna & Palepu (2000) and Khanna 
& Rivkin (2006), and the business group hypothesis.  
 
The interactive effects of political connections are examined via firm characteristics in both 
government periods. Results are shown in Panel B and Panel C of Table 5.5. The inclusion of 
interactive variables in the performance equation does not affect the connection–performance 
relationship. In the case of both periods, political connections are negatively associated with 
performance in all four regressions, supporting our earlier findings. Next, the estimated 
coefficients on the control variables are seen to be statistically insignificant, with firm size 
the only exception, which still has a significant positive impact on performance in both 
periods. Regarding the indirect effect of political connections, only estimated coefficients on 
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interaction terms between political connections and size (PC×SIZE) are statistically 
significant in the case of both periods. This evidence suggests that large firms are subject to 
more political interferences than small firms; this effect is more pronounced in the first-
government period. Largely, there is no support in either period for the hypotheses, stating 
business grouped and foreign-owned firms demonstrate better performance.  
 
In all regressions, the statistics of the F-test of the joint significance of estimated coefficient 
does not reject the hypothesis that the instrument is relevant and significant. Furthermore, the 
Hansen-Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions does not reject the null hypothesis that our 
instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals of the regression.  
 
5.6.3  Further analyses 
Growth opportunities and firm performance 
The effect of growth opportunities on firm performance has been discussed widely (see e.g. 
Gaver & Gaver, 1993; Pilotte; 1992; Gay & Nam, 1998). Prior studies, such as those by 
Chow et al. (2011) and Smith & Watts (1992) have found that firms with substantial growth 
opportunities have greater information asymmetry mainly owing to the intangibility of their 
assets; therefore, generally, there is a low level of leverage. Following this argument, it may 
be posited that high-growth firms that rely less on debt financing, in fact, are less dependent 
on political connections62 . Consequently, the involvement of politicians in the financing 
policy of connected growing firms will be limited, and thus the performance of firms tends to 
be less deterred (in our case).  
                                               
62
 As discussed earlier in section 5.3, empirical evidence suggests that political connections matter most through 
preferential access to finance.  
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In order to investigate this premise, following Belghitar et al. (2011) and Dessi & Robertson 
(2003), the sample is divided into three groups based on the firm’s price–earnings ratio. More 
specifically, the firms sampled are arranged in an ascending order based on the average 
price–earnings ratio for the period 2002–2010, with the upper 40% representing high-growth 
firms, the lower 40% representing low-growth firms, whilst the remaining middle 20% of the 
firms were dropped. A similar estimation exercise is carried out for both sub-samples (based 
on growth opportunities), with the results obtained presented in Table 5.6. Column 1 and 
Column 2 report the results for ROA, and columns 3 and 4 present the results for ROE. A 
number of interesting results were established. For both measures of performance, the 
coefficient on high-growth firms was found to be positive and significant, therefore 
indicating that political connections exert a positive impact on the performance of firms with 
more growth options. However, the magnitude of coefficient and statistical significance is 
higher for ROE. Results support this prediction owing to less dependence on debt; the 
performance of growing firms is not distorted by connected politicians. In contrast, the 
performance of low-growth firms shows an inverse relationship with political connections, 
thereby inferring that political connections distort performance. Regarding firm 
characteristics, notably, the magnitude of leverage with a negative sign on high-growth firms 
is almost twice as large as on low-growth firms, therefore showing less dependence of 
growing firms on debt. Taken together, the overall results suggest that politicians channel 
excessive capital into their private benefits in low-growth connected firms more often, whilst 
for firms with high-growth opportunities, political favours reflect in their performances. 
 Table 5.6: Further analyses 
 Growth opportunities 
ROA 
 Growth opportunities 
ROE 
 Alternative measure of 
performance 
 Heckman two-stage analysis 
Independent Variables High growth 
(1) 
Low growth 
(2) 
 High growth 
(3) 
Low growth 
(4) 
 Tobin’s Q 
(5) 
 ROA 
(6) 
ROE 
(7) 
ROA 
(8) 
ROE 
(9) 
PC 0.042** 
(0.02) 
-0.127** 
(0.01) 
 0.055* 
(0.06) 
-0.168** 
(0.01) 
 -0.141** 
(0.03) 
 -0.152** 
(0.04) 
-0.136*** 
(0.00) 
-0.260** 
(0.03) 
-0.194** 
(0.01) 
SIZE 0.065** 
(0.04) 
0.141* 
(0.09) 
 0.088* 
(0.07) 
0.102* 
(0.08) 
 0.136* 
(0.05) 
 0.041** 
(0.03) 
0.075** 
(0.02) 
0.086* 
(0.05) 
0.105* 
(0.09) 
LEVERAGE -0.239* 
(0.06) 
-0.126*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.068* 
(0.09) 
-0.052** 
(0.01) 
 -0.081* 
(0.07) 
 -0.097* 
(0.06) 
-0.082** 
(0.04) 
-0.124*** 
(0.00) 
-0.101*** 
(0.00) 
FOREIGN 0.080*** 
(0.00) 
0.094** 
(0.04) 
 0.020 
(0.16) 
0.047 
(0.12) 
 0.165** 
(0.03) 
 0.108 
(0.10) 
0.135 
(0.11) 
0.169 
(0.12) 
0.185 
(0.21) 
BUS-GROUP 0.103 
(0.98) 
0.055 
(0.92) 
 0.071 
(0.83) 
0.060 
(0.074) 
 0.130 
(0.64) 
 0.041 
(0.20) 
0.053 
(0.17) 
0.032 
(0.46) 
0.060 
(0.37) 
PC×SIZE          
 
 -0.095*** 
(0.00) 
-0.78* 
(0.06) 
PC×FOREIGN          
 
 0.082 
(0.22) 
0.055 
(0.13) 
PC×BUS-GROUP          
 
 0.202 
(0.43) 
0.284 
(0.17) 
Inverse Mills ratio(λ)         0.061 
(0.19) 
0.096 
(0.41) 
0.072 
(0.35) 
0.118 
(0.52) 
CONSTANT 
 
0.403*** 
(0.00) 
0.367** 
(0.02) 
 1.18** 
(0.04) 
2.019*** 
(0.00) 
 0.351*** 
(0.00) 
 0.341*** 
(0.00) 
0.296*** 
(0.00) 
0.457*** 
(0.00) 
0.362*** 
(0.00) 
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Time dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industries dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 908 842  2199 2199  2199  2199 2199 2199 2199 
Number of Firms 152 152  380 380  380  380 380 380 380 
R-square 0.115 0.274  0.193 0.146  0.394  0.271 0.304 0.209 0.192 
F-statistics 460.03 215.41  178.92 156.03  682.44      
Hansen-Sargan test 
(p-value) 
0.112 0.248  0.091 0.174  0.236      
The columns 1-5 report the second-stage results of 2SLS regressions. The columns 6-9 report the second-stage results from the Heckman selection model. The columns (1-4) 
include the subsample of the high growth and the low growth firms. The dependent variable in columns (1&2) is return on assets (ROA) whereas return on equity (ROE) is used as 
dependent variable in columns (3-4). Column (5) employs Tobin’s Q as a dependent variable. In columns 1-5, leverage is instrumented with collateral in first-stage regression, 
defined as the ratio of tangible to the total assets, and all other independent variables used in the baseline model.  F-test tests for weak identification. The Hansen-Sargan test is a 
test of over-identifying restrictions with the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The inverse Mills ratio is obtained from the probit regression (first-stage of Heckman 
selection model). P-values, adjusted for heteroskedasticity, are reported in brackets. * Significant and 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm performance 
There has been considerable criticism of the use of accounting measures of performance 
(Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1988; Lubatkin & Shrieves, 1986). This critique is based mainly 
on the failure of accounting measures to consider differences in systematic risk, temporary 
disequilibrium effects, and future growth potentials. Consequently, it is argued that such 
measures capture only changes in firm value—not levels of value. For this reason, in our 
analysis, the main findings are re-estimated with a widely used market-based measure—
Tobin’s Q—as a dependent variable. Results are presented in Table 5.6. As shown in Column 
5, the qualitative results remain largely unchanged; the coefficient on political connections is 
still negative and statistically significant. The magnitude of coefficient is lower (0.141) than 
the earlier finding (0.236); however, the evidence of an inverse relationship between the 
political connections and performance still remains. Overall, consistent findings suggest the 
robustness of the results in regard to the market measure of performance. 
 
The Heckman two-stage approach 
There is a possibility that standard regression techniques might not control for the 
endogeneity bias stemming from self-selection linked with examining the performance-
connection relationship. One possible way to control such self-selection bias is through 
Heckman’s two-stage approach (Heckman, 1979). This method allows rectifying some 
econometric issues traditionally coupled with the estimation of the corporate connections 
effects like sample-selection bias and endogeneity. In the first stage of this model, the 
technique estimates the selection equation as a probit model to capture the propensity to be 
politically active, which consequently yields the Inverse Mills ratio. Later, in the second 
stage, standard regression is used to investigate the effect of political connectedness on 
performance. More specifically, the selection equation (first stage equation) has PC 
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dependent variable and all control variables from the regression equation (1) are used as 
independent variables. In addition, following Boubakri (2009), Agrawal & Knoeber (2001) 
and Bertrand et al. (2007), the firm’s location is selected as a discerning variable (instrument) 
of political connections. Firm location takes value 1 if firm is located in the two largest cities 
of Pakistan, namely, Lahore and Karachi. Second stage equation (corrected regression 
equation) is the same as equation (1), except we incorporate the Inverse Mills ratio obtained 
from the selection equation.   
 
We estimate the basic performance model using ROA and ROE as dependent variables and 
report the results in columns 6-7 of Table 5.6. In column 6, we find that inverse Mills ratio is 
statistically insignificant for both measures of performance. Importantly, the main findings 
for the effects of political connectedness on performance remain unaffected. In particular, the 
noteworthy difference is that the coefficients on PC for ROA and ROE become smaller in an 
absolute sense; however they maintain the same sign with statistical significance as in the 
earlier estimations. Regarding control variables, it is found that these variables follow the 
similar pattern as reported in earlier specifications. Overall, the basic results support the 
competing hypothesis (1B) which asserts that the negative impact of political connections on 
firm performance is robust to potential sample selection bias.   
 
Similarly, we address the potential endogeneity concern in the subsequent estimation 
capturing the impact of firms’ characteristics through employing Heckman two-step 
procedure. Said alternatively, we re-estimate the specification reported in Table 5.5 after 
accounting for sample selection bias. In doing so, we follow the same Heckman two-stage 
routine as outlined above. Results are shown in columns 8-9 of Table 5.6. Results 
demonstrate that our main findings are not affected by sample selection bias. As it can be 
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seen, the inverse Mills ratio is not significant in any cases indicating the absence of sample 
selection bias. Once again, the coefficients of the political connections indicator (PC) in both 
columns 8 & 9 maintain the significant negative sign. Regarding interactive variables, 
essentially, the coefficients for PC×SIZE in both estimations remain significant and keep 
pointing in the expected directions. In terms of magnitude, these coefficients become larger 
in an absolute sense as compared to earlier results. In nutshell, the findings indicate that the 
large firms are subject to more political interventions which subsequently cause poor 
performance as compared to their small counterparts. The remaining interactive variables are 
found statistically insignificant as in the earlier estimations. Taken together, our results 
provide evidence that after accounting for unobserved information which leads firms to 
establish political connections, there is still large effect of firm size in shaping the influence 
of political connections on performance. 
5.7  Conclusion 
This paper addresses the question of whether or not political connections translate into better 
firm performance. We hypothesise that accumulated benefits from connections should be 
reflected in the performance of connected firms; thus, better performance is expected from 
such firms. In an attempt to test this main hypothesis, firm-level data from Pakistani-listed 
firms is utilised over the period 2002–2010. In contrast to our predictions, our results find 
that political connections have a negative effect on firm performance a result that is robust to 
specification tests. Interestingly, this negative impact of political connections is more 
pronounced in the first-government period (military dictatorial regime). This provides 
evidence of managerial inefficiencies and rent-extraction by affiliated politicians, which 
relates to differences in the political set-up of government terms. 
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As an extension, the role of growth opportunities is examined in relation to determining the 
impact of political connections on firm performance. Consistent with the hypothesis, the 
results suggest that the performance of those firms with more growth opportunities is not 
distorted by political connections. Subsequently, the effects of firm characteristics on the 
performance of connected firms are examined. As a result, we find that large firms are 
subjected to more severe performance distortions than their small counterparts. Moreover, 
group-affiliated connected firms have better performance than those without group-
affiliation.  
 
Overall, such results lend support to the crony capitalism view that Pakistani firms channelise 
political benefits capital into their private gain and subsequently perform poorly, which, in 
turn, casts doubts on the efficacy of institutional reforms the Pakistani government has 
undertaken with the aim of curbing political corruption.  
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CHAPTER 6: POLITICAL INTERVENTION AND FIRM OPERATIONAL 
INEFFICIENCIES—EVIDENCE FROM A DEVELOPING COUNTRY 
 
6.1  Introduction 
Although political intervention in business is not unique to Pakistan but rather is based on the 
evidence provided in Chapter Five, which notably shows the poor performance of politically 
connected firms, induce us to further investigate the possible implications of the business–
politicians nexus. The effect of political connections on firm performance is well recognised. 
Anecdotal evidences have highlighted that firms secure benefits from connections with 
politicians that may be translated into better performance (Fisman, 2001; Li et al., 2009; 
Driffield et al., 2007; Johnson & Mitton, 2003). A common impression is that political 
connections are important for operational efficiencies 63 , particularly in less developed 
markets (Chen et al., 2011). However, some research studies have provided contrary 
evidence that political connections distort the performance of affiliated firms (Faccio, 2006; 
Boubakri et al., 2008; Dombrovsky, 2008). The common justification for the poor 
performance of connected firms is the ‘political cost’, i.e. the costs associated with the 
control of the firm by a politician with political objectives that differ from economic 
efficiency (Bai et al., 2010). Although these studies agree on the political intervention in 
corporate operations as a reason for underperformance, the mechanism of such interventions 
has generally been overlooked. Hence, the channels through which such interventions are 
carried out and which ultimately lead to operational inefficiencies and poor performance is an 
issue worthy of future research. 
                                               
63
 Operational efficiency is the ability of a firm to produce its products in the most cost-effective manner 
possible while still ensuring the high quality of its products. In the current context, firms establish political 
connections to reduce the cost of resources required in production.   
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Chapter Five provides empirical evidence to support that political intervention distorts the 
performance of connected firms. The negative effect of political connections on firm 
performance provides the motivation to investigate this relationship a step further, and further 
attempts to reveal the channels through which politicians interfere and distort the 
performance of connected firms. In order to investigate this premise, two possible operational 
inefficiencies that political interventions may cause are proposed: the investment inefficiency 
and the excess employment. The former approach is based on the argument that self-
interested politicians intervene in the investment decisions of the affiliated firm to benefit 
themselves. Moreover, the preferential access to external finance further exacerbates the 
tendency of connected firms to engage in inefficient investments motivated by political 
objectives (Chen et al., 2011). On the other hand, the latter approach rests on the argument 
that connected politicians impose objectives on affiliated firms that would help them to 
maximise electoral support (Bertrand et al., 2007). Such objectives generally appear in a 
demand of excessive employment in the company.  
 
Our empirical strategy consists of studying differences in investment efficiency and 
employment size at connected firms compared with other firms that are not politically 
connected. A central assumption underlying the empirical approach is that both investment 
inefficiencies and politically motivated employment favours (excess employment) induce a 
direct negative effect on firm performance. Following the literature on corporate investment 
theory (Chen et al., 2011; Bushman et al., 2007), the sensitivity of investment expenditure to 
investment opportunities is employed as a measure of investment efficiencies. The intuition 
underlying is straightforward: the firm managed efficiently (inefficiently) should invest 
relatively more (less) in response to its available investment opportunities. With regard to 
employment size, it is argued that if a politician intervenes in the firm’s employment 
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decision, then the connected firm should have more employees, ceteris paribus, and 
consequently show lower employee productivity than non-connected firms (Bertrand et al., 
2007). Thus, employee productivity is used as an indication of excess employment in a 
firm64. 
 
We draw on a sample of 2,199 Pakistani firm year observations over the period ranging 
2002–2010 to test the relationship between political intervention and efficiency of business 
operations65. The results show that the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment 
opportunities is weaker for connected firms, therefore confirming the hypothesis of 
investment inefficiencies caused by political interferences. Surprisingly, political intervention 
is found to be significant for investment (allocation) efficiency, but not necessarily for the 
level of investment expenditure. Subsequently, the negative correlation of employee 
productivity, with political connections, supports the hypothesis that excessive employment is 
one of the channels of political intervention. It is worth mentioning that the effect of 
interference is more pronounced for employment decisions. This finding may be attributed to 
the fact that a substantial fraction of the connected firms in Pakistan are located in the 
constituencies of connected politicians, which suits politicians in terms of transferring rents 
to their constituents in the form of employment favours 66 . Moreover, considering that 
unemployment is regarded as a major social problem in Pakistan, and also under the 
assumption that voters are myopic, we may assert that voters’ support binds with such 
employment opportunities. Accordingly, in order to maximise electoral support in electoral 
                                               
64 We restrict ourselves only to observe altered employment size as an outcome of political interference. 
Unfortunately, the unavailability of data did not allow us to examine politically motivated hiring of inept 
employees that is also a significant aspect of political interference in employment decisions.  
65
 Throughout this chapter we use terms ‘operations’ and ‘activities’ interchangeably which refers only to firm 
investment and employment decisions.  
66Some examples of firms that locate in the constituency of their connected politicians are provided in the 
discussion section 6.5.1.  
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districts, politicians are required to provide employment opportunities to their supporters. The 
findings show strong evidence of ‘clientelism’ in the Pakistani economy where politicians 
distribute job favours in exchange of electoral support.  
 
Moreover, whether the political intervention relates to growth opportunities available to firms 
is also examined. The findings support this conjecture, and further illustrate that connected 
firms with high growth opportunities experience political interference less often than their 
peers with low growth opportunities. Furthermore, whilst investigating the cross-industry 
variations in economic inefficiencies, the results suggest that industries with a high 
proportion of politically connected firms are potentially more subject to political intervention 
in terms of investment inefficiencies and excessive employment. The results suggest that, 
although the frequently cited industry-specific characteristics (discussed later in Section 
6.5.3) have sufficient explanatory power for inter-industry differences, the sectoral extent of 
political connectedness is nevertheless an important determinant that shapes business 
decisions across industries. Thus, this facet must be taken into account in the corporate 
finance literature examining cross-industry heterogeneity. In addition, we also find an 
indirect link between political intervention and operational efficiencies through firm size and 
ownership. The main results are robust to industry-adjusted measures of investment, growth 
opportunities, and employment productivity. Lastly, a sense of economy-wide costs caused 
by political intervention is provided, with the estimation that an additional 0.19% of GDP is 
lost each year as a result of such political distortions in employment decisions.  
 
This chapter relates to two main strands of literature: first, it adds further evidence to the new 
and growing literature on the implications of political connections (see, e.g., Fraser et al., 
2006; Yeh et al., 2012; Boubakri et al., 2008); and second, the chapter is also related to the 
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literature on corporate investment and, more specifically, on the agency problem (see, for 
example, Jensen, 1986; Childs et al., 2005; Hirth & Uhrig-Homburg, 2010). The results 
suggest that political influence acts as another friction that averts firms from making optimal 
operational decisions. The agency problem is manifested through collusion between 
politicians and shareholders in operating business activities. On a practical level, the priorities 
of politicians do not necessarily coincide with those of shareholders; therefore, in contrast to 
the wealth maximisation objective of shareholders, politicians want management to support 
their objectives, such as through investing in dictated (inefficient) projects and excessive 
employment. The chapter is most closely related to the work of Chen et al. (2011), who argue 
that political intervention distorts firms’ investment behaviour and ultimately leads to 
investment inefficiency; however, the work does not study the way in which political 
interference may impact corporate employment decision, which is a central feature of this 
analysis.  
 
Taken together, this study contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, it identifies 
and demonstrates the channels through which political connections affect the firm’s 
economic decisions. By showing this, it adds another dimension to the understanding of 
political connections in general and in developing countries in particular. Secondly, to our 
knowledge, this study is amongst the first aiming to examine more than one channel of 
political interference in analysis. Thirdly, the results provide empirical evidence, which 
shows political connections as being an important determinant of the cross-industry 
heterogeneity, thus enhancing understanding of the cross-industry variation. Finally, our 
study contributes to the corporate investment literature that is based mainly on standard 
corporate finance theories, such as Trade-off theory, Pecking order theory, and Agency cost 
theory (Heinkel, 1982; Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999; Hoshi et al., 1991). However, we find 
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that political forces play a significant role in the investment decisions of the firms; thus, the 
inclusion of the political aspect is needed to be considered whilst examining the corporate 
investment behaviour.  
 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 6.2 describes the theoretical 
background and develops hypotheses to be tested in this chapter; Section 6.3 provides details 
of the research methodology; the dataset employed in the empirical analysis is described in 
Section 6.4, whilst Section 6.5 presents our main empirical results; finally, Section 6.6 
concludes the chapter. 
 
6.2  Theoretical framework and hypotheses development 
From the standpoint of political economy literature, the impact of political connections on 
firm performance may be twofold: first, through direct influence on the firm’s economic cost; 
and, second, through altering the set of growth opportunities. The former channel is usually 
considered even more important. A distinct stream of studies on political connections 
observes those effects, and mostly provides evidence of a positive impact on firm 
performance (Li et al., 2008; Braggion & Moore, 2011; Niessen & Ruenzi, 2010). However, 
in sharp contrast, some studies do not observe improved performance of the connected firms. 
For instance, Bertrand et al. (2007) report that French firms connected to government 
officials display higher rates of employment but lower performance. Dombrovsky (2008) 
finds that Latvian firms connected only to winning parties experience better performance. 
Likewise, in the context of Italy, Asquer & Calderoni (2011) find that connections with ex-
politicians have no effect on firm performance. In an event study, Fisman et al. (2006) 
investigated the stock market reaction on news—both negative and positive—relating to the 
former Halliburton’s CEO and US Vice President Richard Cheney, and accordingly 
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documents that the return of firms—including Halliburton, connected to Richard Cheney—
are unaffected by events that would credibly impact the value of any such connections. In a 
cross-country study, Faccio (2006) shows that, besides the considerable political benefits, 
connected firms underperform in comparison with non-connected firms on an accounting 
basis. Finally, Fan et al. (2007) find that politically connected Chinese firms underperform in 
comparison with those without political connections in three years post-IPO performance. 
 
In principle, inferior performance implies that the cost of connections outweighs the benefits. 
The cost of connections stems mainly from the political intervention in business activities 
that cause the firm to deviate from its profit-maximisation objective67 . The analysis of 
Shleifer & Vishny (1994) highlights that self-interested politicians utilise their power to 
intervene in connected firms for their own objectives. As a consequence, managers of 
connected firms pursue strategies that satisfy the political objectives of connected politicians, 
which undermine overall operational efficiency and accordingly distort performance. 
 
Excess employment is one potential source of performance distortion. Politicians have an 
incentive to intervene in the operations of connected companies to maintain political support 
through offering their constituents employment. On the other hand, such surplus employment 
increases the cost and diminishes the profitability of connected firms. Bertrand et al. (2007) 
observe that the presence of political directors on the Board significantly increases the level 
of excess employment in the firm. Said differently, market forces encourage firms to reduce 
the excess employment level so as to enhance economic performance, whilst politicians 
                                               
67
 Though cost of political connections also includes the cost of political donation, gifts, and bribes but we 
confine ourselves only to ex post cost of political connections.  
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desire the maximisation of their political support by maintaining high employment levels, 
which subsequently result in deteriorated firm performance.  
 
Firms with political ties are also forced to undertake inefficient investments, which serve as a 
tool for the private enrichment of politicians. The theory of corporate investment suggests 
that wealth-maximisation aim encourages a firm to invest according to the net present value 
principle (Chen et al., 2011). However, political intervention inexorably alters the objective 
function of connected firms to that preferred by the politician, thus leading to investment 
inefficiencies in two main ways: ex ante, where connected firms most likely forgo profitable 
investment opportunities to follow political objectives; and ex post, if investment fails to 
produce the expected outcomes, connected firms find it difficult to either terminate the 
unsuccessful project or cut their investment because of conflicts with political objectives. The 
negative impact of political interference on investment efficiency may become further 
exacerbated by preferential access to credit of connected firms (Chen et al., 2011). Based on 
prior research, there is considerable evidence to believe that connected firms have easy access 
to credit in all counties (Yeh et al., 2012; Faccio, 2010; Claessens et al., 2008; Goldman et 
al., 2009), as well as in Pakistan (Khwaja & Mian, 2005), which may intensify the investment 
inefficiency problem. Importantly, the reason behind why firms continue to perform 
inefficient economic activities—without facing the threat of bankruptcy—lies in the fact that 
connected politicians will bail the firm out with the use of public budget since it is valuable 
for politicians to keep such firms alive so as to continue to extract political and other benefits.  
 
In addition, the argument may also be motivated for operational inefficiencies with Agency 
theory, which predicts the moral hazard problem between managers and shareholders. The 
classic principal agent problem (Jensen, 1986) fits well in this context since managers pursue 
 180 
 
political objectives that may be in conflict with those of outside shareholders. Empirical 
evidence shows managerial sub-optimal decisions as being substantial (Hainmueller & 
Eggers, 2011; Blanchard et al., 1994). In a recent study, Aggarwal et al. (2012) discussed 
agency problems in a different but related context, and argued that political connections are 
the manifestation of an agency problem between managers and shareholders, with 
contributions for establishing political connections correlated with weaker governance and 
unobservable to shareholders, which may accordingly instigate agency problems. Taken 
together, such theoretical and empirical considerations generate testable predictions relating 
to the firm’s operational decisions that may ultimately harm shareholder value. Therefore, in 
this study, we investigate whether political intervention in connected firms signifies another 
friction and thus accordingly averts firms from making optimal operational decisions. 
 
Based on foregoing arguments, it is predicted that, as a result of political intervention, 
connected firms may follow inefficient strategies, such as inefficient investments and excess 
employment, both of which ultimately distort firm performance. In order to provide empirical 
content to this statement, it is hypothesised that:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Political intervention causes investment inefficiency amongst connected firms, 
i.e.  investment efficiency is negatively related to political connections.   
 
Hypothesis 2: Political intervention causes excess employment amongst connected firms, i.e. 
excessive employment is positively related to political connections.  
 
Further hypotheses 
Firm growth opportunities and operational efficiencies 
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A glut of studies show that the effects of financial market imperfections are more pronounced 
on high-growth firms (i.e. Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004; Gaver & Gaver, 1993). These studies rest 
their argument on the fact that growing firms hold most of their value in growth opportunities 
available to them which have little or no collateralisable net worth. The lack of 
collateralisable assets causes them additional cost on external financing. As a result, such 
growing firms with insufficient collateralisable assets are likely to forgo investment 
opportunities with positive net present value. To overcome this problem, such firms adopt 
policies with aim to mitigate underinvestment problem. These policies mainly include paying 
fewer dividends to increase the level of internal capital and reliance on internal capital rather 
than leverage (Chow et al., 2011). Having said that growing firms depend less on leverage, 
we may argue that such firms are less likely to rely on political connections and consequently 
their business operations are less likely to have intervention by politicians. Thus, it may be 
hypothesised that business operational efficiencies of high-growing firms are not deteriorated 
to a similar extent as low-growth firms. Formally we may state that:   
 
Hypothesis 3: Politically connected firms with more growth opportunities have higher 
operational efficiencies (investment and employment) than connected firms with less growth 
opportunities.  
 
Firm size and operational efficiencies 
 
According to Rajan & Zingales (1995) large firms have better access to financial resources 
mainly because large firms provide more information to lenders and have lower bankruptcy 
costs and operating risk. In addition, as Fama & Jensen (1983) argue that large firms are more 
diversified and therefore, less prone to bankruptcy. All these characteristics of large firms 
mostly appear in the form of better performance (Tezel & McManus, 2003). From the 
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political standpoint, such substantial resource base and better performance make large firms a 
gratifying target of political exploitation. As Poyry & Maury (2010) argue that large firms are 
more likely to suffer political interventions owing to the fact that such firms are lucrative 
target of political patronage than firms lacking such resources. Resting on this argument we 
may hypothesise that large politically connected firms experience more political interferences 
and suffer investment and employment inefficiencies at larger extent as compared to small 
firms. The testable hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Large politically connected firms have lower operational efficiencies 
(investment and employment) than small connected firms.  
 
Financial resources and operational efficiencies 
Earlier literature shows that firms with better financial resources are able to accumulate 
political connections and accordingly extract more political rents out of these links. For 
instance, Faccio (2006) and Fraser et al. (2005) indicate that political connections are more 
widespread amongst firms with large financial resources. Moreover, firms with sufficient 
financial resources possess not only advance technology, proficient human capital and better 
management, but also the ability to influence policy decisions (Girma et al., 2005). Thus, 
firms with such resources become appealing to politicians for rent-seeking practices. 
Consequently, the operational efficiencies of these firms tend to be lower than firms lacking 
large financial resources. In order to test this prediction, we may hypothesise as:  
  
Hypothesis 5: Politically connected firms with more cash flow have lower operational 
efficiencies (investment and employment) than connected firms with low cash flow.  
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Hypothesis 6: Politically connected firms with more leverage have lower operational 
efficiencies (investment and employment) than connected firms with low leverage. 
 
6.3  Empirical strategy 
The aforementioned hypotheses are tested alongside two independent empirical models. The 
first model seeks to test the inefficiencies stemming from political intervention in the firm’s 
investment decisions, whilst the second model estimates the effects of political intervention 
on employment decisions.  
 
Investment inefficiencies 
Theoretically, investment efficiency refers to firms undertaking all and only investments with 
positive net present value (Arnold, 2007). According to Tobin (1969), in a perfect capital 
market, firm investment should relate positively to its growth opportunities; however, in the 
presence of the frictions of the real world, such as agency costs and information asymmetry, 
firm investment does not respond adequately to available growth opportunities. Numerous 
empirical studies have tested the implications of such market frictions on firm investment 
decisions; nevertheless, growth opportunities have commonly remained a determining 
construct in these analyses (Bushman et al., 2007; Hayashi, 1982; Blundell et al., 1992).  
 
Consistent with this strand of literature, the sensitivity of investment expenditure to 
investment opportunities is also employed as our measure of investment efficiency. The 
underlying intuition is that the firm managed efficiently (inefficiently) should invest 
relatively more (less) in response to its available investment opportunities. Bushman et al. 
(2007) employ Q theory as a basis for estimating investment efficiency. More specifically, 
they assume that the relationship between investment expenditure and investment 
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opportunities can be estimated through a piecewise linear function which permits slopes on 
expanding and contracting investment opportunities to change. In estimation model, 
investment response to change in investment opportunities is captured, subsequently; impact 
of control variables such as financial institutions and accounting practices on investment 
sensitivity to changing growth opportunities is captured.  In the same spirit, we capture the 
impact of political connections on the sensitivity of investment to changing investment 
opportunities. In this regard, the political connection is tested as a source of inefficiency. 
Following this intuition, the testable Hypothesis 1 may be stated as: ceteris paribus, the 
sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment (growth) opportunities is lower in 
politically connected firms compared with non-connected firms. The empirical approach 
closely follows that of Chen et al. (2011), Bushman et al. (2007), and Hung et al. (2007). 
Technically, the following econometric specification is utilised:  
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where the dependent variable INVESTMENT is the investment expenditure of a firm’s i in 
year t. It is measured as expenditure to acquire fixed assets, proxied by change in fixed assets 
between year t-1and t plus depreciation in year t, and divided by total assets in year t.68 The 
explanatory variables of interests are PC and GROWTH-OPP, where the former is a dummy 
variable indicating the firm’s political connections, whereas the latter indicates the growth 
opportunities available to a firm. Growth opportunities, unlike Bushman et al. (2007), are 
measured by price earnings ratio. This indicator of growth opportunities rests in the fact that 
                                               
68
 This definition of investment expenditure is commonly used in corporate investment studies such as Poncet et 
al. (2010); Ratti et al. (2008); Bhaduri (2006); Athey and Laumas (1994); Becker and Sivadasan (2006); and 
Koo and Maeng (2005). 
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it shows the expected value of future profit of a firm; therefore, a higher price earnings ratio 
shows high growth opportunities. In addition, as price earnings is given by the ratio of the 
price that investors are willing to pay to buy a share and earnings per share, the market’s 
prices thus predict the firm’s potential growth opportunities, and the stock market capitalises 
its present value (Kumar & Hyodo, 2001). Hereafter, we refer to the specification in Equation 
1 as the investment efficiency model. 
 
Control variables for investment were selected on the basis of the results of earlier empirical 
studies or of the surveys thereof (see, for example, Schiantarelli, 1995). We include three 
control variables in the model, all of which may be seen to influence investment. First, cash 
flow is included in the model as it has been used in numerous studies as a determinant of a 
firm’s investment, such as in the case of Fazzari et al., (1988) and Harris et al., (2000), who 
found that internal capital has a significantly positive influence on the level of investment in 
Indonesian firms. Intuitively, large operating cash flows provide a firm with financial 
resources for investment; therefore, it is anticipated that there will be a positive coefficient 
for (CF). Second, the variable (SIZE) is employed in order to control firm size effect. As per 
prior studies (Gelos & Werner, 2002; Bond & Meghir, 1994), in the presence of non-trivial 
fixed costs of raising external finance, large firms have easier access to external financing, 
mainly owing to less information asymmetry with lenders, which that ultimately positively 
impacts their investment decisions. Size consideration may also affect access to political 
support because establishing political connections may require extensive ex ante costs, which 
large firms may easily afford. Thus, a positive coefficient is expected for firm size. Third, 
firm leverage effect may be taken into account by including the variable (LEVERAGE). It is 
often argued that the degree of firm leverage may deter access to external capital, which 
ultimately influences investment. As the cost of leverage increases with debt ratio, ceteris 
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paribus, one may anticipate a negative relationship between leverage and investment. 
Investment decision may have time-specific and industry-specific heterogeneity, which are 
unobservable in estimation. In an attempt to control such unobservable effects, YearDum and 
IndDum are used for year and industry dummies, respectively. A detailed description of the 
variable measurement is provided in the next section.  
 
In the investment efficiency model, β1 measures the sensitivity of investment expenditure to 
investment opportunities, whilst β2 captures the impact of political connections on the level of 
firm investment. Subsequently, the effect of political connections on investment efficiency by 
interacting the PC term with the proxy of growth opportunities GROWTH-OPP is examined. 
The coefficient on this interactive term β3 would measure whether or not the sensitivity of 
investment expenditure to investment opportunities is affected by the firm’s political 
connections. If political connections cause intervention in the investment decision, β3 is 
predicted to be negative, which is consistent with investment inefficiency hypothesis.  
 
Excess employment 
As discussed earlier, connected politicians impose objectives, mainly in the form of excess 
employment, on affiliated firms against favours granted that would help them to maximise 
electoral support. If this is true, connected firms should have more employees, ceteris 
paribus, and lower employee productivity than non-connected firms. With this noted, we 
argue that profit per employee is a better indicator for excess employment owing to the belief 
that, if employment is value added, higher employment would increase profit, meaning that 
profitability and employment size would move simultaneously, and hence the variation in 
labour productivity would be smaller. On the other hand, if employment is not value added, 
employment size and profit would move in opposition, and variation in labour productivity 
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would be large. It is worth quoting the statement of Xu and Wang (1997); this relationship 
‘looks like but cannot be interpreted as a production function, because the dependent variable 
is not value-added per worker but the average profits created by each employee’. Therefore, 
we use low labour productivity as an indication of excessive employment. To test this 
hypothesis, following Xu & Wang (1999) and Bartel & Harrison (2005), the following 
regression equation is implemented: 
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The dependent variable (EMP_PROD) is employee (labour) productivity, which is measured 
as profit divided by the total number of employees. Profitability is the operating income plus 
accumulated depreciation of the firm i in year t. PC is a dummy variable used to distinguish 
politically connected firms from non-connected firms.  
 
To control for the relationship between labour productivity and political connections, we use 
the same control variables that were employed earlier in the investment efficiency model. 
Industrial organisation literature supports the view that large firms have more cost-efficient 
and higher labour productivity than small ones, mainly owing to sufficient technological 
resources (Wakelin, 2001; Papadogonas & Voulgaris, 2005). However, in contrast, political 
economy literature argues that, since political connections are common amongst large firms, 
they are more likely to experience political interference in employment decisions (i.e. Fraser 
et al., 2005). Owing to such conflicting theoretical arguments, a priori, no relationship is 
posited for firm size, and is thus left to be empirically determined from the analysis. In 
Equation 2, firm size is represented as SIZE. There is a general assumption in much of the 
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literature on the firm’s productivity that growing firms are operationally more efficient than 
low-growth firms (Coad & Broekel, 2012; Baily et al., 1996). The underlying reasons are the 
higher research and development activities, the usage of latest technology, specialised 
knowledge relating to production, and the efficient utilisation of human capital. Prior 
literature, such as that by Daveri (2002), argues that corporate employment size and 
productivity recently are largely influenced by the advances in information technology, which 
is a trait of growing firms. Accordingly, in this study, in an attempt to control the firm’s 
growth effect, a variable (GROWTH_OPP) is included in the specification.  
 
In this way, one mechanism geared towards increasing labour productivity is to buy new 
equipment or invest in on-the-job training, which requires sufficient financial resources. 
Considering this aspect, a firm’s financial capability is an important determinant of employee 
productivity, and thus a positive relationship may arise between them (Nunes et al., 2011; 
Brush et al., 2000). This positive association between leverage and labour productivity may 
also be rationalised through the Agency cost theory. According to Jensen (1986), a high level 
of leverage increases the likelihood of bankruptcy, and if this occurs, managers fare worse 
than owners. This coerces managers to increase the efficiency of the firm, and thus increase 
the labour productivity. Hence, following these arguments, a positive association is expected 
in our estimations. The financial resources are controlled in Equation 2 by employing two 
variables: cash flow (CF) for internal capital and leverage (LEVERAGE) for external 
finance. Finally, YearDum represents year dummies, IndDum represents industry dummies at 
the two-digit level of SIC, and ε is the error term.  
 
The given model resembles the model used in the context of political connections studies of 
Bai et al. (2010) and Xu & Wang (1999). A negative (positive) coefficient, β1, on PC would 
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be interpreted as indicating interference (no-interference) in firm employment. Hereafter, we 
refer to the specification in Equation 2 as the employment model. 
 
Estimation technique 
An important issue in performing panel analysis is the selection of the correct estimation 
methodology. For this purpose, Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test is first performed (Breusch 
& Pagan, 1980), which tests for the presence of random effects69. The null hypothesis is that 
the cross-sectional variance and time-series variance components are zero. If the null 
hypothesis is not rejected, the pooled OLS regression is appropriate. The chi-square statistics 
are reported along with the results in relevant tables, and are equal to 184.08 and 130.19, 
respectively, for investment efficiency and employment models. The results of LM test lead 
to the rejection of the null hypothesis for investment efficiency models at 5% level; however, 
for the employment model, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The results suggest that 
cohort effect is zero and pooled regression is appropriate for estimating the employment 
model, whilst the random effect model is suitable for investment efficiency model. 
 
Although the above results indicate that the random effect model should not be discarded in 
favour of the investment efficiency model, it does not conclude that the fixed-effect model 
should be ruled out; therefore, the Hausman (1978) test is conducted in regard to the 
investment efficiency model so as to compare the fixed effect and random effect estimation 
techniques70. The null hypothesis states that individual effects are uncorrelated with other 
regressors in the model. Moreover, if there is such a correlation (H0 rejected), the fixed-effect 
model would be more appropriate. The results of the Hausman test could not reject the null 
                                               
69
 Command xttest0 tells the statistics of LM test.  
70
 We did not perform Hausman (1978) test for employment model, since the LM test results suggested that 
pooled regression is appropriate for employment model.  
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hypothesis, therefore implying that the random effects model outperforms the fixed-effects 
model. Thus, the random effects model is used to estimate the investment efficiency model71. 
In addition to the insignificance of the results, the fixed-effect model is not considered 
suitable to this study because our main variable of interest—political connections—is time-
invariant, and is automatically dropped in the fixed-effect estimation. 
 
Regarding the measurement of the employment model, there is the probability that residuals 
will be correlated across years within each firm in pooling regression, and standard errors can 
be biased and either over- or underestimate the true variability of coefficient estimates. 
Therefore, following related literature (Claessens, et al., 2008; Khwaja & Mian, 2005; Dinç, 
2005; Jayachandran, 2006), pooling regression is estimated with heteroskedasticity-consistent 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm’s level72.  
 
6.4  Data 
Our firm-level data is taken from two sources. The OSIRIS, a commercial database supported 
by Bureau van Dijk, provided most accounting data. The sample utilised comprises listed 
non-financial firms over the period of 2002–2010. The study begins with 2002 as this is when 
the first election was held and the government was established. The data on politicians 
(reviewed in order to identify the firms with ties to politicians) has been obtained from the 
official website of Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), which conducts elections for the 
                                               
71
 The adopted procedure to conduct Hausman test is as follows. First, we estimated a random effect model that 
treats the firm individual effects as a random draw from a zero-mean distribution assumed to be uncorrelated 
with the regressors. Second, obtained results are stored. Third, we estimated the fixed-effect model that uses 
only within-firm variation over time. The fixed effect procedure provides an unbiased estimate even if the 
individual effects are correlated with regressors. Fourth, we stored the fixed effects results. Finally, ‘hausman 
fixed random’ command tested the null hypothesis that regressors are uncorrelated with firm specific effects.  
72
 Studies examining the political patronage extensively employed pooled regression with robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. The recent studies include Poyry and Maury (2010); Bunkanwanicha and 
Wiwattanakantang (2009); Dombrovsky (2008) and Boubakri et al. (2008). 
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National and Provincial Assemblies73. It maintains comprehensive information on national 
and provincial elections: including the candidates list with their full names, parties’ positions, 
and electoral outcomes. 
 
6.4.1  Sample selection and distribution 
The sample includes non-financial listed firms from Pakistan for the period 2002–201074. The 
decision to restrict the sample to include only the non-financial sector is because the 
accounting treatment of revenue and profits for financial firms (banks, insurance and 
investment firms) is significantly different to that of non-financial firms. Rajan & Zingales 
(1995) argue that financial firms’ leverage is affected significantly by explicit (or implicit) 
investor insurance schemes, such as deposit insurance. In addition, the capital structure of 
such firms is influenced heavily by regulatory requirements; therefore, it is not appropriate to 
compare the financing policies of such firms with non-financial firms. Another decisive 
factor put forward in the data selection criteria is that, for each firm, it is required that a 
minimum of two consecutive years’ information be reported so as to assess the changes in the 
financing structure of the firm. Moreover, firms with missing values for the important 
variables are removed from the sample as well.  
 
The firm-level information in the OSIRIS databases is available for approximately 419 non-
financial Pakistani-listed firms. Following the application of the aforementioned selection 
criteria, an unbalanced panel of 2,199 firm-year observations on 380 firms left for the 
empirical analysis. Following, the list containing names of politicians (that participated in the 
2002 and/or 2008 elections) obtained from the Election Commission of Pakistan is matched 
                                               
73
 Data is available at the following URL: http://www.ecp.gov.pk/ 
74
 For the ease of readers, the some aspects of sample selection criteria and sample distribution are rewritten 
here in this chapter. 
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with the full names of firms’ directors one by one. By so doing, 107 politicians were matched 
to firms’ directors. No politicians were matched to more than one firm; therefore, 107 firms 
were identified as politically connected firms.75 The politically connected firms in this sample 
account for 28%, whilst 72% are non-connected firms.  
 
Table 6.1 presents the distribution of the sample across industries. The sample is distributed 
according to two-digit SIC, which categorises the sample into twelve sectors. Given the size 
of the sample, this distribution is too in-depth for the study; thus, following Aharony et al. 
(2010) and Campbell (1996), the two-digit SIC is re-classified to a narrower eight-industry 
category. The frequency distribution across industries is non-uniform. We have the most 
firms from Textiles & Trade industry (132), followed by Basic industries, including 
petroleum (67), and then Construction (58). Firms belonging to the first four industries 
comprise more than 80% of the total sample. Furthermore, Table 6.1 shows that the 
percentage of political connected firms is highest in the Textile & Trade industry (41%). This 
is followed by Food & Tobacco industry with 34% of connected firms76. 
 
  
                                               
75
 In order to avoid the human error, we conducted the matching of politicians with firm’s board of directors by 
applying VBA programming code, which is available on request.  
76
 For detailed discussion on industry classification see chapter-3, section 3.4. However, for the ease of readers 
here the first three columns in table 6.1 are reproduced. 
 
 193 
 
Table 6.1: Firm distribution across industries 
Industry  Two-digit SIC code Number 
of firms 
Politically 
connected 
firms 
Non-
connected 
firms 
Food & Tobacco 1, 2, 9, 20, 21, 54 48 
 
17 
(34) 
31 
(66) 
Basic industries 
including petroleum 
10, 12, 13, 14, 24, 26, 
28, 29, 33 
67 
 
13 
(19) 
54 
(81) 
Construction 15, 16, 17, 32, 52 58 
 
10 
(17) 
48 
(83) 
Textiles & Trade 22, 23, 31, 51, 53, 56, 59 132 
 
54 
(41) 
78 
(59) 
Consumer durables 25, 30, 36, 37, 39, 50, 
55, 57 
33 5 28 
 34, 35, 38  (15) (85) 
Transportation 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47 10 
 
3 
(30) 
7 
(70) 
Services 72, 73 75, 76, 80, 82, 87, 
89 
11 
 
2 
(18) 
9 
(82) 
Others firms No specific SIC code 21 
 
3 
(14) 
18 
(86) 
Entire sample 
 
380 107 273 
Percentage of the respective industry is in brackets. 
 
6.4.2  Variable measurement 
Following mainstream literature (Khwaja & Mian, 2005; Boubakri et al., 2008; Faccio, 
2010), a firm is defined as politically connected if it has a politician on its Board of Directors. 
A politician is defined as any individual who stood in the national or provincial election, held 
in 2002 and 2008. A politician’s full name is matched to a firm’s director and, if their full 
(first, middle, and last) name matches exactly, the firm is considered as a politically 
connected firm.  
 
The dependent variable, INVESTMENT, is the ratio of the investment expenditure divided 
by the total assets, where investment expenditure is taken as the change in fixed assets 
between year t-1 and t plus depreciation in year t. It can be expressed as {(Fixed Assets in 
year t) – (Fixed Assets in year t-1) + Depreciation (t)}/(Total Assets in year t). This definition 
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of investment is commonly used in corporate investment studies, such as those of Ratti et al. 
(2008), Becker & Sivadasan (2006), and Koo & Maeng (2005). The second dependent 
variable for measuring excessive employment, EMP-PROD, is defined as profitability scaled 
by the total number of employees, where profitability is the firm’s net profit before interest 
and tax expenses in a given year. This measure of employee productivity is adopted from Xu 
& Wang (1999) and Bartel & Harrison (2005), who employ a similar measure for Chinese 
state-owned firms. 
 
Based on prior studies, the following additional variables are utilised in this study: growth 
opportunities, cash flow, size, and leverage. The variable GROWTH-OPP represents a set of 
firms’ growth opportunities and is measured as the price earnings ratio. CF is the cash flow of 
the firm, measured as operating income (net income before interest and tax) plus accumulated 
depreciation divided by the total assets. This measure is adopted by Laeven (2002) and Love 
(2003), both of whom used it to measure firms’ dependence on internal capital for their 
investment outlay. SIZE refers to the firm size, and is defined as the natural log of total 
assets. Finally, LEVERAGE is measured by the ratio of the book value of a firm’s total debt 
(short-term and long-term) to total assets. In order to avoid outliers and spurious inferences, 
we winsorise all variables at the top and bottom 5% of their respective distributions. For 
convenience, details of how the variables are constructed are provided in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2: Variable measurements 
Variables Acronym Definition Source 
Investment  INVESTMENT Ratio of the investment expenditure divided by the total assets, 
where investment expenditure is measured as the change in fixed 
assets between year t-1 and t plus depreciation 
OSIRIS 
Employee productivity EMP-PROD Ratio of profit before interest and tax expenses divided by total 
number of employees 
OSIRIS 
Growth opportunities GROWTH-OPP Price earnings ratio OSIRIS 
Political connections  PC A firm is considered as connected if the firm has a politician on its 
board of directors and a politician is defined as any individual who 
stood in the national or provincial election, held in 2002 and 2008 
OSIRIS 
and ECP* 
Cash flow CF Net income before interest and taxes plus accumulated 
depreciation divided by total assets 
OSIRIS 
 Leverage  LEVERAGE Book value of a firm's total debt (short term and long term) to the 
total assets. 
OSIRIS 
Size SIZE Natural logarithm of the total assets OSIRIS 
* Official website of ECP (Election Commission of Pakistan) provides the list of individuals participated in previous elections 
since 1970.  
 
 
6.4.3   Data description 
The comparison of financing patterns and firms’ characteristics between firms with and 
without political connections is presented in Table 6.3. Since the differences of used variables 
across connected and non-connected firms have already been discussed in Chapter Four and 
Chapter Five in sections 4.4 and 5.5 respectively, focus is directed exclusively to investment 
expenditure and labour productivity variables.  
 
. 
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Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics for key variables 
 Total sample  Political Connected firms  Non-connected firms Mean 
difference 
 Mean St. Dev Min Max  Mean St. Dev Min Max  Mean St. Dev Min Max (t-statistics) 
INVESTMETN 0.54 0.39 0.11 0.92  0.53 0.41 0.07 0.92  0.58 0.40 0.11 0.91 1.04** 
EMP-PROD 9.74 16.56 -12.74 12.30  6.03 16.11 -11.69 12.18  10.57 16.80 -12.74 12.30 4.32** 
TOTAL LEV 0.64 0.25 0.22 1.26  0.67 0.24 0.22 1.26  0.61 0.25 0.23 1.25 -3.38*** 
CF 5.99 10.84 -13.92 12.43  4.27 9..82 -9.05 12.02  6.28 11.34 -13.92 12.43 4.51** 
SIZE 6.30 0.66 5.15 8.22  6.33 0.61 5.15 7.59  6.28 0.68 5.21 8.22 -1.66* 
GROWTH-OPPOR 8.16 5.78 0.93 11.46  8.28 5.88 0.98 11.46  8.10 5.73 0.93 10.21 -0.65 
PROFIT 5.94 10.91 -13.72 11.85  4.39 10.26 -13.72 11.85  6.64 11.12 -7.94 9.85 4.44*** 
EMPLOYMENT 1.87 0.62 1.30 3.61  1.96 0.59 1.39 3.54  1.81 0.66 1.30 3.61 -2.06*** 
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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As expected, politically connected firms tend to have less investment expenditure than non-
connected firms. More specifically, the average investment expenditure to total assets for 
connected firms is 0.53—smaller than the value for non-connected firms (0.58). The result is 
strongly significant at the 5% level. The low investment rate by connected firms may be an 
indication of investment inefficiencies. The result for excessive employment provides 
preliminary support for the second hypothesis. In particular, the mean ratio of the labour 
productivity of connected firms is approximately 6.03, whereas that of non-connected firms is 
10.57, which indicates that connected firms maintain excessive employees; therefore, 
productivity per employee is low. It is worth mentioning that the labour productivity of 
connected firms is exacerbated by the fact that these firms tend to maintain large employment 
size and have poor performance, as evidenced in the last two rows of Table 6.3, compared 
with non-connected firms, which further reduces productivity per worker. This preliminary 
investigation offers some degree of support for the conjecture of operational inefficiencies in 
connected firms. 
 
6.5  Empirical results 
6.5.1  Impact of political connections on firms’ activities 
In this section, the effects of political intervention on investment are investigated, as well as 
on employment decisions.   
 
Investment efficiency 
Table 6.4 presents the random effects regression results of the investment inefficiency model, 
taking investment expenditure as a dependent variable. Recall that the sensitivity of 
investment expenditure to available growth opportunities is utilised as a measure of 
investment efficiency. Furthermore, our variable of interest, PC, is included in order to test 
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the impact of political connections on investment efficiency. In particular, this key variable 
interacts with the sensitivity of investment expenditure to growth opportunities to measure 
the effect of political intervention in investment decision. For a robustness check, the 
estimations are run both with and without the firms’ control variables. All models include 
year and industry fixed effects which, for the sake of brevity, are not reported. The overall R2 
shows the satisfactory explanatory power of the estimated model.  
 
                      Table 6.4: Impact of political connections on investment efficiencies 
Independent Variables (1) (2) 
GROWTH-OPP 0.131*** 
(0.00) 
0.104*** 
(0.00) 
PC 0.023 
(0.15) 
0.011 
(0.16) 
PC * GROWTH-OPP -0.052** 
(0.04) 
-0.043** 
(0.003) 
CF  0.039 
(0.85) 
SIZE  0.293* 
(0.05) 
LEVERAGE  -0.009** 
(0.01) 
CONSTANT 
 
0.209*** 
(0.00) 
0.512*** 
(0.00) 
Time dummies  Yes Yes 
Industries dummies Yes Yes 
Number of Obs 2199 2199 
Overall R-square 0.184 0.207 
Lagrangian Multiplier (ch2) 249.59** 184.08** 
Hausman test (p value) 0.127 0.205 
This table reports the estimates of random effects model. The 
dependent variable in both regressions is the ratio of investment 
expenditure to the total assets. The Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test 
is used to test the random effects model versus the pooling 
regression with the null hypothesis that cross-sectional variance and 
time-series variance components are zero. The significant chi2 
values indicate that random effects model outperforms pooled 
regression. The Hausman specification test is used to test the fixed-
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effects model versus the random effects model with the null 
hypothesis that individual effects are uncorrelated with other 
regressors in the model. The insignificant p-value indicates that 
random effects model outperform fixed effects model. P-values, 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity, are reported in brackets. * 
Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
The results in Column 1—in which no control variables are included—report that firms 
respond positively to their available growth opportunities. More specifically, the estimated 
coefficient on growth opportunities is positive and strongly significant at 1% level. Next, 
somewhat unexpectedly, the political connections induce a positive but statistically 
insignificant effect on the investment expenditure, thereby indicating that political 
connections are not a significant predictor of firms’ investment expenditure. Furthermore, the 
coefficient on interactive term is found negative and statistically significant at 5% level. The 
magnitude of coefficient indicates that firms with political connections, on average, have 
5.2% lower investment efficiency than non-connected firms77.  
 
Importantly, the results hold even when the control variables are included in the estimation, 
as shown in Column 2. The coefficient on growth opportunities remains positive and 
significant at 1% level. Furthermore, politically connected firms are not significantly 
different in investment expenditure than those without connections. Finally, political 
intervention in investment efficiency is still found to be negative and statistically significant, 
thus implying that, even after controlling for firm-level effects, connected firms have, on 
average, a lower investment efficiency of 4.3%. Results support our conjecture that 
investment inefficiencies is one of the channels of political intervention.  
                                               
77 Recall that a negative sign on interactive term indicates that sensitivity of investment expenditure to 
investment opportunities, investment efficiency, is distorted by firm’s political connections.  
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Regarding the effects of the firm’s characteristics on investment expenditure, results partially 
support the predictions of firm investment literature. The coefficient on cash flow variable 
(CF) is positive but notably statistically insignificant, thus indicating that internal capital is 
not an important determinant of investment expenditure of Pakistani firms. Next, as expected, 
firm size (SIZE) has a positive and significant effect on firm investment expenditure. It can 
be interpreted that large firms invest more when compared against their small counterparts. 
Since firm size proxies for the importance of knowledge and capital intensity—proportion of 
intangible assets, and the share of fixed capital—it is then not surprising that there is higher 
investment spending amongst large firms. Finally, firm leverage (LEVERAGE) exerts a 
significant negative effect on investment. The most persuasive argument is the increasing 
cost of capital due to the degree of financial leverage; which can be seen to adversely affect 
firm investment. This finding corroborates most studies examining the impact of corporate 
financing on investment (for example, Aivazian et al., 2005; Lang et al., 1996).  
 
In summary, the results from Table 6.4 support the hypothesis of the negative effect of 
political intervention on firm investment efficiency. Moreover, results support the notion that 
political intervention acts as another friction, which ultimately increases agency cost for 
connected firms and thus averts firms from making optimal investment decisions. It is worth 
noting that political intervention is found significant for investment (allocation) efficiency, 
but not for the level of investment expenditure. The latter observation is surprising in the 
sense that studies carried out previously have documented a higher investment rate for 
connected firms (i.e. Claessens et al., 2008). Nevertheless, the results are understandable in 
light of politicians’ opportunistic behaviour, where motivation behind decisions to 
misallocate investment resources rather than to increase the level of investment is clearly 
self-interest. Before deducing a definite conclusion, however, it is important to explore the 
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alternative channel of intervention, and find out to what extent political intervention in 
employment decisions (if any) is used as a source of resource obliteration. 
 
Excessive employment 
Table 6.5 reports pooled regression results for the excessive employment model. For a 
robustness check, the estimations are run both with and without the firms’ control variables. 
Column 1 reports the result of simple specification, which relates employee productivity to a 
dummy variable, separating connected firms from non-connected firms. The estimated 
coefficient on variable political connections is both negative and statistically significant at 
5% level. This result suggests that firms with political ties have lower productivity per 
employee, thus suggesting the presence of excessive employment. In terms of the estimated 
magnitude of political effect, connected firms are found to have, on average, 8.7% excessive 
employment than their non-connected peers. The results hold even when control variables are 
included in the estimation, as shown in Column 2. The estimated coefficient is significant at 
5% level, and the magnitude indicates that connected firms have 7.1% excessive employees. 
The negative correlation of labour productivity with political connections corroborates the 
hypothesis that excessive employment is one of the channels of political intervention, with 
the main motive of the politicians recognised as transferring rents to supporters. This, 
together with supportive univariate findings for excess employment goes in line with the 
results shown in Bertrand et al. (2007).  
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                             Table 6.5: Impact of political connections on employment size 
Independent Variables (1) (2) 
PC -0.087** 
(0.01) 
-0.071** 
(0.01) 
GROWTH_OPP  0.030** 
(0.02) 
CF  0.051 
(0.43) 
SIZE  0.008 
(0.61) 
LEVERAGE  -0.017 
(0.34) 
CONSTANT 
 
0.361*** 
(0.00) 
0.600*** 
(0.00) 
Time dummies  Yes Yes 
Industries dummies Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 2199 2199 
Adjusted R-square 0.108 0.204 
Lagrangian Multiplier (ch2) 152.85 113.26 
This table reports the estimates of pooled regression. The 
dependent variable in both regressions is the ratio of profitability to 
total number of employees. The Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test is 
used to test the random effects model versus the pooling regression 
with the null hypothesis that cross-sectional variance and time-
series variance components are zero. The insignificant chi2 values 
indicate that pooled regression outperform random effects model. 
P-values, adjusted for heteroskedasticity, are reported in brackets. * 
Significant and 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
Following, attention is directed towards the effect of control variables on employee 
productivity. Firms’ financial resources and size are not significant, thus indicating that these 
factors are not important determinants of employee productivity. However, the variable 
capturing firm growth opportunities is positive and statistically significant, therefore 
supporting the view that growing firms maintain higher productivity owing to their efficient 
resources management.  
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In sum, the results presented in Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 lend support for the notion of 
political intervention reducing operational efficiencies. In addition, the results strengthen the 
view that political interference in corporate activities is another type of market friction that 
drives firms into inefficient business decisions. Collectively, we are now able to indicate the 
channels through which additional financial resources—as documented in Khwaja & Mian 
(2005)—are utilised (in fact, wasted) by connected firms. These channels include investment 
inefficiencies and excessive employment. Importantly, note that the effect of interference is 
more pronounced for the latter channel, which seems a somewhat striking result. However, 
the literature on political patronage offers very contradictory evidence amongst almost every 
work, which might be rationalised by its own arguments. We may think of two such 
arguments.  
 
First, a substantial fraction of the connected firms in Pakistan are located in the constituencies 
of the connected politicians 78 . Given that unemployment is regarded as a major social 
problem in Pakistan, and under the assumption that voters are myopic, we may assert that 
voters’ support binds with employment opportunities. Accordingly, in order to maximise 
electoral support in electoral districts, politicians have to provide supporters with 
employment opportunities.  
 
Second, one can think of employment favours as a part of an exchange relationship between 
politicians and supporters. As Robinson & Torvik (2005) indicate, the politicians in fact face 
commitment problems as they have to honour their promises. Such promises of job provision 
                                               
78
 For instance, Ittafaq Textile Mills and Khalid Siraj Textile Mills, are owned by Nawaz Sharif (former Prime 
Minister) located in his constituency in the city of Lahore. Similarly, Gujarat Silk Mills is connected to 
Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi (Member of National Assembly) and is located in his constituency in the city of 
Gujarat; and Tandlianwala Sugar Mills is linked with Humayun Akhtar Khan (former Commerce Minister) 
located in his constituency of Lahore.  
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in election campaigns by politicians, with the intent of wooing potential voters, are relatively 
popular. Presumably, a politician who diverts from his promised course of action reduces his 
likelihood of being elected again. This argument is close to what is known as ‘clientelism’ in 
the literature of political science, where a politician distributes jobs or special favours in 
exchange of electoral support79 . Intuitively, clientelism is more pertinent to low-income 
economies, such as that of Pakistan, where voters’ allegiance is cheaper to buy with 
employment offer.  
 
6.5.2  Differential impact of political connections on high- and low-growth firms  
Prior financial research argues that investment opportunities available to a firm cause 
variations in financial policies, mainly investment. For instance, Smith & Watts (1992) found 
that firms with more growth opportunities employ less debt for their investment and 
distribute fewer dividends. Similarly, Gaver & Gaver (1993) and Gul (1999) report that 
growing firms generally maintain A lower debt-to-equity ratios. Viewing the relationship 
between growth opportunity and leverage from a political economic perspective, one may 
posit that high-growth firms that rely less on debt financing are, in fact, less dependent on 
political connections (as political connections matter most through preferential credit). 
Consequently, political involvement in business operation is expected to be lower 80 . 
Empirically, this conjecture is tested in this section by stratifying the sample into two broad 
categories, namely high-growth firms and low-growth firms.  
 
To examine this premise empirically, following Belghitar et al. (2011) and Dessi & 
Robertson (2003), the sample is stratified into three groups based on firms’ growth 
                                               
79
 For detailed discussion on clientelism see Robinson and Verdier (2003).  
80
 Moreover, finding in previous chapter (section 5.6.4) also asserts that performance of connected firms with 
high growth opportunities is not distorted by their political connections. Thus, of great interest is the comparison 
of political interference across firms with high and low growth opportunities.  
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opportunities, measured as price–earnings ratio. More specifically, the sampled firms are 
arranged in an ascending order based on averaged price–earnings ratio for the period 2002–
2010, the upper 40% representing high-growth firms, the lower 40% representing low-growth 
firms, whilst the remaining 20% of firms in the middle were dropped. We estimate both 
investment efficiency and excessive employment models for the two sub-samples separately. 
 
Panel A in Table 6.6 presents the results of the investment efficiency model. The regression 
results show that growth opportunities enter with positive and significant coefficients for both 
high- and low-growth firms. The magnitude of coefficient indicates that firms with more 
growth opportunities tend to have higher investment expenditure than firms with low growth 
opportunities. Following the definition of investment efficiency (sensitivity of investment 
expenditure to investment opportunities), it may be inferred that high-growth firms are more 
efficient in investment decisions than low-growth firms. As mentioned earlier, the coefficient 
on political connections is positive but insignificant. Following, the estimated coefficient on 
the interactive term shows that connections influence the investment decisions of both types 
of firm. Nevertheless, the effect of political influence on investment efficiency is relatively 
smaller for high-growth firms, which can be interpreted as reflecting less investment 
inefficiencies. Regarding control variables, the results remain largely unchanged with the 
exception of size, which loses statistical significance for both sub-samples.  
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Table 6.6: Differential impact of political connections on high and low growth firms 
Panel A: Investment efficiency model  Panel B: Employment model 
Variables Dependent variable: 
INVESTMENT 
 Variables Dependent variable: 
EMP-PROD 
 High growth Low growth   High growth Low growth 
GROWTH-OPP 0.127** 
(0.02) 
0.080* 
(0.06) 
 PC -0.068*** 
(0.00) 
-0.072** 
(0.01) 
PC 0.007 
(0.19) 
0.015 
(0.24) 
 GROWTH_OPP 0.042* 
(0.08) 
0.023** 
(0.02) 
PC * GROWTH-OPP -0.038** 
(0.04) 
-0.041** 
(0.01) 
 CF 0.074 
(0.13) 
0.038 
(0.10) 
CF 0.025 
(0.41) 
0.027 
(0.30) 
 SIZE 0.004 
(0.62) 
0.013 
(0.45) 
SIZE 0.318 
(0.61) 
0.164 
(0.73) 
 LEVERAGE -0.008 
(0.13) 
-0.011 
(0.19) 
LEVERAGE -0.003* 
(0.08) 
-0.004** 
(0.02) 
    
CONSTANT 
 
0.443*** 
(0.00) 
0.281*** 
(0.00) 
 CONSTANT 
 
0.401*** 
(0.00) 
0.726*** 
(0.00) 
Time dummies  Yes Yes  Time dummies  Yes Yes 
Industries dummies Yes Yes  Industries dummies Yes Yes 
Number of Obs 908 842  Number of Obs 908 842 
Overall R-square 0.179 0.135  Adjusted R-square 0.143 0.204 
Panel (A) & (B) represent the estimates for investment efficiency and employment models, respectively. The investment efficiency 
model is estimated by random effects model and employment model is estimated using pooled regression. The dependent variables in 
Panels (A) & (B) are the ratio of investment expenditure to the total assets and the ratio of profitability to the total number of 
employees, respectively. P-values, adjusted for heteroskedasticity, are reported in brackets. * Significant and 10%, ** significant at 5%, 
*** significant at 1%. 
 
In the next test, the alternative channel of inefficiency—excessive employment—is 
examined, with the employment model re-estimated separately for the high- and the low-
growth firms. Results are shown in Panel B of Table 6.6. A similar pattern of results emerges 
from the estimations as in Table 6.4. Both types of connected firm have excessive 
employment. Statistically, high-growth, connected firms appear to be slightly less subject to 
employment inefficiencies by the politicians.  
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Overall, the results support the conjecture that connected firms with high growth 
opportunities experience political interference less often than their counterparts with low 
growth opportunities. Moreover, consistent with the earlier finding, the effect of interference 
is more pronounced in employment decision. Finally, the analysis is also coherent with the 
findings of Zheng & Zhu (2010), although the context is different; they investigate the effects 
of political involvement in China, whilst this analysis focuses on Pakistan.  
 
6.5.3  Impact of political connections across industries 
It is well recognised that firms’ financing policies, growth -opportunities and performances 
exhibit significant variation across industries. Literature on corporate finance (Ross et al., 
2008; Frank & Goyal, 2009; Hovakimian et al., 2001) often reports such inter-industry 
differences. Essentially, firms within an industry face common forces that influence their 
operational decisions. Such forces may appear as product market interactions or as 
competitive intensity. These may also appear as industry heterogeneity in the internal asset 
composition, business risk factors, technology, or regulatory standards (Frank & Goyal, 
2009). Moreover, Biatour et al. (2011) and Bradley et al. (1984) describe that the intensity of 
R&D, advertising expenditures, level of cash holdings and earning volatility all help in terms 
of explaining inter-industry variations in the firm’s economic decisions. Following these 
arguments, it is posited that unique industry-specific factors also affect the extent of political 
interventions and corporate operational inefficiencies, and subsequently cause dissimilarities 
in investment and employment decisions across the industries.  
 
In an attempt to empirically test this conjecture, the investment efficiency and employment 
models on various industries is estimated separately in order to detect the way in which 
political connections influence the investment and employment decisions of each firm within 
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the same industry. The econometric analysis is confined to four of the largest sectors, which 
constitute over 80% of the sample. These industries include Food & Tobacco, Basic 
Industries including petroleum, Construction, and Textiles & Trade. The distribution of the 
sample across industries is provided in Table 6.1.  
 
The regression results of the investment efficiency model are shown in Panel A of Table 6.7. 
The estimated coefficient on the interaction of political connections and growth-opportunities 
is negative and statistically significant for three industries with the exception of the 
Construction industry. This indicates that political connections influence the investment 
efficiencies of firms belonging to Food & Tobacco, Basic Industries, and Textile & Trade. 
Notably, the magnitudes of coefficients show that the effect of political inefficiencies is 
significantly higher for the Food & Tobacco industry. Regarding results of other variables, all 
four sectors have positive response to available investment opportunities; however, the level 
of investment expenditure against available growth opportunities is higher in Construction 
industry. We may attribute this finding to the surge of real estate business in Pakistan in the 
last decade. Further, firm size is found to be significant only for Basic Industries & Petroleum 
and Construction industries. Lastly, cash flow does not seem to have any impact on 
investment expenditure of firms in any industry.  
 
Following, tests are carried out in order to investigate the alternative channel of inefficiency 
(excessive employment) across the industries; results are shown in Panel B of Table 6.7. The 
firms connected to politicians experience excessive employment problem, irrespective of the 
industry to which they belong. Statistically, the Textile & Trade industry is subject to most 
political interferences in the employment decision, whilst Basic Industries is found to 
experience least political interferences. As for as control variables are concerned, growth 
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opportunities insert positive impact on the employment productivity of all industries, except 
Construction industry. In contrast, firms’ financing decisions in terms of leverage have 
positive impact on labour productivity only in Construction industry. Finally, the remaining 
two variables, namely, cash flow and size do not find to have any significant effect on labour 
productivity.   
 
Taken together, the findings suggest that political intervention is higher for Food & Tobacco 
industry and Textile & Trade industry. One plausible explanation for this is that, in the 
context of Pakistan—particularly in our sample—politically connected firms are more 
concentrated in these two industries, which may cause such a pattern of political interferences 
to occur. The Textile & Trade is the largest industry in Pakistan, accounting for 
approximately 40% of the total manufacturing within the country. Three notable families—
namely Arain, Chinioti Sheikhs and Jalundhari Sheikhs—control the largest business groups 
in the Textile & Trade industry. These families not only dominate the industry but also the 
political sense of the region (Islam, 2007). Further, The News, a Pakistani newspaper, reports 
that in excess of 50% of the total sugar mills in the country (78 in 2009) are owned by main 
political leaders81. Such facts provide a good theoretical reason to believe that industries with 
a high proportion of politically connected firms are most likely to suffer high political 
intervention in terms of investment inefficiencies and excessive employment. Overall, this 
finding emphasises the significance of political connectedness as an important determinant of 
inter-industry heterogeneity; hence, this facet needs to be taken into account when examining 
cross-industry variations. 
 
                                               
81
 Sugar mills belong to Food & Tobacco industries.  
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Table 6.7: Impact of political connections across industries 
Panel A: Investment efficiency model  Panel B: Employment model 
Variables Dependent variable: INVESTMENT  Variables Dependent variable: EMP-PROD 
 Food & Tobacco Basic Industries 
& petroleum 
Construction Textile & 
Trade 
  Food & Tobacco Basic Industries 
& petroleum 
Construction Textile & Trade 
GROWTH-OPP 0.089** 
(0.02) 
0.080* 
(0.05) 
0.135*** 
(0.00) 
0.069** 
(0.01) 
 PC -0.059*** 
(0.00) 
-0.015** 
(0.01) 
-0.032*** 
(0.00) 
-0.074* 
(0.06) 
PC 0.015 
(0.22) 
0.009 
(0.14) 
0.041 
(0.19) 
0.005 
(0.27) 
 GROWTH_OPP 0.021* 
(0.05) 
0.054** 
(0.04) 
0.040 
(0.17) 
0.013** 
(0.02) 
PC * GROWTH-OPP -0.058** 
(0.04) 
-0.019*** 
(0.00) 
-0.021 
(0.10) 
-0.026** 
(0.02) 
 CF 0.046 
(0.32) 
-0.038 
(0.36) 
0.015 
(0.29) 
0.062 
(0.41) 
CF 0.106 
(0.90) 
0.044 
(0.82) 
0.014 
(0.71) 
0.010 
(0.76) 
 SIZE 0.026 
(0.70) 
0.011 
(0.58) 
-0.015 
(0.64) 
0.002 
(0.61) 
SIZE 0.117 
(0.11) 
0.069* 
(0.09) 
0.162* 
(0.08) 
0.026 
(0.14) 
 LEVERAGE -0.043 
(0.30) 
-0.016 
(0.28) 
0.068** 
(0.35) 
0.010 
(0.54) 
LEVERAGE -0.002 
(0.11) 
-0.001** 
(0.04) 
0.022 
(0.10) 
-0.013** 
(0.04) 
      
CONSTANT 
 
1.084*** 
(0.00) 
0.270*** 
(0.00) 
0.642*** 
(0.00) 
1.27*** 
(0.00) 
 CONSTANT 
 
0.988*** 
(0.00) 
1.016*** 
(0.00) 
0.614*** 
(0.00) 
0.312*** 
(0.00) 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs 292 450 304 721  Number of Obs 292 450 304 721 
Overall R-square 0.114 0.267 0.408 0.241  Adjusted R-square 0.228 0.170 0.209 0.254 
Panel (A) & (B) represent the estimates for investment efficiency and employment models, respectively. The investment efficiency model is estimated by random effects model and employment 
model is estimated using pooled regression. The dependent variables in Panels (A) & (B) are the ratio of investment expenditure to the total assets and the ratio of profitability to the total number of 
employees, respectively. P-values, adjusted for heteroskedasticity, are reported in brackets. * Significant and 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  
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6.5.4  Firm’s characteristics and political inefficiencies 
Our regression analyses confirm a direct link between the business decisions (investment and 
employment) and political connections; however, there may also be indirect links between 
these two through interactions with variables that are known to be associated with the firm’s 
investment and employment decisions. Earlier related studies recognise that firm with 
sufficient resources (both financial and non-financial) enable them to accumulate stronger 
political connections and accordingly extract more political rents from such these links. For 
instance, Faccio (2006, 2010) indicates that political connections are more widespread 
amongst firms with large internal and external financial resources. Similarly, Fraser et al. 
(2005) and Charumilind et al. (2006) report the higher value of political connections for the 
large firms. Thus, the extent to which political gain varies across firms depends a great deal 
on the firm’s specific characteristics.  
 
To examine the potentially interactive effects, the control variables are interacted with the 
main variable of interest in the respective models. In particular, in the investment efficiency 
model, the interaction term GROWTH-OPP×PC is interacted with the control terms used in 
the model, namely: CF, SIZE, and LEVERAGE. Similarly, for employment model, PC is 
interacted with GROWTH-OPP, CF, SIZE, and LEVERAGE. Econometrically, we introduce 
three double interactive terms into the investment efficiency model: GROWTH-
OPP×PC×CF, GROWTH-OPP×PC×SIZE, and GROWTH-OPP×PC ×LEVERAGE, and four 
interactive variables are introduced in the employment model: PC×GROWTH-OPP, PC×CF, 
PC×SIZE and PC×LEVERAGE. 
 
Results for the investment model are reported in Panel A of Table 6.8. The coefficients on the 
given interactive terms measure the way in which the relation between political connections 
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and investment efficiency differs across the relevant firm’s characteristics. The coefficients 
on the control variables of baseline model change at a larger extant compared with those in 
Table 6.4. Cash flow reverses the direction of the relationship, but ultimately remains 
statistically insignificant.  
Table 6.8: Regression analysis using interactive variables 
Panel A: Investment efficiency model  Panel B: Employment model 
Variables Dependent variable: 
INVESTMENT 
 Variables Dependent variable: 
EMP-PROD 
GROWTH-OPP 0.082** 
(0.01) 
 PC -0.044* 
(0.05) 
PC 0.016 
(0.28) 
 GROWTH_OPP 0.018** 
(0.04) 
PC * GROWTH-OPP -0.034** 
(0.02) 
 CF 0.074 
(0.030) 
CF -0.004 
(0.36) 
 SIZE 0.002 
(0.41) 
SIZE 0.261* 
(0.08) 
 LEVERAGE 0.056 
(0.44) 
LEVERAGE -0.009 
(0.72) 
 PC* GROWTH_OPP 0.051** 
(0.02) 
PC * GROWTH-OPP*CF -0.002 
(0.85) 
 PC*CF 0.019 
(0.73) 
PC * GROWTH-OPP*SIZE 0.164** 
(0.01) 
 PC*SIZE 
 
-0.029** 
(0.01) 
PC * GROWTH-OPP*LEVERAGE 0.014 
(0.20) 
 PC* LEVERAGE -0.014 
(0.58) 
     
CONSTANT 
 
0.184*** 
(0.00) 
 CONSTANT 
 
0.510*** 
(0.00) 
Time dummies  Yes  Time dummies  Yes 
Industries dummies Yes  Industries dummies Yes 
Number of Obs. 2199  Number of Obs. 2199 
Overall R-square 0.118  Adjusted R-square 0.134 
Panel (A) & (B) represent the estimates for investment efficiency and employment models, respectively. The investment 
efficiency model is estimated by random effects model and employment model is estimated using pooled regression. The 
dependent variables in Panels (A) & (B) are the ratio of investment expenditure to the total assets and the ratio of profitability to 
total number of employees, respectively. P-values, adjusted for heteroskedasticity, are reported in brackets. * Significant and 
10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Furthermore, leverage loses statistical significance. Regarding new interactive variables, only 
the interactive term of GROWTH-OPP×PC×SIZE enters the investment efficiency model 
with statistical significance. This indicates that political connections are linked with 
investment decisions—both directly and indirectly—though firm size. The positive sign on 
interactive term shows that political influence on investment decisions is higher in the case of 
large connected firms.  
 
Subsequently, we perform regression analysis on the employment model using interactive 
terms. The results are shown in Panel B of Table 6.8. The coefficients of the non-interactive 
variables remain materially the same as in Table 6.4. Regarding the interactive terms, two 
interactive terms are found significant. Firstly, PC×GROWTH-OPP is positive and 
significant, supporting the findings mentioned in Section 6.5.2. The findings suggest that 
efficient resource management and less reliance on political capital—which results in 
political intervention—enable growing firms to yield high labour productivity. Secondly, 
PC×SIZE is found to be statistically significant. The negative coefficient on interactive term 
supports the political economy view postulating that large firms provide a greater resource 
base for politicians to target with their objectives; therefore, such firms are more subject to 
the demands of politically motivated employment.  
 
6.5.5   Industry-adjusted measures  
In analysis, there is a potential concern of heterogeneity in investment and employment 
decisions across different industries. More specifically, there is the concern that firms’ 
sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities is unique to the industry to 
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which it belongs82. Firms in an industry face common forces that affect their investment 
decisions; therefore, there exist vast industry differences in the available growth opportunities 
and the firm’s response to such opportunities. Similarly, homogeneity in the productivity 
function of sampled firms is also a question. Such factors cause heterogeneity between 
industries. In order to alleviate these concerns and verify the robustness of the results 
presented in Table 6.4 and Table 6.5, three industry-adjusted variables are used in our 
estimations, namely industry-adjusted growth opportunities, industry-adjusted investment 
expenditure, and industry-adjusted employee productivity 83 . In aggregate, by doing so, 
industry adjusted variables remove shocks to investment and employment productivity that 
are similar to the entire industry. 
 
In the empirical work, the measurement of industry-adjusted variables is carried out as 
follows. Industry-adjusted growth opportunities is defined as: [(growth opportunities of firm 
i) minus (median value of growth opportunities for all firms in firm i’s primary two-digit SIC 
industry)], industry-adjusted investment expenditure is proxied as [(investment expenditure 
of firm i) minus (median value of investment expenditure for all the firms in firm i’s primary 
two-digit SIC industry)]; and finally, the industry-adjusted productivity of the employee is 
computed as [(employee productivity of firm i) minus (median value of employee 
productivity for all firms in firm i’s primary two-digit SIC industry)]. Note that the two-digit 
SIC distributes the sample into twelve individual categories, which is regarded as being too 
                                               
82Since it is well know that financing decisions exhibit significant differences across the industries. Literature on 
corporate finance such as Gilson (1997) and Frank and Goyal (2009), routinely indicate inter-industry variations 
in investment decisions.  
83
 This test is done as a robustness check since we have already controlled the industry with industry dummies 
effects (as an alternative technique) in our earlier estimations. Nevertheless, the role of the industry variables in 
capturing sector specific effects has been called into question (Mairesse and Sassenou, 1991). They argue that 
instead of using industry variables to pick up related effects it might be more appropriate to introduce direct 
industry measures. Thus, following Lang et al. (1996), we re-estimate our results with the industry-adjusted 
variables.  
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in-depth for this study; therefore, following Aharony et al. (2010) and Campbell (1996), this 
study re-classifies the two-digit SIC to a narrower eight-industry category. 
Panel A of Table 6.9 presents the regression estimates of the investment efficiency model 
obtained after adjusting dependent and a key explanatory variable (growth opportunities) for 
industry effects. Again, support for the hypothesis of investment inefficiencies is established. 
Although estimated coefficient for the interactive term is smaller than that in the case without 
industry adjustments (0.043), the direction of the relationship and statistical significance 
nevertheless satisfy the hypothesis of political influence on the investment decisions. 
Following, the employment model is estimated with the industry-adjusted dependent variable. 
Results shown in Panel B confirm the findings garnered previously. The negative correlation 
of industry-adjusted employee productivity with political connections does not negate the 
hypothesis that employment is one of the objectives held by politicians (as aforementioned, 
low productivity is an indication of excess employment, and here we find that political 
connection reduces the industry-adjusted employee productivity which is taken as a symptom 
of excess employment). Overall, it can be concluded that the support for both hypotheses is 
robust to industry-adjusted measures. 
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Table 6.9: Regression analysis using industry-adjusted variables 
Panel A: Investment efficiency model  Panel B: Employment model  
Variables Dependent variable: 
INVESTMENT 
 Variables Dependent variable: 
 EMP-PROD 
GROWTH-OPP 0.091* 
(0.01) 
 PC -0.066* 
(0.06) 
PC 0.015 
(0.26) 
 GROWTH_OPP 0.042** 
(0.02) 
PC * GROWTH-OPP -0.028** 
(0.01) 
 CF 0.079 
(0.38) 
CF 0.060 
(0.56) 
 SIZE -0.012 
(0.55) 
SIZE 0.286 
(0.61) 
 LEVERAGE -0.022 
(0.19) 
LEVERAGE 0.004 
(0.14) 
   
CONSTANT 
 
0.206** 
(0.01) 
 CONSTANT 
 
0.454*** 
(0.00) 
Time dummies  Yes  Time dummies  Yes 
Industries dummies Yes  Industries dummies Yes 
Number of Obs. 2199  Number of Obs. 2199 
Overall R-square 0.204  Adjusted R-square 0.093 
Panel (A) & (B) represent the estimates for investment efficiency and employment models, respectively. The 
investment efficiency model is estimated by random effects model and the employment model is estimated using 
pooled regression. The dependent variables in Panels (A) & (B) are the ratio of investment expenditure to the total 
assets and the ratio of profitability to total number of employees, respectively. P-values, adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity, are reported in brackets. * Significant and 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
6.5.6  The Heckman two-stage approach 
To address the possible endogeneity issue, Heckman two-stage model is applied on both 
investment efficiency and excessive employment models independently. More specifically, 
this approach is used to control for the firm’s selection into political activity on the basis of 
investment and employment efficiencies. The first stage of Heckman model is probit equation 
where dummy variable, PC, is regressed against instrument variable ‘location’ which takes 
the value 1 if firm is located in two largest cities of Pakistan, namely, Lahore and Karachi.. In 
addition, all control variables used in equations 1&2 which also relate to the choice of 
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political activity are also used as regressors. The second stage of this model is identical to the 
equations outlined above for investment and employment, Equations (1 & 2), except the 
addition of the Inverse Mills ratios in these equations. By doing so, we may explicitly check 
whether political connectedness still influences corporate investment and employment 
decisions after controlling for self-selection because of unobservable information. Results are 
shown in Table 6.10. 
Table 6.10: Regression analysis using Heckman two-stage approach 
Panel A: Investment model  Panel B: Employment model 
Variables Dependent variable: 
INVESTMENT 
 Variables Dependent variable: 
EMP-PROD 
GROWTH-OPP 0.096*** 
(0.00) 
 PC -0.064*** 
(0.00) 
PC 0.019 
(0.26) 
 GROWTH_OPP 0.026* 
(0.07) 
PC * GROWTH-OPP -0.046** 
(0.03) 
 CF 0.066 
(0.29) 
CF -0.019 
(0.86) 
 SIZE 0.006 
(0.35) 
SIZE 0.231* 
(0.07) 
 LEVERAGE 0.022 
(0.11) 
LEVERAGE -0.004*** 
(0.00) 
 Inverse Mills ratio(λ) 0.064 
(0.20) 
Inverse Mills ratio(λ) 0.101 
(0.31) 
   
CONSTANT 
 
0.273*** 
(0.00) 
 CONSTANT 
 
0.404*** 
(0.00) 
Time dummies  Yes  Time dummies  Yes 
Industries dummies Yes  Industries dummies Yes 
Number of Obs. 2199  Number of Obs. 2199 
Overall R-square 0.235  Adjusted R-square 0.294 
This table reports the second-stage results from the Heckman selection model. Panel (A) & (B) represent the estimates for 
investment efficiency and employment models, respectively. The investment efficiency model is estimated by random effects 
model and employment model is estimated using pooled regression. The dependent variables in Panels (A) & (B) are the ratio of 
investment expenditure to the total assets and the ratio of profitability to the total number of employees, respectively. The 
inverse Mills ratio is obtained from the probit regression (first-stage of Heckman selection model). P-values, adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity, are reported in brackets. * Significant and 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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The inverse Mills ratio is not significant for both the investment inefficiency and the 
excessive employment models. It indicates that our results do not suffer sample selection 
bias. Our coefficient for the effect of political connections on the sensitivity of investment 
expenditure to investment opportunity maintains the same negative sign as in the earlier 
specifications. Similarly, the coefficient of the political connections in excess employment 
model is also negative and statistically significant. Thus, we may conclude that after 
controlling effects of unobserved information which may influence firms to be politically 
active, there is still a significant negative effect of political connectedness on investment and 
employment decisions.  
 
6.5.7   Political inefficiencies across government periods 
In this section, it is recognised that the data sample period covers two elected government 
terms. Amongst these governments, the first government, 2002-2007, is led by a military 
dictator, whilst the second is a democratic civil government, 2008-2010. Hitherto, political 
environment for entire sample period is considered as uniform. However, now as robustness 
check, we distinguish between these two government periods and partition the sample period 
into first-government (2002-2007) and second-government periods (2008-2010). The 
underlying argument, as discussed earlier in Chapter 5, is that the military dictator builds 
supporting political coalitions by distributing financial resources and bestowing political 
power to them (Escriba-Folch & Wright, 2010). Consequently, the extent of political 
interferences in business operations is expected to be much higher in the dictatorial period 
than the civil democratic period. Empirically, we test this conjecture by re-estimating 
investment efficiency and excess employment models on both periods separately and 
compare the impacts of political connections on investment and employment decisions across 
government periods.  
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Table 6.11 reports the results of subsample regressions. In Panel A, the coefficients on PC are 
still insignificant in both the government periods. Next, the interaction term has negative and 
significant coefficients indicating the presence of investment inefficiencies in both 
government periods.  The magnitude of coefficients on interaction term is not considerably 
different across the periods. Thus, we may not claim higher extent of investment 
inefficiencies in the dictatorial regime as compared to the democratic regime. Among control 
variables, firm size and leverage continue to insert positive and negative impact on 
investment expenditure, respectively. The regression results in Panel B indicate that the 
estimated coefficients on PC are negative in both government periods. More specifically, the 
coefficients of PC in the first government and the second government periods are 0.092 and 
0.057, respectively. It represents that the extent of political interference is higher in the first-
government period supporting our argument of higher level of political patronage in the 
dictatorial regime. The results for control variables remain largely unchanged as presented in 
Table 6.5. 
In summary, it is found that political connections insert similar effect on firm investment 
decision in both government periods, whereas exert a large negative effect on firm 
employment decision in the first government period. These findings support the view that 
excessive employment is an important channel through which politicians benefit themselves 
and this practice is more pronounced in the dictatorial regime.   
 
 
 
 
 
 220 
 
 
Table 6.11: Regression analysis across political regimes 
Panel A: Investment model  Panel B: Employment model 
Variables Dependent variable: 
 INVESTMENT 
 Variables Dependent variable: 
EMP-PROD 
 First-government Second-government    First-government Second-government  
GROWTH-OPP 0.096*** 
(0.00) 
0.101*** 
(0.00) 
 PC -0.092** 
(0.01) 
0.057** 
(0.04) 
PC 0.009 
(0.18) 
0.012 
(0.24) 
 GROWTH_OPP 0.028** 
(0.04) 
0.031** 
(0.04) 
PC * GROWTH-OPP -0.037** 
(0.01) 
-0.035** 
(0.04) 
 CF 0.048 
(0.60) 
0.056 
(0.87) 
CF -0.044 
(0.96) 
-0.028 
(0.81) 
 SIZE 0.009 
(0.56) 
0.008 
(0.62) 
SIZE 0.290** 
(0.03) 
0.307* 
(0.09) 
 LEVERAGE -0.014 
(0.28) 
-0.021 
(0.30) 
LEVERAGE -0.012** 
(0.01) 
-0.007*** 
(0.00) 
    
CONSTANT 
 
0.383*** 
(0.00) 
0.241*** 
(0.00) 
 CONSTANT 
 
0.357*** 
(0.00) 
0.479*** 
(0.00) 
Time dummies  Yes Yes  Time dummies  Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 2199 2199  Number of Obs. 2199 2199 
Overall R-square 0.282 0.184  Adjusted R-square 0.227 0.316  
This table reports the second-stage results from the Heckman selection model. Panel (A) & (B) represent the estimates for investment 
efficiency and employment models, respectively. The investment efficiency model is estimated by random effects model and employment 
model is estimated using pooled regression. The dependent variables in Panels (A) & (B) are the ratio of investment expenditure to the 
total assets and the ratio of profitability to total number of employees, respectively. First-government and second-government comprised of 
periods from 2002-2007 and 2008-2010, respectively. P-values, adjusted for heteroskedasticity, are reported in brackets. * Significant and 
10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
6.5.8   Economic welfare cost of political inefficiencies 
In this section, an attempt is made to quantify the economy-wide cost of excessive 
employment. It seems rather audacious to estimate the economic cost at large of the political 
interference in the connected firms since there are likely varieties of other costs related with 
the excessive employment that are not measured. Nevertheless, in this case, the objective is 
merely to approximate the costs that can be concluded from the results. Theoretically, a 
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welfare loss only arises if the real return (labour productivity) on employees’ investment is 
less than that of resources invested elsewhere. 84  Empirically, this cost of excessive 
employment is calculated by comparing the labour productivity of connected firms with that 
of non-connected firms.  
 
Following Claessens et al. (2008) and Khwaja & Mian (2005), welfare loss is estimated 
through two steps. First, the differential in Tobin’s Q is taken in order to measure the 
difference in employment investment return. Importantly, here we assume that Tobin’s Q 
captures only the efficiency of employment investment rather than the overall investment, 
which includes both employment and non-employment investment. As can be seen in 
Equation 3, the coefficient of the interaction between political connections and Tobin’s Q—
defined as the market value of equity plus book value of the total debts divided by the book 
value of the total assets—is negative, therefore indicating that Tobin’s Q of the connected 
firms is 0.031 lower than non-connected firms85. This represents the misallocation of capital 
through excessive employment amongst connected firms. Second, if we next assume that 
employment size is the direct representation of investment level in employment, the 
coefficient of PC in Table 6.5 can be inferred as the annual employment investment of 
connected firms as 0.071 higher than non-connected firms. Combining these estimates, it can 
be established that welfare loss from excess (inefficient) employment is 0.220% (0.071% × 
0.031% =) each year of the average firm’s total assets.  
 
;<' = 	 0.031   0.742                                                    335 
                                               
84
 Employee investment mostly refers to capital investment that firms make in the workplace for employee 
inducement, such as pay, benefits, career opportunities (Romzek, 1990).  
85
 The pooled regression includes industry and time effects and R2 of the estimation is 0.084.  
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On average, our sample of 380 firms—including both connected and non-connected—
comprises total assets of approximately 1,400 million PKR in 2010. Assuming that 
employment investment distortion is similar for all 380 listed firms, the gross welfare cost of 
the political interference in the connected firms is approximately 1.8 billion PKR (= 380 × 
1400 × 0.00220) each year, or about 0.19% of GDP annually (GDP of Pakistan in 2010 was 
618,530 million PKR). Note that this figure is substantially smaller than the estimates of 
Khwaja & Mian (2005) for Pakistan. One should bear in mind that we estimate only the cost 
of distortion in the employment investment. In addition, our sample is relatively small, and 
includes only listed non-financial firms. Therefore, we caution against generalising this 
outcome more broadly in the context of any on-going policy debate on political patronage.   
 
6.6  Conclusion 
Unlike the previous studies that concentrate on the firm’s advantages of political connections, 
in this chapter, focus is instead directed towards the opposite perspective. Specifically, we 
investigate the possible adverse impacts of political intervention in business operations in two 
ways: investment inefficiencies and excessive employment. The analysis is based on a 
sample of 2,199 firms’ year observations of Pakistani-listed firms for the period 2002–2010. 
The results support our hypotheses that political intervention adversely affects business 
investment and employment decisions. More specifically, investment efficiency—measured 
as sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities—is distorted by political 
intervention; however, political intervention has a significant effect on investment 
(allocation) efficiency, but not on the level of investment expenditure. Regarding corporate 
employment decisions, the negative correlation of labour productivity with political 
connections indicates that excessive employment is one of the channels of political 
intervention that impairs employment behaviour. Importantly, the distortional effect of 
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political involvement is greater for firms’ employment decisions than investment decisions. 
The results are robust to industry-adjusted measures of investment expenditure, growth 
opportunities, and employee productivity. In sum, we conclude that political interference in 
Pakistan harms the overall efficiency of firms’ investment, and distorts employment 
decisions. Taken together, the result, whilst certainly worthwhile by itself, presents insights 
into the forces that shape investment and employment decisions, particularly in less 
developed economies. 
 
The differential effect of political interference on low- and high-growth opportunity firms is 
further examined. The results show that connected firms with high growth opportunities 
experience political interference less often than their peers with low growth opportunities. 
Regarding the effects of firms’ characteristics, results show that political interference in 
investment decisions is greater in large connected firms than small firms. Moreover, we have 
shown that our base results are robust to sample selection bias. Further, the extent of political 
patronage in terms of excess employment is higher in first-government period. Finally, our 
estimates show that there is a welfare loss of 0.15% of GDP each year due to employment 
distortion from political interference.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this concluding chapter is to summarise the results of this research and provide 
some possible ideas for future research. The subsequent section briefly restates the main 
purpose of this research study. This will be followed by the review of empirical results of the 
three analytical chapters. The contributions of the study are discussed in the next section. 
Finally, the last section discusses the limitation of the study and suggests some future 
research avenues.  
 
7.2 Summary of the research questions 
Political connections is a prevalent phenomenon around the world; however, it is argued 
widely that the prevalence of political connections is considerably higher in developing 
countries where an external governance structure is ineffective. Essentially, dependence on 
relational contracting through establishing political connections stems from inadequacies in 
formal institutions and market intermediaries that make arm’s-length contracting unreliable. 
From this perspective, political connections might be seen as a substitute for ineffective 
financial system; however, essentially, the purpose of firms establishing connections with 
politicians is to gain political favours with significant economic value. Despite a considerable 
amount of research attempting to examine the role of political capital in developing 
economies, thus far, relatively little is known about the detailed workings of political 
connections. 
 
The purpose of this research is to depict a complete picture of the function of political capital 
by investigating the detailed working of political connections in the developing economy. For 
this purpose, data is used from Pakistan over the period 2002–2010. By employing Pakistani 
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firm-level data, the study addresses the following three fundamental political economy 
questions: 
 
1. Do political connections help connected firms in accessing leverage? 
2. What is the impact of political connections on the performance of connected firms? 
3. What are the channels through which politicians may influence the business 
operational efficiencies? 
 
7.3 Research findings 
In order to accomplish the aforementioned research objectives, this study has been classified 
into three parts: the first part (Chapter Two) is theoretical in nature, and provides a survey of 
literature on the firm leverage, performance, and the impact of political connections on 
financing policy and performance; the second part (Chapter Three) describes the data used in 
this study; and lastly, the third part is empirical in nature and comprises three analysis 
chapters. The first empirical chapter (Chapter Four) examines the impacts of political 
connections on the level of leverage of the connected firms. It is followed by Chapter Five, 
which concerns the impacts of political connections on the performance of the connected 
firms. The last chapter (Chapter Six) studies the channels through which politicians intervene 
in business activities. The main findings of this study are presented here, which are based on 
the results of the three empirical chapters.  
 
Political connections and leverage: New evidence from Pakistan 
Using pooled regressions, Chapter Four tests the significance of political connections in 
terms of access to leverage. The estimated coefficient on political connections has a positive 
value, which is found to be statistically significant. It indicates that the connected firms—
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defined as if its director participates in an election—are more levered than non-connected 
firms. Results support the political lending hypothesis in the Pakistani credit market. In the 
next step, leverage is divided based on debt maturity, and dependent variables are redefined 
as long-term leverage and short-term leverage. Results show that the positive effect of 
connections remained only for long-term loans, whilst the firm’s political connections do not 
have any effect on short-term finance. The overall results remained significant after 
controlling for the firm characteristics. In sum, results provide evidence of preferential 
treatment of the connected firms and show that political connectedness appears to be a 
determining factor of financing decision of firms operating within the Pakistani market.  
 
This chapter extends this analysis further by examining whether or not this preferential 
treatment varies with the strength of the firms’ politician, particularly whether it affects 
whether or not politician holds office or belong to the ruling party. For this purpose, 
connected firms are stratified according to the strength of their politician by introducing two 
dummies in the baseline specification. The first dummy discerns the firms belonging to the 
winning or losing politician; the second dummy differentiates between the firms having 
politicians that are members of the winning party or the opposition party. In order to 
empirically test this conjecture, two separate pooled regressions were run in order to check 
the politician winning effect and party winning effect. Results show that having connections 
with a winning politician or politician affiliated to the winning parties (coalition) has a larger 
impact on the firm’s total and long-term leverage, implying that the benefits associated with 
political connections depend on the electoral outcomes.  
 
Subsequently, this chapter focuses on the role of firm-specific characteristics in financing the 
decisions of connected firms. The regression results find limited support for the importance 
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of these determinants in explaining access to leverage. More specifically, the positive effect 
of political connections is driven mainly by the firm size and business group affiliation. In 
other words, firm size and business group affiliation have an increasing effect on the 
borrowing capabilities of the connected firms. On the other hand, connections underplay the 
significance of collateral. Firms with connections with politicians are seen to need much less 
collateral to borrow than firms without connections. Lastly, the remaining standard firm 
characteristics that are widely used as determinants of leverage—namely: profitability, 
growth opportunities, and foreign ownership—do not seem to play any significant role in 
financing decisions of the connected firms. 
 
As a robustness check, baseline results are re-estimated mainly in two ways: first, to take into 
account the possible endogeneity issue pertaining to the relation between political 
connections and leverage, the regression is re-estimated using the Heckman two-stage model; 
and second, in order to facilitate the comparison with prior studies, the alternative definition 
of growth opportunities, Tobin’s Q, is used in the estimation. The achieved results are robust 
to potential endogeneity issues, and alternative estimation techniques. 
 
Political connections and firm performance: New evidence from a developing country 
The next empirical study (Chapter Five) examines the impact of political connections on firm 
performance. To measure firm performance two accounting-based proxies, namely return on 
assets and return on equity are utilised. The empirical strategy in this chapter is based on the 
instrumental variable approach, two-stage regression analysis. Using the panel data of 
Pakistani listed firms ranging 2002–2010, the regression results show that those firms with 
political connections have poorer performance when measured as return on assets than non-
connected firms. Similar results are found for return on equity—an alternative measure of 
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performance. The results for both measures are sustained when the other potential 
determinants of firm performance are controlled. 
 
The chapter proceeds to analyse whether or not the impact of connectedness on performance 
differs systematically in different political environments. The sample period, notably 2002–
2010, covers two contrasting government terms: the first elected government (2002–2007) is 
led by a military dictator, whilst the second is a democratic civil government (2008–2010). In 
this regard, considering the different political nature of the governments, the impact of 
connections is expected to be different in both government periods. The literature on 
authoritarianism asserts that military dictator builds supporting political coalitions whose 
loyalty is largely dependent on obtaining patronage resources from the dictator (Escriba-
Folch & Wright, 2010). In order to maintain such coalition, it is necessary for the dictator to 
distribute benefits to the coalition. The extent of political patronage therefore tends to be 
much higher in military dictator regime than civil democratic government. If this is the case, 
when considering the positive effect of political connections on firm performance, it may be 
argued that the value of political connections in terms of firm performance should be higher 
in dictatorial regime. In order to conduct this analysis, the sample is stratified into two broad 
categories: first-government period and second-government period. The cross-sectional 
regression based on standard model of performance is then estimated for each sample 
separately. More specifically, in the first government period, firm performance (as the 
dependent variable) in 2007 and explanatory variables over the period 2002–2006 are 
measured, and for the second-government period, firm performance (as the dependent 
variable) in 2010 and explanatory variables over the period 2008–2009 are measured.  
 
 229 
 
Using the two-stage cross-sectional regression, it can be seen that the estimated coefficient on 
political connections is negative and significant for both periods; however, in contrast to this 
prediction, the magnitude of coefficients show that the negative impact of connections is 
more pronounced in the first-government period, providing evidence of excessive managerial 
inefficiencies and the rent-extraction of affiliated politicians in the dictatorship regime. 
 
From the above analysis, it can be seen that a direct relationship has been established between 
political connections and firm performance. In the subsequent step, the indirect effect of 
political connections via firm-specific characteristics is examined in relation to the 
performance of the connected firms. More specifically, whether or not the negative 
relationship between political connections and firm performance varies across firm groups is 
examined based on size, ownership and group affiliation. The estimated coefficients on the 
interaction terms between size and political connections, and business group and political 
connections, are statistically significant. Consistent with our sub-hypothesis, the negative 
coefficient on interactive term between size and political connections suggests that the large 
firms are subject to more severe performance distortions than small firms. Moreover, the 
positive coefficient on business group and political connections indicates that the 
performance of connected firms increases if they also belong to business groups. 
 
In the context of growth opportunities available to firms, a similar estimation exercise for the 
high- and the low-growth sub-samples was carried out, as in the last chapter. The positive and 
significant coefficient on high-growth firms indicates that political connections exert positive 
impact on the performance of firms with more growth options. The result is in line with the 
hypothesis and the earlier findings of the previous chapter (Chapter Four), which, owing to 
less dependence on debt, shows that the performance of the growing firms is not distorted by 
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the connected politician. On the other hand, the performance of low-growth firms has an 
inverse relationship with political connections, thus emphasising that political connections 
distort performance. Overall, results indicate that firms with low growth opportunities are 
prone to the negative effects associated with political connectedness on their performances. 
 
Finally, at the end of Chapter Five, the sensitivity analysis is run in order to check the 
robustness of the main results. For this purpose, a market-based measure of performance, 
Tobin’s Q, is adopted so as to examine the robustness of base model results. The estimated 
results remain unchanged with the Tobin’s Q as a dependent variable, which shows the 
robustness of the earlier results.  
 
Political connections and operational inefficiencies: Evidence from a developing country 
Chapter Six examines the relationship between political intervention and the efficiency of 
business operations. More specifically, it investigates the channels through which politicians 
intervene in the business activities. To examine this research premise, two possible 
operational inefficiencies that political interventions may cause are proposed: the investment 
inefficiency and the excess employment. In the empirical strategy, two independent empirical 
models are estimated: the former investigates the effects of political intervention on 
investment, whilst the latter examines employment decisions. Using the Pakistani listed non-
financial firms from 2002–2010, results for the first investment efficiency model show that 
the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities is weaker for connected 
firms, thus supporting the hypothesis of investment inefficiencies caused by political 
interferences. On the other hand, the negative relationship of employee productivity with 
political connections lends evidence to the hypothesis that excessive employment is one of 
the channels of political intervention. Importantly, the effect of interference is more 
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pronounced for employment decisions. Our results reveal that the presence of clientelism in 
the Pakistani market—where politicians maximise the electoral support by distributing jobs—
favours in exchange of electoral support.  
 
Following the idea of the previous chapters, this chapter also examines whether or not 
political intervention relates to the growth opportunities available to firms. As noted earlier, 
the sample is un-pooled in relation to high- and low-growth firms, and baseline models are 
re-estimated for sub-samples. The results achieved support this conjecture, and further show 
that the connected firms with high growth opportunities experience political interference less 
often than their peers with low growth opportunities. Subsequently, this chapter seeks to 
explore the indirect links between these two through interactions with variables that are 
known to be associated with the firm’s investment and employment decisions. Results show 
an indirect link between political intervention and operational efficiencies through firm size 
and ownership.  
 
This chapter also deals with the potential concern of heterogeneity in investment expenditure 
across different industries. More specifically, in an attempt to control the industry differences 
in the sample, industry-adjusted variables are employed in the baseline models. With the 
industry-adjusted variables, results confirm that political relationships distort the investment 
and employment decisions of the connected firms. 
 
Finally, in an attempt to depict the severity of this problem within the economy, this chapter 
offers a sense of economy-wide costs caused by political intervention. The results 
demonstrate that an additional 0.15% of GDP is lost each year owing to such political 
distortions in employment decisions. 
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7.4 Research contribution 
We conduct three independent empirical studies in order to achieve the aforementioned 
objectives of the thesis. The contribution of each empirical study is as described below. 
 
The first study makes both theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature, which 
builds-up the political capital debate. The findings are salient with on-going research on the 
applicability of the Trade-off and Pecking order theories. Considering the preferential 
treatment to connected firms in the credit market, easy access to credit allures these firms to 
maintain high leverage, which contends the proposed financing hierarchy of Pecking order 
theory. In addition, political connections substitute the importance of physical assets as 
collateral in financing decisions, which notably contradicts the predictions of Trade-off and 
Pecking order theories. From an empirical perspective, the results first enrich the extant 
literature on corporate patronage by exploring both the relation between connections and 
leverage, and the impact of political strength of connected politicians on corporate leverage. 
In so doing, the leverage is split on the basis of maturity structure, and provides evidence, for 
the first time, that the impacts of connectedness are more pronounced for long-term debt. 
Largely, our results lend support to the crony capitalism view that Pakistani firms benefit 
from political connections. Prior empirical research in this sphere is based mainly on data 
from the US and other developed economies with a private, or quasi-private, banking sector. 
Employing data from Pakistan facilitated the examination of the politics-leverage nexus in a 
state-controlled banking environment that varies significantly from those of other countries. 
Secondly, this analysis adds to those studies focused on the traditional determinants of 
financing decision—particularly in developing economies. Furthermore, the analysis 
emphasises the significance of political connectedness as an important determinant of 
leverage that cannot be overlooked.  
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In order to pursue the second objective of the thesis, we contribute to the literature on 
political connections and firms’ performances in several ways. Firstly, the study contributes 
to Agency theory by identifying political connections as a source of agency problem that 
deteriorates firm performance. Secondly, we examine the impact of political connections on 
firm performance in two contrasting political settings, namely the autocratic regime and the 
democratic regime. Thirdly, our work broadens the literature on political connections by 
demonstrating that the impact of political connectedness on firm performance is subject to 
political environment (autocratic and democratic), which shows a step towards reconciling 
the mixed empirical findings on corporate political connections. Although previous studies 
have extensively documented the relationship between growth options and firm performance, 
this has nevertheless been generally unheeded in the political connection’s standpoint. To fill 
this gap, this study considers the role of growth opportunities and identifies that the impact of 
political connectedness on firm performance can be shaped by growth opportunities available 
to a firm. Lastly, the study provides a useful addition to the nascent strand of literature on the 
impacts of ownership structure on firm performance in the developing economies.  
 
Finally, the third study contributes to the literature mainly in three ways. Firstly, we 
empirically investigate hypotheses based on theoretical perspectives on business operations in 
the same study. Secondly, it identifies and demonstrates investment inefficiencies and 
excessive employment as channels through which political connections affect the firm’s 
economic decisions. In other words, the study recognises political connections as a market 
friction, which increases agency cost and ultimately averts firms from making optimal 
decisions. By showing this, study adds an explicit dimension to the Agency cost theory that is 
not found in conventional principal-agent literature. Thirdly and finally, the study contributes 
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to the corporate investment literature, which is based mainly on standard corporate finance 
theories. The results indicate the significant role of political ties in the decision of capital 
investment; thus, it can be stated that firm investment decisions cannot be effectively studied 
without consideration being directed towards the dominant effects of corporate political 
connections.  
 
In sum, the results provide new insights into the ways in which political connections operates, 
and also deepens understanding of the consequences of political connections. More 
specifically, it is hoped that light we shed on the relationship between the politicians and 
businesses will enrich the existing understanding of business dynamics in developing 
economies. These results are not particular to only one country; rather, these findings might 
be generalised to other economies characterised by similar political and institutional settings. 
 
7.5 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
This research examines the business–politics relationship, and further provides insight into 
the workings of the political connections. However, limitations do exist in this study, which 
also highlights the future research avenue.  
 
Firstly, this study identifies corporate political connectedness through corporate Boards of 
Directors; other mechanisms geared towards establishing political relations—such as lobbing 
and advocacy advertising—have not been incorporated in the study. It is worth suggesting, 
therefore, that a larger research study be conducted by including alternative methods of 
establishing political ties, which may able to identify and contrast the impacts of various 
corporate political activities on firm-level outcomes. Provided that the theoretical arguments 
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and findings here are not simply set aside, such a research would indeed be a stimulating 
reassessment of the results presented in this study.  
 
Secondly, the unavailability of data could not facilitate the identification of the year when 
political connections were established; therefore, as a natural extension of this research, one 
could measure the impact of political connections by contrasting the financing policies, 
performance, and operational efficiencies of firms in pre-and post-connection periods. 
 
On a related point, owing to the constraints of data availability, an interesting dimension that 
has not been taken into consideration in this study is the alternative rent-seeking mechanism. 
As in the first empirical chapter, the impact of political connections is examined on firm 
leverage; however, other channels through which benefits are accrued are not included in the 
study. As Desai & Olofgard (2011) highlight, in developing nations where cronyism is a 
pernicious feature of their economies, such channels typically take the form of lower 
taxation, subsidies, greater market shares, and import quotas. Thus, expanding the study by 
including such mechanisms of rent-seeking may prove beneficial in terms of widening our 
understanding of the relationship between politics and business, particularly in developing 
economies. 
 
Thirdly, our analysis could not discern the impact of political connectedness according to 
geographic regions. As prior research (Li et al., 2008) has shown, the effect of political 
connections depends on the institutional environment and regional development; the lack of 
access to institutional variables constrained us to pursue this research avenue. Nevertheless, 
when striving to investigate whether or not political connections are more important in 
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regions with weaker markets and inefficient legal systems remains a fruitful avenue for 
further study.  
 
Fourthly, since our data comprises only listed non-financial firms, our estimates for the 
economy-wide costs of excessive employment could not accurately project the actual 
intensity of political inefficiencies problem. Listed firms, however, only represent a small 
portion of all Pakistani firms, and might simply be a cadre of firms decided to be listed on 
stock markets. There might also be other politically connected firms that have chosen to 
remain unlisted; hence, caution should be taken in generalising the results as their 
applicability might be limited to the distinct environmental context of Pakistani firms. Future 
research could probe the question of social welfare loss more deeply by including unlisted 
connected firms.  
 
Fifthly, one interesting extension of this strand is the impact of political connectedness on the 
financial constraints of connected firms. As accessing external finance is a critical problem 
for the development of firms operating in less developed economies, therefore, these 
constrained firms are highly dependent on internal capital. However, some firms mitigate 
these financial constraints by establishing relationships with the politicians. A large body of 
literature (e.g. Fazzari et al., 1988; Harris et al., 2000) measure financial constraints through 
investment-cash flow sensitivity. Thus, it would be fruitful to explore this avenue further and 
find out whether or not political connections reduce financial constrains of the connected 
firms. Put alternatively, to what extent the investment cash flow sensitivity varies across 
connected and non-connected firms.  
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Regarding estimation technique, to control the sample selection bias, propensity score 
matching technique can also be utilized to counter-check the results of Heckman sample 
selection model. Propensity score matching technique is a statistical matching technique 
which tries to measure the impact of treatment. It yields the predicted probability of treatment 
obtained from the fitted regression model (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983).  
 
Finally, there is the suggestion that future research may address the impact of political 
connections on firms’ cash holdings, which is regarded as being an important aspect of 
corporate financing policy. It would be particularly noteworthy to investigate whether 
political connections substitute or complement the theoretical motives of corporate cash 
holdings. Additionally, the question could also be posed as to whether this relationship varies 
across industries, as well as whether political influence is more nuanced for winning 
politicians. Such research questions warrant further and more in-depth investigation.  
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